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Abstract 
 
 
It is undisputed that the world’s securities markets are becoming increasingly international 
and increasingly integrated. The internationalization of the world’s securities markets is one 
of the most significant developments affecting the securities markets of many nations. “How 
should regulators respond?” is an issue that is hotly contested. The purpose of this thesis is 
not to introduce a new theory but rather to offer a comprehensive analysis of past and present 
practice, in order to identify what is effective and what is not.  
 
There are three competing approaches to international securities regulation – harmonization, 
regulatory competition and cooperation. Thus the thesis analyzes these three leading current 
theoretical arguments in turn as paradigms for international securities regulation. On this basis, 
the paper will focus on these three approaches and address the fundamental questions posed by 
the internationalization of securities markets: which regulatory approach is the proper and best 
way to govern securities regulation in the new international market? Are there any areas which 
need to be improved? And therefore, how can international regulation be improved? The thesis 
will answer these questions in two ways: in theory and in practical application. With regard to 
theory, the thesis examines the definitions and arguments given to each approach. 
Harmonization is the idea that rules and regulations should be standardized across countries as 
much as possible. In contrast to the harmonization is the regulatory competition approach. 
Under this model, countries do not coordinate with one another – each country is free to enact 
whatever rules and regulations it chooses. Whereas, the third approach cooperation 
traditionally is an instrument to reduce conflicts and tensions. International cooperation is 
defined as conscious policy coordination among states. On a practical level, the thesis 
delineates the current stage of harmonization, regulatory competition and cooperation 
developments in the EU, US, as well as internationally.  
 
It should be recognized that each of the three securities regulatory approaches analyzed in this 
thesis have contributed much towards international securities regulation. However, as 
discussed each approach has its problems, none is perfect. As long as there are regulations, 
there will be abuses and room for improvements. One of major problem in the international 
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arena is that there are no international law-making institutions vested with legal authority to 
address these issues. Instead of a formal international securities regulator there is a set of 
international institutions which include a limited number of countries which produce standards 
and norms that are then adopted by national authorities on a voluntary basis. Because of the 
diversity, complexity, and universality of issues likely to continue to arise over the next 
decade, a single international body should be considered to facilitate world cooperation in 
addressing these issues. 
 
 
 
 
  
4
 
Contents 
Table of Legislation ..........................................................................10 
List of Abbreviations .........................................................................15 
 
 
Introduction ...................................................................................17 
 
Chapter One: Securities Markets and Securities Exchanges 
1.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................... 22 
1.2 The Characteristics of Securities Markets ........................................................................ 22 
1.2.1 The Emergence and Development of Securities Markets............................................ 22 
1.2.2 Securities Markets and Economic Development ......................................................... 23 
1.2.3 The Typology of Securities Markets............................................................................ 25 
1.2.4 The Functions and Dealing Systems of Securities markets ......................................... 27 
1.3 The Characteristics of Securities Exchanges .................................................................... 29 
1.3.1 Defining a Securities Exchange ................................................................................... 29 
1.3.1.1 Securities Exchange as a Firm ................................................................................ 30 
1.3.1.2 Securities Exchange as a Regulator ........................................................................ 31 
1.3.1.3 Securities Exchange as a Regulated Entity ............................................................. 32 
1.3.2 The Development of Securities Exchanges ................................................................. 33 
1.3.2.1 The birth of securities exchanges............................................................................ 33 
1.3.2.2 Securities Exchanges Demutualization................................................................... 34 
1.3.2.3 Conflict of Interests under Demutualized Securities Exchanges ............................ 38 
 
Chapter Two: Securities Regulation and Securities Markets Regulators 
2.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................... 41 
2.2 What is securities regulation? ........................................................................................... 41 
2.2.1 The History of Securities Regulation........................................................................... 42 
2.2.1.1 The Era of Self-regulation....................................................................................... 42 
2.2.1.2 The Era of Government Regulation ........................................................................ 44 
2.2.2 The Relationship between Company Law and Securities Regulation ......................... 47 
2.2.3 The Scope of Securities Regulation ............................................................................. 49 
2.2.4 The Objectives of Securities Regulation...................................................................... 51 
  
5
 
2.3 Securities Markets Regulator ............................................................................................ 53 
2.3.1 National Public Securities Markets Regulators ........................................................... 53 
2.3.1.1 The Rationale of National Public Regulator ........................................................... 53 
2.3.1.2 The Roles of National Public Regulators................................................................ 55 
2.3.2 The Division of Regulatory Responsibilities ............................................................... 56 
2.3.2.1 The American Type ................................................................................................ 57 
2.3.2.2 The British Type ..................................................................................................... 59 
2.3.3 The Functions of Securities Markets Regulators ......................................................... 61 
2.3.3.1 Rules-based Approach ............................................................................................ 61 
2.3.3.2 Principles-based Approach ..................................................................................... 63 
 
Chapter Three: Internationalization 
3.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................... 68 
3.2 The Characteristics of Internationalization ....................................................................... 69 
3.2.1 Defining Internationalization ....................................................................................... 69 
3.2.2 The Process and Illustration of Securities Markets Internationalization ..................... 70 
3.3 Driving Forces of Internationalization.............................................................................. 73 
3.3.1 Capital Imbalances....................................................................................................... 73 
3.3.2 Technological Innovations........................................................................................... 75 
3.3.3 The Advent of Modern Portfolio Theories .................................................................. 75 
3.3.4 Deregulation of the Major Securities Markets............................................................. 76 
3.4 The Influences of Internationalization of Securities Markets........................................... 78 
3.4.1 Consolidation ............................................................................................................... 78 
3.4.2 Access to International Securities Market ................................................................... 80 
3.4.3 Financial Infrastructure ................................................................................................ 80 
3.4.4 The Risks ..................................................................................................................... 81 
3.5 Calling for International Securities Regulation ................................................................ 85 
 
Chapter Four: Theory of International Securities Regulation 
4.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................... 88 
4.2 Main Theories ................................................................................................................... 89 
4.2.1 The Theory of Harmonization...................................................................................... 89 
4.2.1.1 Defining Harmonization ......................................................................................... 89 
  
6
 
4.2.1.2 The Relationship between the Concepts ................................................................. 90 
4.2.2 The Theory of Regulatory Competition....................................................................... 91 
4.2.3 The Theory of Cooperation.......................................................................................... 94 
4.3 The Relationship among Harmonization, Competition and Cooperation......................... 97 
 
Chapter Five: Harmonization 
5.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................... 99 
5.2 The Rationales for Harmonization.................................................................................... 99 
5.2.1 Common Reasons ........................................................................................................ 99 
5.2.2 EC Reasons ................................................................................................................ 101 
5.2.3 US Reasons ................................................................................................................ 102 
5.3 The Process of Harmonization........................................................................................ 102 
5.3.1 The Evolution of US Harmonization ......................................................................... 103 
5.3.2 The Evolution of EC Harmonization ......................................................................... 105 
5.3.3 The Evolution of International Harmonization.......................................................... 108 
5.4 The Techniques of Harmonization.................................................................................. 110 
5.4.1 Detailed Harmonization ............................................................................................. 110 
5.4.2 Minimum Harmonization........................................................................................... 110 
5.4.3 Mutual Recognition.................................................................................................... 111 
5.4.4 Home Country Control .............................................................................................. 112 
5.4.5 Single Passport........................................................................................................... 113 
5.4.6 Maximum Harmonization .......................................................................................... 114 
5.5 The Scope of Harmonization .......................................................................................... 115 
5.5.1 The Disclosure Regime.............................................................................................. 115 
5.5.1.1 At National Level.................................................................................................. 115 
5.5.1.2 At Regional Level ................................................................................................. 116 
5.5.1.3 At International Level ........................................................................................... 119 
5.5.2 Accounting Standards ................................................................................................ 120 
5.5.2.1 At National Level.................................................................................................. 121 
5.5.2.2 At Regional Level ................................................................................................. 122 
5.5.2.3 International Level ................................................................................................ 124 
5.5.3 Capital Adequacy Rules for Securities Firms ............................................................ 126 
5.5.3.1 At Regional Level ................................................................................................. 126 
  
7
 
5.5.3.2 At International Level ........................................................................................... 127 
5.5.4 Clearing and Settlement Systems............................................................................... 129 
5.5.4.1 At Regional Level ................................................................................................. 130 
5.5.4.2 At International Level ........................................................................................... 132 
5.5.5 Regulation of Market Conduct................................................................................... 134 
5.5.5.1 At National Level.................................................................................................. 134 
5.5.5.2 At Regional Level ................................................................................................. 135 
5.6 The Road-block of International Harmonization ............................................................ 136 
 
Chapter Six: Regulatory Competition 
6.1 Introduction..................................................................................................................... 140 
6.2 The Rationales for Regulatory Competition ................................................................... 141 
6.3 Feasibility of International Regulatory Competition ...................................................... 142 
6.3.1 The New Structures of Securities Exchanges ............................................................ 142 
6.3.2 The Impact of Technological Advances .................................................................... 143 
6.3.3 Cross-listing ............................................................................................................... 144 
6.4 The Regulation of Foreign Listing Companies............................................................... 146 
6.4.1 United States .............................................................................................................. 146 
6.4.2 United Kingdom......................................................................................................... 149 
6.4.3 Hong Kong................................................................................................................. 151 
6.4.4 Singapore ................................................................................................................... 153 
6.4.5 Summary .................................................................................................................... 154 
6.5 The Trends of Cross-listing............................................................................................. 154 
6.5.1 By Country................................................................................................................. 154 
6.5.2 Analysis...................................................................................................................... 157 
6.5.2.1 Successful Stories ................................................................................................. 157 
6.5.2.2 Failure Story.......................................................................................................... 161 
6.6 Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Bonding theory........................................................................ 162 
6.6.1 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act ............................................................................................ 163 
6.6.1.1 Overview............................................................................................................... 163 
6.6.1.2 The Influences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ........................................................... 164 
6.6.1.3 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act can not Explains Everything......................................... 166 
6.6.2 The Bonding Theory .................................................................................................. 168 
  
8
 
6.6.2.1 What is Bonding Theory? ..................................................................................... 168 
6.6.2.2 Cross-listing Premium........................................................................................... 169 
6.6.2.3 Beyond the Bonding Theory ................................................................................. 170 
6.7 The Consequences of Competition ................................................................................. 170 
 
Chapter Seven:  Cooperation 
7.1 Introduction..................................................................................................................... 173 
7.2 The Pre-period of Cooperation ....................................................................................... 173 
7.3 Methods of Cooperation ................................................................................................. 175 
7.3.1 The Hague Convention .............................................................................................. 175 
7.3.2 Mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) ................................................................. 176 
7.3.3 Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) ...................................................................... 177 
7.4 Legislative Basis for Providing Assistance..................................................................... 178 
7.5 The Scope of Cooperation............................................................................................... 180 
7.5.1 Unilateral.................................................................................................................... 181 
7.5.2 Bilateral...................................................................................................................... 182 
7.5.3 Regional Level ........................................................................................................... 186 
7.5.4 International Level ..................................................................................................... 188 
7.6 The Influence of Cooperation ......................................................................................... 192 
 
Chapter Eight: International Securities Regulatory Institutions 
8.1 Introduction..................................................................................................................... 197 
8.2 American Leadership ...................................................................................................... 198 
8.3 The Special Case of the European Union ....................................................................... 199 
8.4 International Securities Regulatory Institution ............................................................... 200 
8.4.1 Briefly introduction of international organizations.................................................... 200 
8.4.2 The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (Basle Committee).......................... 202 
8.4.3 The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)....................... 204 
8.4.4 The International Accounting Standards Boards (IASB) .......................................... 208 
8.5 Who is going to Supervise International Securities Markets? ........................................ 211 
8.5.1 The SEC ..................................................................................................................... 211 
8.5.2 The IOSCO ................................................................................................................ 212 
8.5.3 Lessons Learned From the EU................................................................................... 217 
  
9
 
 
 Chapter Nine: Conclusion ............................................................... 2190 
 
Appendix..................................................................................... 2266 
Bibliography .................................................................................. 230 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
10
 
Table of Legislation 
International Law 
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters 
Article 1……………………………………………………………………………………...175 
Article 12…………………………………………………………………………………….176 
Article 23…………………………………………………………………………………….176 
Article 27…………………………………………………………………………………….176 
European Community Legislation 
Admission Directive—Council Directive 79/279/EEC (OJ 1979 L66/21) of 5 March 
1979........................................................................................................................................105  
Capital Requirements Directive—Council Directive 2006/48/EC (OJ 2006) 14 of June 2006 
Article 1……………………………………………………………………………………...127 
Article 3……………………………………………………………………………………...127 
Collateral Directive— Council Directive 2002/47/EC (OJ L168) of 6 June 2002………...131 
Article 2 (1) (a)……………………………………………………………………................130 
Article 2 (1) (b)………………………………………………………………………………130 
Article 2 (1) (c)………………………………………………………………………………130 
Consolidated Admissions and Reporting Directive— Council Directive 2001/34/EC (OJ 
2001 L184/1) of 28 May 2001……………………………………………………………….105 
Interim Reports Directive— Council Directive 82/121/EEC (OJ 1982 L66/21) of February 
1982………………………………………………………………………………………….105 
  
11
 
Insider Dealing Directive—Council Directive 89/592/EEC (OJ 1989 L334) of 13 November 
of 1989 
Article 1……………………………………………………………………………………...112 
Recital 7…………………………………………………………………………… ………..134 
Recital 8…………………………………………………………………………………….. 134 
Investment Services Directive—Council Directive 93/22/EEC (OJ 1993 L141) of 10 May 
1993……………………………………………………………………………………..112,113 
Listing Particulars Directive— Council Directive 80/390/EEC (OJ 1980 L100/1) of 17 
March 1980…………………………………………………………………………………..105 
Major Share-holdings Directive— Council Directive 88/627/EEC (OJ 1988 L348) of 12 
December 1988………………………………………………………………………………105 
Market Abuse Directive—Council Directive 2003/6/EC (OJ 2003 L96/16)………………118 
Article 6……………………………………………………………………………………...119 
Article 12…………………………………………………………………………………….135 
Article 24…………………………………………………………………………………….135 
Article 25…………………………………………………………………………………….135 
Article 26…………………………………………………………………………………….135 
Article 31…………………………………………………………………………………….135 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive—Directive 2004/39/EC (OJ 2004 L145/1) of 
21 April 2004 ……………………………………………………………………..112, 113, 114 
Article 4 (1)……………………………………………………………………………………50 
Article 31 (5)…………………………………………………………………………………..77 
Article 34 (1)…………………………………………………………………………………131 
Article 34 (2)…………………………………………………………………………………131 
  
12
 
Annex 1……………………………………………………………………………………….77 
Prospectus Directive—Council Directive 2003/71/EEC (OJ 2003 L345/64) of February 
2003………………………………………………………………………………...112,114,123 
Article 17 (1)…………………………………………………………………………………113 
Article 2(1) (d)…………………………………………………………………….................118 
Article 5(1)…………………………………………………………………………………...118 
Article 7 (1)…………………………………………………………………………………..118 
Article 10…………………………………………………………………………………….118 
Settlement Finality Directive— Council Directive 98/26/EC (OJ 1998 L166) of 19 May 
1998………………………………………………………………………………………….130 
Recital 2……………………………………………………………………………………...130 
Transparency Directive—Council Directive 2004/109/EEC (OJ 2004 L390/38) of 
2004………………………………………………………………………………................123 
Article 4………………………………………………………………………………….......118 
Article 5……………………………………………………………………………………...118 
Article 6……………………………………………………………………………………...118 
United Kingdom 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000  
Section 3(2)……………………………………………………………………………………33 
Section 19……………………………………………………………………………………...51 
Part IV ………………………………………………………………………………………...51 
Section 23……………………………………………………………………………………...51 
  
13
 
Section 22 (1)…………………………………………………………………….....................51 
Section 22 (4)……………………………………………………………………………...50, 51 
Section 2………………………………………………………………………………52, 53,139 
Section 3……………………………………………………………………………………….52 
Section 4……………………………………………………………………………………….52 
Section 5……………………………………………………………………………………….52 
Section 6……………………………………………………………………………………….52 
Statutory Instruments 
 
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Recognition Requirements for Investment 
Exchanges and Clearing Houses) Regulations 2001, SI 
2001/995……………………………………………………………………………………..27 
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001, SI 
2001/544…………………………………………………………………………..................45 
 
United States of America 
Securities Act 1933 
 §§ 77a-77aa …………………………………………………………………………………..40 
Section 2(1)……………………………………………………………………………………50  
Section 7 ……………………………………………………………………………………..110 
Section 4(2)…………………………………………………………………………………..149 
Securities Exchange Act 1934 
§11A (a) (1) (A)……………………………………………………………………………….31 
§78k-I (a) …………………………………………………………………………..................31 
  
14
 
§78b………………………………………………………………...........................................32 
Section 4 ………………………………………………………………………………………32 
§78d……………………………………………………………………………........................46  
§6……………………………………………………………………………………………....47 
§78(c) (a) (26)…………………………………………………………………………………47 
§15A…………………………………………………………………………………………..47 
§78(f)……………………………………………………………………………….................47 
§19(c)……………………………………………………………………………….................47 
§78s (c)………………………………………………………………………………………...47   
§19(d)………………………………………………………………………………………….47 
§19 (g)…………………………………………………………………………………………47 
§11A…………………………………………………………………………………………...47 
§78k-1………………………………………………………………………………................47 
§78n (a)………………………………………………………………………………………148 
§78(c) (a) (50)………………………………………………………………………………..179 
§78(u) (a) (2)…………………………………………………………………………………179 
Section 24 (c)………………………………………………………………………………...179  
§78x (d)………………………………………………………………………………………180  
 
 
 
  
15
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
ADR      American Depositary Receipt  
AIM       Alternative Investment Market 
CBRC       China Banking Regulatory Commission 
CESR       Committee of European Securities Regulators  
CFTC       Commodities Futures Trading Commission  
CPSS       Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems  
CRD       Capital Requirements Directive  
CSRC       China Securities Regulatory Commission 
ECB       European Central Bank   
ESCB       European System of Central Banks  
EU       European Union 
FASB       Financial Accounting Standards Board  
FSA       Financial Services Authority 
FSA 1986      Financial Services Act 1986  
FSMA 2000      Financial Services and Markets Act 2000  
FSAP       Financial Services Action Plan   
FSAP                   Financial Sector Assessment Program 
GEM      Growth Enterprise Market 
GAAP       Generally Accepted Accounting Principles  
HKSE       Hong Kong Stock Exchange  
IAS        International Accounting Standards 
IASC       International Accounting Standards Committee  
ICMA       International Capital Market Association  
ICSA       International Councils of Securities Associations  
IDD        Insider Dealing Directive 
IDS       International Disclosure Standards 
IFRS       International Financial Reporting Standards 
IMF                     International Monetary Fund 
IOSCO           International Organization of Securities Commissions 
IPO       Initial Public Offering  
ISD       Investment Service Directive 
  
16
 
ISDA        International Swaps and Derivatives Association  
ISITC       International Securities Association for Institutional Trade  
       Communication  
LSE       London Stock Exchange  
MAD       Market Abuse Directive 
MiFID       Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
MLATs      Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties  
MOU       Memorandum of Understanding 
NASDAQ      National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
NYSE       New York Stock Exchange 
PCAOB      Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
PD       Prospectus Directive  
RIE       Recognized Investment Exchange  
SEC        Securities and Exchange Commission 
SGX        Singapore Exchange  
SESDAQ      Stock Exchange of Singapore Dealing and Automated Quotation  
       Systems   
SRO       Self-regulatory Organization 
SSSs       Securities Settlement Systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
17
 
Introduction 
 
Internationalization is a global phenomenon. Every area of life has been affected by it. Thus, 
it is not surprising that the securities markets have also undergone a metamorphism in this 
international environment. Since the 1980s, the internationalization of securities markets has 
accelerated its pace and broadened its scope as it has become easier to trade securities around 
the world. A new securities market has formed with parameters that are international. The 
internationalization trend of securities markets around the world has become a twentieth 
century phenomenon that is changing the face of world finance. It requires a rethinking of 
securities regulation because the world today is significantly different from that of decades 
ago. Importantly, it is not the international form of the markets that is novel; it is the 
regulation of that international marketplace that produces the difficulties. The 
internationalization of securities regulation is a direct response to the increasing inter-
dependence of the world’s securities markets. This is the situation in its simplistic form but 
the question still needs to be asked: what kind of international securities regulation is ideal 
and how can it be fulfilled?  Discussion on the international aspects of securities regulations 
started after the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) of United States issued its 1987 
report on the internationalization of the securities markets. Since then more than twenty years 
have passed, many efforts have already been made to track and comprehend the dynamics of 
this rapidly emerging market and its wide-ranging implications. The process of 
internationalization in the new global market has been the focus of study by academics and 
practitioners since the beginning of the 1990s. Therefore, this is not a new subject. The 
purpose of this thesis is not to introduce a new theory but rather to offer a comprehensive 
analysis of past and present practice, in order to identify what is effective and what is not. On 
this basis, the thesis will address the fundamental questions posed by the internationalization 
of securities markets: which regulatory approach is the proper and best way to govern 
securities regulation in the new international market? Are there any areas which need to be 
improved? And therefore, how can international regulation are improved? These are the core 
questions which will be explored in this thesis. However, enforcement of international 
securities regulation in detail and accountability of regulators are not covered by this thesis. 
 
Before touching on the core questions, the thesis begins with some analytical throat-clearing, 
by setting out what is meant by “securities market”, “securities exchange”, “securities 
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regulation” and “securities regulator” in the introductory chapters. The starting point in 
understanding the main theme of this thesis is to define what they are. Chapter 1 will firstly 
consider the regulated entities, i.e. securities market and securities exchange as these are of 
considerable importance. A securities market and a securities exchange are concepts which 
are neither new nor very sophisticated.  Both of them were known from very early times as 
the most important components of a capital market. The history and research of the securities 
market as well as the securities exchange is well documented. However, the study of them 
both has changed beyond recognition over the last century. During that period, the important 
role played by securities market has increased within the economy and many securities 
exchanges have transformed from not-for-profit member-owned organizations to for-profit 
shareholder-owned corporations.1 Following chapter 1, chapter 2 will go on to explain the 
roles of securities regulation and securities regulator. Regulation as a social and political 
activity is universal, it is understood nowadays more specifically to refer to rules and 
procedures created by statute and administered by dedicated agencies.2 Securities regulation 
as a discrete subject separated from company law during the 1930s. It can be loosely defined 
as being concerned with the way in which the marketing of all recognizable investment 
vehicles are regulated, either by the statute or administered by dedicated financial agencies 
established by statute. Securities regulation in order to function proficiently would logically 
need a regulator, but in many countries securities markets started to develop without the 
existence of a public regulator. Self-regulatory organisations (SROs), such as exchanges and 
industry associations, carried out the main regulatory function in the jurisdiction. It is now 
widely accepted that the existence of a public entity charged with the regulation and 
supervision of the market and market participants, is key to the healthy development of 
markets. 
 
As has been noted, one of the most significant developments within the world’s securities 
market is internationalization; it has had an affect on the securities regulation of many 
nations. Today, it is almost commonplace for issuers of securities to seek financing beyond 
the borders of their home country, accessing overseas capital markets, conducting public 
offerings addressed to foreign investors and obtaining listings in one of the major exchanges 
around the world. Internationalization has opened the way for a new platform concerning 
                                                 
1 Pamela S. Hughes, ‘Background information on demutualization’ in Shamshad Akhtar (eds), Demutualization 
of stock exchanges problems, solutions and case studies (Manila, Asian Development Bank, 2002), 33.  
2 Iain G MacNeil, An introduction to the law on financial investment (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005), 20. 
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national and international regulation. International securities regulation has developed due to 
the growth of international portfolio investment. It is necessary to understand the causes and 
magnitude of this phenomenon in order to evaluate different regulatory responses. Chapter 3 
attempts to do this. Firstly it will discuss all the details necessary in order for us to fully 
understand what internationalization actually is; particularly when it is applied to the 
securities markets, and also, we need to comprehend what influences internationalization has 
in the securities market. It will point out the main changes that have occurred in the securities 
market as well as the risks now involved because of this changing market. The main change 
has been from a national level to an international one. National regulators faced questions 
which were beyond the scope of national regulatory regimes. It draws attention to the 
importance of examining the interaction of participants within the regulatory system in order 
to understand its operation and the risks that are involved. The risks are credit risk, liquidity 
risk, position risk, operational risk, legal risk, and – resulting from these – systemic risk. 
These new or aggravated risks are often poorly understood by individual investors and 
perhaps also by professional investment managers. In a worst case scenario, the failure of 
major market participants (e.g., securities firms or banks) with heavy commitments in several 
countries could have grave detrimental results for national financial and payment systems 
and possibly for entire economies. 
 
Now considering the core question: what kind of international securities regulation is ideal? 
The thesis will answer that question in two parts, theory and practical application. On the 
theory level, the thesis will examine the dominant ideas: harmonization, competition and 
cooperation. As different jurisdictions have divergent national securities regulation, issuers 
seeking to raise capital in a foreign market will be faced with the task of reconciling these 
differences. Depending on the degree of divergence between home and host country, 
reconciliation can become a costly and time-consuming exercise, thus constituting a 
significant barrier for issuers seeking cross-border financing. The quest to eliminate the 
reconciliation requirement has led to the development of two distinct approaches: 
harmonization and competition. The first approach is based on the notion of making the 
regulatory requirements or governmental policies of different jurisdictions identical, or at 
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least more similar.3 Harmonization is the process of reconciling two or more models in order 
to achieve greater similarity. In its absolute form, the harmonization approach pursues the 
goal of unifying the differences among various nations. A noticeable trend among securities 
regulators and practitioners is a movement towards and support of harmonization in 
securities regulation. It suggests that the harmonization of securities regulation would result 
in more efficient financial markets and improved investor protection. The competition 
approach is based on the premise that different regulators (whether nations, states, agencies, 
securities exchanges, or the like) compete to attract regulated subjects. This is different from 
harmonization which seeks to unify the regulation. Regulatory competition could yield a 
diversified set of regimes from which market players could pick and choose. Also the bulk of 
the academic literature considers regulatory diversity a component of international regulatory 
competition. The two approaches although distinct in nature and effects, have become largely 
interconnected. It is also true that the two approaches share similar concerns even as they 
adopt different mechanisms to address these concerns. Nonetheless, different approaches 
reflect not only different responses to similar problems, but also deliberate policy choices. 
Regulatory cooperation is another important reaction to the internationalization evolution. 
Whether the approach is harmonization or competition, enforcement of standards of fairness 
and honesty needs cooperation. As internationalization has accelerated, securities regulators 
are also experiencing a corresponding rise in securities fraud originating from abroad. It is 
now not uncommon that illegal activities occurring in the domestic market of one country, or 
multiple countries, are being controlled by persons resident in another country, often in a 
jurisdiction which affords protection to such persons through blocking statutes and bank 
secrecy laws. This has increased the incentives for domestic regulators to extend their reach 
abroad. Securities regulators recognize that their enforcement programm must include an 
international dimension. Responses to inquiries from foreign regulators should be made with 
dispatch. Establishment of agreements governing on-going exchanges of investigatory and 
regulatory information need to be encouraged. In response, efforts to formalize cooperation 
among regulators have redoubled, to the point where “international cooperation...is 
blossoming among the world’s regulators”.4  
 
                                                 
3 David W.Leebron, ‘Lying Down with Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization Claims’ in  International and 
European Law Department (eds), Harmonization in the European Union  Part I: Capita selecta EU Law 
(Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, 2001).  
4  David Zaring, ‘International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial 
Regulatory Organizations’ (1998) 33 Texas International Law Journal, 281.  
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Chapters five, six and seven will focus on a practical level. The aim of these chapters is to 
delineate the current stage of developments in the EU, US, as well as internationally. These 
chapters will examine the harmonization, competition and cooperation efforts being made in 
order to improve international securities regulation. They will examine the extent to which all 
these methods have had individual achievement. The principal issues confronting national 
securities regulators are—disclosure, insider trading and other fraud, capital adequacy, 
clearing and settlement, and accounting — these are the same issues that must be dealt with 
by international securities regulators. Therefore harmonization, competition and cooperation 
will have to be based on the above issues under discussion. This part will focus on case 
studies.  
 
The last question that needs to be asked is: how can we fulfil the ideal international securities 
regulation? We will identify several roadblocks on the way to the internationalization of 
securities regimes. One of major problems in the international arena, however, is that there 
are no international law-making institutions vested with legal authority to address these 
issues (aside from the European Union which is not open to the international community at 
large). Accordingly, the question of international securities regulation devolves into a ‘Hodge 
Podge’ of national or non-governmental regulations which are working fitfully, sporadically, 
and sometimes at cross-purposes on one of the most complex economic problems of our 
times. Nevertheless, the international community has not, to date, made a major commitment 
to developing a system of international securities regulation. Only the European Union has 
developed a comprehensive system of securities regulation that transcends national 
boundaries. 
 
The final conclusion of the paper is that we need international securities regulation rather 
than regulation based on national regulatory systems. After examining all the methods that 
have been used, the conclusion is that there is no single method that is best for all situations. 
The appropriate regulatory response may well depend largely on the specific type of 
regulation with which we are concerned. The ideal international securities regulation is one 
that minimizes risks, protects investors and promotes internationalization of securities 
markets. Correspondingly, we need a strong international organization to take full 
responsibility for addressing these issues. 
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Chapter One: Securities Markets and Securities Exchanges 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Before we move into the main discussion we face the preliminary questions of what is a 
‘securities market’ and what is a ‘securities exchange’? Quite often the answer has been 
given that the securities market and the securities exchange are one and the same thing. Are 
securities market and securities exchange the same thing? Can the terms be used 
interchangeably? In many ways they are similar but they also have significant differences. 
One of them is that a securities exchange has dual roles. It is not only regulated entity but 
also a self-regulatory organization (SRO). The securities exchange could set rules and 
regulations to ensure that the securities market operates efficiently and fairly for all parties 
involved. The securities exchange also acts as a firm that market transaction services to 
facilitate trading and generate revenue from listing and other transaction fees. These 
characteristics make the securities exchange different from the securities market, and merit 
separate discussion.  
 
1.2 The Characteristics of Securities Markets 
 
Securities markets have grown considerably in developed and developing countries over the 
last century, but when people talk about the securities market, it is still not always 
immediately clear what they are referring to. Why do we have securities markets? Are 
securities markets merely burgeoning casinos where more and more players are coming to 
place bets?  Do we need them? For many people the answers to all these questions are merely 
abstract ideas. This section will explore the answer in four parts; these are (1) the emergence 
and development of securities markets; (2) securities markets and economic development; (3) 
the typology of securities markets and (4) the functions and dealing systems of securities 
markets. 
1.2.1 The Emergence and Development of Securities Markets  
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Today, there is no doubt that the emergence of securities markets are a pure macroeconomic 
phenomenon. The development of securities market is a complex process that is intimately 
connected to real economic activity. 1  Early observations by Gurley and Shaw 2  and 
Goldsmith3 indicate that as economies develop, self-financed capital investment first gives 
way to bank intermediated debt finance and later to the emergence of equity markets as an 
additional instrument for raising external funds. In the early stages of economic development 
financial markets are very thin and very rudimentary. During these stages financial markets 
are dominated by banks, or similar types of financial intermediaries. Stock markets are 
completely absent or, if they exist in any form, their size is negligible.4 As the economy 
grows, securities markets develop further. We can say that without economic development 
we would not have seen the development of securities markets. Indeed, a large body of 
empirical studies clearly shows that as economies develop securities markets tend to expand 
both in terms of the number of listed companies and in terms of market capitalization. For 
instance, Levine and Zervo sample 47 countries from 1976 to 1993 and find that securities 
market liquidity, measured as the value of stock traded relative to the size of the market and 
the size of the economy, is strongly and positively correlated to the rate of economic growth.5 
Blackburn et al. found capital accumulation can influence the development of equity markets 
because it can affect the degree of control that the lender has over these choices.6 Securities 
markets appear to emerge and develop only when economies reach a reasonable size and the 
level of capital accumulation is high. This is a solid and uncontroversial result and it appears 
to be true across time and for many countries. 
 
1.2.2 Securities Markets and Economic Development 
It is true securities markets are born from economic growth and are associated with its 
development but conversely, securities markets developments also play a crucial role in 
economic growth and financial stability. Thus the robust relationship between the 
                                                 
1 Salvatore Capasso, ‘Stock Market Development and Economic Growth: A matter of information dynamics’ 
(2006) September, Research Paper No. 2006/102, available at:  
http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/rps/rps2006/rp2006-102.pdf. 
2 Gurley, John G., and Edward S. Shaw, ‘Financial Aspects of Economic Development’ (1955) 45 American 
Economic Review, 515. 
3 Goldsmith, Raymond, W., Financial Structure and Development (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 
1969). 
4 See Capasso, ‘Stock market development’, above, n.1. 
5 Ross Levine and Sara Zervos, ‘Stock market development and long-run growth’ (1996) 10 (2) World Bank 
Economic Review, 223. 
6 Blackburn, K., Bose, N., and Capasso, S., ‘Financial development, financing choice and economic growth’ 
(2005) 9 Review of Development Economics (2),135. 
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development in the securities markets and the economic growth is not one way but it works 
both ways. There have been a number of studies supporting the proposition that as an 
‘engine’ of general financial development, a well functioning securities market is conducive 
to sustained economic growth. Also the level of securities markets development does a good 
job of predicting future economic growth. Atje and Jovanic using cross-sectional regressions 
conclude that stock markets have long-run impacts on economic growth.7 An important study 
by Ross Levine and Sara Zervos finds that the stock market development is highly significant 
statistically in forecasting future growth of per capita GDP. Their regressions forecast that if 
Mexico or Brazil were to obtain stock markets as advanced as Malaysia, then they might 
obtain an additional per capita GDP growth per year of 1.6%.8 Harris shows within a cross-
sectional framework that stock markets promote growth, although this occurs only for 
developed countries.9 Rousseau and Wachtel analyze 47 economies and report that stock 
markets influence growth via value traded of shares.10 Arestis et al. using time-series on five 
industrialized countries also indicate that stock markets play a role in growth.11 Bekaert et al. 
go further to show the important part that equity market liberalization plays in boosting 
economic growth.12 
 
In light of securities markets influence growth through a number of channels: liquidity, risk 
diversification, acquisition of information about firms, corporate governance and savings 
mobilization.13 As shown by Levine and Bencivenga, Smith, and Starr, securities markets 
may affect economic activity through the creation of liquidity. Many profitable investments 
require a long-term commitment of capital but investors are often reluctant to relinquish 
control of their savings for long periods. Liquid equity markets make investment less risky 
and more attractive because they allow issuers to acquire much needed capital quickly, hence 
facilitating capital allocation and enhance prospects for long-term economic growth. At the 
same time, companies enjoy permanent access to capital raised through equity issues. 
                                                 
7Atje, R. and Jovanovic, B, ‘Stock markets and development’ (1993) 37 European Economic Review, 632. 
8 See Levine and Zervos, ‘Long run growth’, above, n. 5. 
9 Harris, R.D.F, ‘Stock markets and development: A Reassessment’ (1997) 41 European Economic Review,139. 
10 Rousseau, P.L. and P. Wachtel, ‘Equity markets and growth: cross-country evidence on timing and outcomes 
1980-1995’ (2000) 24 Journal of Banking and Finance, 1933. 
11Arestis,P., P.Demetriades and K. Luintel, ‘Financial Development and Economic Growth: The Role of Stock 
Markets’ (2001) 33 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 16. 
12 Bekaert,G., C.R. Harvey and C. Lundblad, ‘Does financial liberalization spur growth?’ (2004) 77 Journal of 
Financial Economics, 33. 
13 Charles K.D. Adjasi and Nicholas B. Biekpe, ‘Stock market development and economic growth: the case of 
selected African countries’ (2006) 18 African Development Review, 144. 
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Further, by making investment less risky and more profitable, stock market liquidity can also 
lead to more savings and investment. Risk diversification through internationally integrated 
stock markets is another vehicle through which stock markets can affect economic growth. 
Because high-return projects also tend to be comparatively risky, securities markets that 
facilitate risk diversification encourage a shift to higher-return projects. 14  Due to the 
availability of portfolio diversification, firms have the opportunity to specialize in production 
activities thus increasing firm efficiency.15 Securities markets also spur growth through the 
regular provision of information about firms. The ease and timeliness of release of 
information affecting prices and profits of shares of listed firms enhances research and 
development which further boosts growth. Well-developed financial markets may encourage 
information gathering and processing. Large, liquid securities markets can stimulate the 
acquisition of information. Moreover, this improved information about firms should improve 
resource allocation substantially with corresponding implications for economic growth.16 In 
terms of corporate governance, securities markets provide proper incentives for managers to 
make investment decisions that affect firm value over a longer time period than the 
managers’ employment horizons through securities-based compensation schemes. 17 
Greenwood and Smith also showed that securities markets lower the cost of mobilizing 
savings, facilitating investments into the most productive technologies.18 
 
1.2.3 The Typology of Securities Markets 
 
There are different types of markets where securities are issued and traded. This thesis will 
focus on the concepts which are discussed in the proceeding chapters. 
The common securities markets include the primary market, where new issues are distributed 
to investors, and the secondary market, where existing securities are traded. The primary 
market is the market where the securities are sold for the first time and for new long term 
                                                 
14 Obstfeld, Maurice, ‘Risk-Taking, Global Diversification, and Growth’ (1994) 84 American Economic Review, 
1310. 
15Acemoglu,D and F.Zilibotti, ‘Was Prometheus unbounded by chance? Risk diversification and growth’ (1997) 
105 Journal of Political Economy, 709. 
16Ross Levine, ‘Financial development and growth: views and agenda’ (1997) June Journal of Economic 
Literature, 688. 
17 Dow, James and Gary Gorton, ‘Stock market efficiency and economic efficiency: is there a connection?’ 
(1997) 52 Journal of Finance, 1087. 
18 Greenwood, J. and B. Smith, ‘Financial markets in development and the development of financial markets’ 
(1996) 21 Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 145. 
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capital. It introduces new companies or government agencies to a market or raises capital for 
existing ones.19 This is typically done through a syndicate of securities dealers. The process of 
selling new issues to investors is called a public offer. The offer may be underwritten by a 
syndicate of banks or investors, thus guaranteeing its success. In the case of a company’s 
securities being listed for the first time, this sale is an initial public offering (IPO). In the 
secondary market, securities are sold by and transferred from one investor or speculator to 
another. In effect the secondary market provides a second-hand market, allowing investors a 
form of liquidity which would not be possible if they had to hold securities until they were 
redeemed.20 Liquidity refers to the ease with which investors can buy or sell securities.21 
 
Distinctions can be drawn by reference to the type of investors. If the investors are private 
individuals, it is called the retail market. Retail offers require more detail in respect of the 
information to be provided in the prospectus.  If the investors are institutional, it is the 
wholesale market or professional markets. Wholesale offers require less detail to be disclosed 
in the document.The attraction of retail markets is that they provide liquidity and ensure 
some degree of investor protection.  
 
Securities markets can also be divided into main markets and growth markets. Main markets 
refer to main securities exchanges where shares of listed companies are traded. London Stock 
Exchange (LSE), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE), 
Singapore Exchange (SGX) and Euronext are the leading main markets in the world. Differing 
from main markets, growth markets focus on attracting younger and smaller companies with 
high growth potential. These companies would otherwise not qualify for the more stringent 
listing requirements of the main markets. The Alternative Investment Market (AIM), The 
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ), The Growth 
Enterprise Market (GEM) and The Stock Exchange of Singapore Dealing and Automated 
Quotation Systems (SESDAQ) are outstanding examples of growth markets. Growth markets 
have, in the past, primarily appealed to locally based smaller and mid cap companies. 
However with increasing numbers of companies opting for dual listings or international 
listings, the tide may be turning. They are now increasingly attractive to international investors 
                                                 
19 Peter D. Spencer, The structure and regulation of financial markets (Oxford, 2000), 77. 
20 Ibid, 79. 
21 See generally M O’Hara, Market Microstructure Theory (Oxford, Blackwell, 1995). 
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as there are generally no different requirements between international and local companies. 
When compared with the main markets, qualifying growth markets often have less stringent 
admission criteria.  
 
1.2.4 The Functions and Dealing Systems of Securities markets 
Securities markets have four main functions. The first is to provide a mechanism for 
companies to sell securities in order to finance corporate expansion. The securities market is 
one of the most important sources for companies to raise money.22 A Company that wishes to 
set up a new business or expand its existing business can raise the capital it requires by 
issuing shares to investors. This will move money from people who save to people who have 
productive investment opportunities.23 Secondly, the securities markets provide a venue for 
the buying and selling of shares. It ensures transferability of securities which is the basis for 
the joint stock enterprise system.24 The attraction of markets is that they provide liquidity. 
The liquidity available to investors does not inconvenience the enterprises that originally 
issued the securities to raise funds. The existence of the securities market makes it possible to 
satisfy simultaneously the needs of the enterprises for capital and of investors for liquidity. 
The liquidity the market confers and the yield promised or anticipated on securities 
encourages people to make additional savings out of current income. In the absence of the 
securities market the additional savings would have been consumed otherwise, thus the 
provision of securities market results in net savings. Thirdly, it encourages risk-taking by 
spreading risks and rewarding profitable investment.25 Well-developed securities markets 
facilitate risk diversification and enhance the ability to avoid liquidity risk. It enables a 
person to allocate his savings among a number of investments. This helps him to diversify 
risks among many enterprises which increases the likelihood of long term overall gains. 
                                                 
22 In July 2008, the new listed companies raised the following capital through an initial public offer: LSE  
$1499.8 million; Nasdaq $636,9 million; NYSE Group $61.3 million; HKSE $920,9 million. This data shows 
that securities markets are one of the important ways in which companies can raise considerable new capital. 
The source of this data is the World Federation of Exchanges (at www.world-exchanges.org) last updated in 
August 2008. 
23 Veronika Dolar and Césaire Meh, ‘Financial Structure and Economic Growth: A Non-Technical Survey’ 
Bank of Canada Working Paper 2002-24 September 2002 available at: 
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/res/wp/2002/wp02-24.pdf. (last visited, October 2007). 
24 Shri G. N. Bajpai, ‘Significance of securities market in the growth of an economy: An Indian Context’ (2003) 
March 13, available at:  
http://www.sebi.gov.in/chairmanspeech/chsp4.pdf (last visited, October 2007). 
25 Yuwa Wei, ‘The Development of the securities market and regulation in China’ (2005) 27 Loyola of Los 
Angeles International and Comparative Law Review, 47. 
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Finally, through transfers of corporate control, it allows managerial and governance failure to 
be corrected through its markets.26 A well-functioning securities market encourages public 
companies to improve managerial efficiency and correct managerial failure in order to be 
admitted into a stock exchange and maintain their profiles.27 This is because companies must 
comply with the listing rules of the stock exchange. Also, once there, the share price of a 
company reflects the managerial efficiency of the company. With a low share price a poorly 
managed company faces the threat of takeover. A takeover inevitably replaces the under-
performing management team. Hence, takeovers contribute to the governance process in two 
ways: (1) the possibility of a takeover encourages management to act in the interests of the 
shareholders or the corporation as a whole;28 and (2) most likely, a takeover would seek to 
remedy the problems caused by unsuccessful incumbent management by replacing it.29 For 
these reasons takeovers are argued to be an effective mechanism for corporate governance. 
Likewise, well-functioning securities markets allow managerial compensation to be attached 
to stock price performance which in turn helps to align the interest of managers with those of 
firm owners.  
 
There are three dealing systems that have been adopted in the securities markets. One is the 
order-driven/auction market system in which buyers and sellers are directly matched 
together, usually via a computer system.30 Most systems in Continental Europe have operated 
on this basis since the late 1980s. Another one is the quote-driven/dealer market system 
which is the traditional system used by Nasdaq. This system is based around buy/sell quotes 
made on a continuous basis by market-makers who trade as principals and provide liquidity 
                                                 
26 Colin Mayer, ‘Stock-markets, Financial Institutions, and Corporate Performance’ in Nicholas Dimsdale & 
Martha Prevezer (eds) Capital Markets and corporate governance  (Oxford University Press, 1994), 179; Paul 
Marsh, ‘Market Assessment of Company Performance’ in Nicholas Dimsdale & Martha Prevezer (eds) Capital 
Markets and corporate governance (Oxford University Press, 1994), 66, 67. 
27 Clyde E. Rankin, III, ‘Unites States Corporate Governance: Implications for Foreign Issuers’ in Dennis 
Campbell and Susan Woodley (eds) Trends and developments in corporate governance (kluwer Law 
International, 2003), 286, 291. 
28 Pauline O’Sullivan, ‘Governance by Exit: An Analysis of the Market for Corporate Control’ in Kevin 
Keasey, Steve Thompson and Mike Wright (eds) Corporate governance: Economic and Financial Issues 
(Oxford University Press, 1997), 122, 122-23.  
29 Ibid, 122-123. 
30 International Financial Services London, ‘Securities dealing’ available at: 
http://www.ifsl.org.uk/pdf_handler.cfm?file=CBS_Securities_Dealing_2003&CFID=831901&CFToken=61327
085 (last visited, September 2007). 
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to the market.31 The last one is a hybrid system. It has both order-driven and quote-driven 
characteristics.32 
 
1.3 The Characteristics of Securities Exchanges 
 
The analysis of this part has two main goals. The first goal is to answer the chapter question: 
are securities markets and securities exchanges the same thing? At the conclusion of this part 
it should now be possible to understand the difference between securities markets and 
securities exchanges. As discussed above, securities markets are not only physical but 
abstract. An exchange is an institution, organization, or association which hosts a market 
where stocks, bonds, options and futures, and commodities are traded.  Securities exchanges 
may have different roles. If confused the two concepts may blur the functions of securities 
exchange as a regulator and a firm. The second goal is to track the history of securities 
exchanges. The Demutualization process from non-profit mutual or membership to for-profit 
shareholder-owned corporations is an important issue because it makes exchanges 
comparable and more integrated. This has resulted in increased competition among securities 
exchanges. 
 
1.3.1 Defining a Securities Exchange 
 
The hallmark of a securities exchange historically has been the centralization of trading on an 
exchange floor.33 Normally an exchange may be defined as a place for organized trading of 
stocks or other financial instruments and the performance of ancillary services that are 
associated with stock exchanges.34 But it ignores its strong business character: to pursue 
profits. There is now widespread recognition that exchanges are handling commodity 
business of buying and selling securities. As such, exchanges are increasingly opting to 
operate as a “firm” that seeks business for profit. Another unique thing worth paying 
attention to is that securities exchanges are both regulators and regulated entities: regulators 
insofar as they oversee the market they organize, and at the same time regulated to the extent 
                                                 
31 Iain G MacNeil, An introduction to the law on financial investment (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005), 288. 
32 See International Financial Services London, ‘Securities dealing’, above, n.30.  
33 Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 3rd edition (Aspen,1995), 604. 
34 Ruben Lee, What is an exchange?  (Oxford University Press, 1998), 322-23. 
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that they are subject to the national control and supervision. A securities exchange is a firm, a 
regulator and a regulated entity, each of those different aspects are discussed below.  
 
 
 
 1.3.1.1 Securities Exchange as a Firm 
 
This “firm view” of the securities exchange is shared by Mulherin. He stresses the definition 
of a financial exchange not as a market, as is usually done, but as a firm that creates a market 
in financial instruments and thus has the property of the price information produced.35 
Furthermore, a securities exchange can then be seen as a firm that produces a composite good 
which it can sell: listing services, trading services, settlement services and price-information 
services. The exchanges do not sell the financial instruments themselves but merely allow 
market participants to buy and sell the instruments. As in other business companies, expenses 
and income matter, management tends to focus on cutting the former and increasing the 
latter. The main expenses of securities exchanges are in maintaining and regulating the 
marketplace (most importantly for the electronic trading system and regulatory staff), while 
their income is derived from various sources. From one of the few analyses of the balance 
sheet of the European exchanges36, it emerges that the revenues come from three major 
sources plus two minor sources: trading fees (both membership and trading fees) (27.8%); 
listing fees (both initial and yearly listing fees) (32%)37; information and price-dissemination 
fee (17.2%);settlement fees (16.1%), even if little by little exchanges are transferring this 
activity to specialized entities where exchanges are, in general, among the shareholders. 
Other revenues come from the developing and selling of proprietary software and 
information technology (19.5%). 
 
Exchanges’ business is different from that of firms engaged in other businesses. From an 
industrial organization point of view, the first thing that makes exchanges different from 
other firms is that, due to ownership structures, some of the customers may be the owners of 
                                                 
35 Mulherin H., Netter J. and Overdahl J., ‘Prices are Property: The Organization of Financial Exchanges from a 
Transaction Cost Perspective’ (1991) Journal of Law & Economics, 591. 
36Based on 1993-94 balance sheet of 11 European stock exchanges. Carmine Di Noia, ‘Competition and 
Integration among Stock Exchanges in Europe: Network Effects, Implicit Mergers and Remote Access’ (2001) 
7 European Financial Management, 39 
37 Listing fees are generally of two kinds: original and continuing annual. 
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the firms as well. Secondly, it is important to note that the exchange produces a special 
“good” as a sort of public utility, even if the firm has a private nature. There is a public 
interest in the exchanges as a central element of the capital raising process. Exchanges are a 
locus of collision between the private and the public, often combining private membership or 
ownership with responsibilities that have public characteristics. They are important national 
assets that serve public and private interests.38  
 
 1.3.1.2 Securities Exchange as a Regulator 
 
Comprehensive governmental regulation of securities markets is a twentieth-century 
phenomenon.39 For most of its history, securities exchanges have been the primary regulators 
of securities markets. As regulators of the market they organize the securities exchange 
mandate which includes all elements of market regulation from making rules to monitoring 
and enforcement. I will look at all elements of market regulation in turn. Firstly, exchanges 
which grew from relatively informal beginnings found that they needed to impose rules on 
market participants. Exchange rules which are of regulatory concern may be generally 
grouped into two categories: (i) rules regulating market activities; (ii) rules governing listing 
of public companies. To maintain a high-quality marketplace, exchanges focus on establishing 
criteria that can determine how bargains could be struck and performed, what standards of 
financial responsibility brokers must meet and which securities they are going to admit. Thus, 
exchanges put in place a signaling function: a stock’s being listed indicates to investors that 
the stock is worthy of investment.40 Over time, exchanges developed their own rules and 
procedures. For instance, The New York Stock and Exchange Board from its inception 
operated a miniature legal system, with its own rules governing securities trading and its own 
mechanism for resolving trade-related disputes. 41  The exchange also offered to listed 
companies a “panoply of rules” to govern their activities. 42  Exchanges required listed 
companies to offer ongoing disclosures on their business activities, their investments, their 
obligations, and their future plans. Moreover, seeking to ensure investors that they are 
                                                 
38 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 11A (a) (1) (A), 15. U.S.C. § 78k-I (a) (describing the securities 
markets as “an important national asset which must be preserved and strengthened”). 
39 For more details see the following chapter: Securities Regulation and Securities Markets Regulator. 
40 See Jonathan R. Macey & Hideki Kanda, ‘The Stock Exchange As a Firm: The Emergence of Close Substitutes 
for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges’ (1990) 75 Cornell Law Review, 1007, 1009. 
41 Stuart Banner, ‘The Origin of the New York Stock Exchange’ (1998) 27 Journal of Legal Studies, 113, 132.  
42 Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, ‘Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and 
Economics Perspective’ (1999) 28 Journal of Legal Studies, 17, 22.  
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protected against abuses of corporate power, securities exchanges even adopted corporate 
governance standards for their listed firms.43 All market participants and affiliates, particularly 
the broker-dealers that trade on the market and the issuers of the traded shares, are subject to 
rules that securities exchanges enact particularly for their marketplace.  
 
Secondly, apart from making rules the securities exchanges often undertake a policing role 
within their markets. Securities exchanges are empowered to monitor the participants’ 
compliance with the regulatory regime. By doing so, securities exchanges perform an 
important role to provide for fair trading and accurate price discovery, both critical 
components in fostering investor confidence. For the case in which someone fails to abide by 
any of the rules, the securities exchanges are vested with numerous enforcement powers, from 
fining violators to permanently banning them from the marketplace.  
 
In summary, many securities exchange rules in the era before governmental regulation were 
premised on the idea that to attract investors, the exchange had to provide elementary 
protections against defaults, forgeries, fraud, manipulation, and other avoidable risks. 44 Thus, 
securities exchange rules dealt with most of the broad categories of issues with which modern 
securities regulations are concerned. 
 
1.3.1.3 Securities Exchange as a Regulated Entity 
 
Because securities exchanges are an important element in the capital formation process they 
must be seen to be clean. Transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities 
exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest which 
makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions and of practices 
and matters related thereto. 45  Therefore like other financial institutions such as banks, 
insurance companies or investment funds, securities exchanges are regulated. In the U.S 
securities exchanges are regulated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 46  The 
Exchange Act sought to ensure that securities exchanges were no longer run as “private clubs 
                                                 
43 Stavros Gadinis and Howell E. Jackson, ‘Markets as regulators: A survey’ (2007) 80 Southern California Law 
Review, 1247. 
44 See Paul Mahoney, ‘The Exchange as Regulator’ (1997) 83 Virginia Law Review, 1462. 
45 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b. 
46 Section 4 of the Exchange Act created the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “the 
Commission”) and gave it the authority to administer the 1933 and 1934 Acts and subsequent securities 
legislation.  
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to be conducted only in accordance with the interests of their members,” but as public 
utilities or “public institutions which the public is invited to use for the purchase and sale of 
securities listed thereon.”47 In the U.K. exchanges are currently regulated under the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000). 48  Under the regulation of the FSMA, a 
regulated exchange must be a ‘recognized investment exchange’ (RIE). To be recognized, an 
exchange must comply with the requirements set by the Act and regulation made by the 
Treasury under the Act. 49  Once recognized, an exchange operates without the controls 
imposed on authorized persons but the FSA can nevertheless veto rule changes and issue 
directions to an exchange. The FSA has the power to determine the manner in which they 
operate. 
 
 Today, regulation of financial exchanges is based on the idea that investors will only trade 
financial instruments in markets which work properly, which are not rife with fraud, which 
have accurate information about the price of the financial instruments readily available and in 
which trading, clearing and settlement procedures are efficient. 50  To achieve these, the 
regulators have to perform adequate oversight of exchanges in order to deal with: (i) the 
conflict of interest between owners of exchange and the business they offer, (ii) rules 
governing primary and secondary market trading, (iii) qualification, operative and ethical 
practices of market participants in particular brokers and dealers, (iv) investor protection, and 
(v) transparency of market transactions, etc. Under all circumstances, exchanges ought to 
operate on established criteria as defined in the securities law and the regulators to retain the 
authority to license an exchange or to revoke it if it fails to comply with the requirements.51 
 
1.3.2 The Development of Securities Exchanges 
 
  1.3.2.1 The birth of securities exchanges 
 
                                                 
47 United States House of Representatives, Committee (H.R.Rep) No. 73-1383 (1934). 
48 See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, Section 3(2) of the Act makes it clear that the “financial 
system” includes “financial markets and exchanges”. 
49 The FSMA 2000 (Recognition Requirements for Investment Exchanges and Clearing Houses) Regulations 
2001, SI 2001/995. 
50 Caroline Bradley, ‘Demutualization of financial exchanges: Business as usual?’ (2001) 21 Northwestern 
Journal of International Law and Business, 657. 
51  Shamshad Akhtar, ‘Demutualization of Asian Stock Exchanges—Critical Issues and Challenges’ in 
Shamshad Akhtar (eds) Demutualization of Stock Exchanges Problems, Solutions and Case Studies (Manila, 
Asian Development Bank, 2002), 3. 
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Usually, most businesses are established by entrepreneurs who believe a promising market 
exists for their products and services, a demand they can profitably supply. However, no one 
set up a stock exchange and offered the service to people who wanted to trade. Instead, stock 
exchanges were established the opposite way: those who wanted to trade in stocks--brokers 
and dealers--looked for a place and system that guaranteed reliable and permanent trading.52 
As no such organized marketplace yet existed, they launched one--the birth of stock 
exchanges. At the original stage traders gathered in a small house, such as a coffee shop. 
They shouted orders across the crowded, noisy and frequently smoke filled room, every 
trader knowing every other trader and what they were good for.53 The Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange, created in 1602, became the first official stock exchange when it began trading 
shares of the Dutch East India Company.54 These were the first company shares ever issued 
to the public. Unlike many other businesses, securities exchanges were founded by their 
customers and thus were customer controlled from their very beginning. Their intention was 
not to attract traders--they were themselves the traders--but to have a convenient forum to 
trade securities (with the prospective benefit of commission fees when they acted for others, 
or direct profits when acting for their own account).  
 
 1.3.2.2 Securities Exchanges Demutualization 
Traditional stock exchanges adopt a floor-based trading system that requires traders to be 
physically present on the floor of exchange. Value enhancement of the exchange was 
achieved by restricting access. However the most distinguishing feature of the traditional 
stock exchange structure is its member’s cooperative or mutual model. Mutual businesses are 
businesses that are designed to be run by managers for the benefit of their members. Before 
1993, stock exchanges operated in the form of non-profit mutual or membership 
organizations. They were founded and owned by brokers and dealers who managed their 
stock exchange like an exclusive club, with high barriers for new entrants and a regional or 
even national monopoly, comparable to a medieval guild. 55 Exchange profits were returned 
to broker and dealer members in the form of lower access fees or trading profits. 
 
                                                 
52Andreas M. Fleckner, ‘Stock exchanges at the crossroads’ (2006) 74 Fordham Law Review, 2541. 
53 Ruben Lee, ‘Changing market structures, demutualization and the future of securities trading’ (2003) April 
15, 5th Annual Brookings/IMF/World Bank Financial Markets and Development Conference, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/15/18450470.pdf. 
54Advanced Financial Network, ‘Stock Exchanges’ available at:   
http://www.advfn.com/StockExchanges.html (last visited, September 2007). 
55 See Fleckner, ‘Stock exchanges at the crossroads’ above, n.52.  
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In this traditional structure the assets of the exchange are controlled by the members who 
take decisions democratically, on a one-member-one-vote basis. The distinguishing feature of 
a mutually owned exchange is that the owners of the enterprise, its decision-makers and the 
direct users of its trading services usually are the same persons: the member firms.56  It 
means that members of exchanges who provide brokerage services have three roles. (1) They 
are owners. Exchanges formalized their ownership structure by granting ‘seats’ to 
members—a seat entitled the owner to trade on the floor of the exchange (or ‘sit’ on the 
exchange) and each seat holder had an equal vote on the exchanges’ affairs. (2) As it is a 
closely held entity, they are usually managers of the stock exchange as well. (3) The owners 
of the mutual enterprise are also its customers.57 Owner/customers may share in the net gains 
of the enterprise in proportion to their ownership interest. Under the traditional model, 
exchanges earned revenues largely through membership fees and trading fees charged to 
members on each transaction. Ownership rights may not be freely tradable and terminate 
with cessation of membership. Mutuals seldom are able to raise capital from anyone other 
than members. 
 
Starting in the early 1990s, securities exchanges around the world have been undergoing 
major organizational and operational changes due to the simultaneous convergence of a 
number of powerful developments. The most notable of these have been the pressures of 
competition, globalization and technological change. The traditional exchange governed by 
its members is seen to be unable to respond adequately to above pressures, because member 
decision making is slow and encumbered by the many, and often conflicting interests of the 
individual members. The question then arises: where should the securities exchanges go? 
Starting with the Stockholmsbörsen (Stockholm Stock Exchange) in 1993, securities 
exchanges worldwide transformed from member-owned companies into publicly held 
companies, a development known as demutualization. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 
which demutualized in November 2000, becoming Chicago Mercantile Exchange Inc., 58 
identified five major objectives for its demutualization: a governance and managerial 
structure that could respond quickly to competition; a financial decision-making model based 
                                                 
56 Frank Donnan, ‘Self-regulation and the Demutualisation of the Australian Stock Exchange’ (1999) 10 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law, 3. 
57Jennifer Elliott, ‘Demutualization of Securities Exchanges: A Regulatory Perspective’ (2002) International 
Monetary Fund Working Paper.  
58 See Chicago Mercantile Exchange Press Release, ‘CME Becomes a For-Profit Corporation’ (November 13, 
2000) available at http:// www.cme.com/news/00149corp.html.  
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on stockholder value; the possibility of pursuing new business strategies; unlocking 
members’ equity values; and facilitating working with strategic partners.59  
 
In the strictest sense, demutualization refers to the change in legal status of the exchange 
from a mutual association with one vote per member (and possibly consensus-based decision 
making), into a company limited by shares, with one vote per share (with majority-based 
decision making).60  A demutualized exchange may take many forms each raising its own 
issues. Some exchanges have demutualized and become public companies listed on their own 
exchanges. Other exchanges have demutualized but have remained private corporations. Still 
others are subsidiaries of publicly traded holding companies. 61  The exchanges 
demutualization occurred as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59 See Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Inc., ‘Amendment No. 5 to Form S-4 Registration Statement’, 4 (Apr. 25, 
2000) available at http://www.cme.com/news/cme_s4.pdf.  
60 See Akhtar, ‘Critical Issues and Challenges’, above, n.51. 
61 The Australian Stock Exchange is a public company listed on its own exchange. The London Stock Exchange 
is also a public company which listed on their own main market in July 2001.The Euronext and The Toronto 
Stock Exchange are presently private corporations. The Pacific Exchange in the United States converted its 
equity business into a wholly owned subsidiary of the exchange and the OM Stockholmsbörsen AB is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of a listed company. 
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Table 1-1 Exchanges Demutualization  
 
Demutualized Exchanges Year 
Stockholm Stock Exchange 1993 
Helsinki Stock Exchange 1995 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange 1996 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange 1997 
Borsa Italiana 1997 
Australian Stock Exchange 1998 
Iceland Stock Exchange 1999 
Simex 1999 
Athens Stock Exchange 1999 
Stock Exchange of Singapore 2000 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange 2000 
Toronto Stock Exchange 2000 
London Stock Exchange 2000 
Deutsche Börse 2001 
Euronext 2001 
The Nasdaq Stock Market 2001 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange 2002 
TSX Group 2002 
New York Stock Exchange 2005 
 
Demutualization alters the governance structure of the exchange although its operations and 
services may remain the same. The transformation of exchanges from mutual to 
demutualized structure involves two key features: the first is a change in the ownership 
structure. In a publicly traded stock exchange the members are no longer the sole owners of 
the exchange. In contrast, most for-profit enterprises are organized as corporations with share 
capital under which the owners of the company, its decision-makers and its principal 
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customers may well be three separate groups.62 The shareholders vest decision-making power 
for the company in a board of directors who are subject to election and removal by 
shareholders and this power is exercised on a day-to-day basis by the management of the 
corporation. Trading rights and ownership are separated; shareholders provide capital to the 
exchange and receive profits, but they need not conduct trading on the exchange. The second 
is a change in legal as well as organizational form. The legal structure for the demutualized 
exchange is based on considerations similar to that for any profit-making company including 
decisions on number of shareholders (partnership vs. corporation), voting procedures, 
limitation of liability (liability limited to equity invested vs. joint and several liability for all 
debts), accounting and reporting requirements (based on taxation laws and on 
partners/shareholders’ access to information of the company) and distribution of dividends 
(re-investment needs vs. distribution to partners, taxation). 
 
The result of demutualization is that the commercial nature of the exchange becomes more 
evident: maximizing profits becomes an explicit objective. The essence of demutualization is 
the separation of ownership from trading rights. In general, the demutualization of the 
exchanges has been observed to offer a wide range of advantages. It allows exchanges to 
abolish the members/traders’ monopoly over intermediation and be responsive to the needs 
of its issuers (listed companies) and investors by allowing them direct and cost effective 
access to the exchange. The for-profit motive of exchanges allows it to generate the desired 
levels of investments, while offering appropriate returns to owners. Demutualization also 
lends itself to improved governance. The Toronto Stock Exchange said that being a “for-
profit” business ... will help the organization to become more competitive, more 
entrepreneurial and more customer-focused.63  
 
1.3.2.3 Conflict of Interests under Demutualized Securities Exchanges 
 
In general, a degree of conflict of interest at the exchange level exists whether an exchange 
has a mutual or a demutualized structure. In the mutual exchange, the key challenge is how to 
balance the members’ (who are owners) interest with that of the public interest of investors 
                                                 
62 IOSCO Technical Committee, ‘International Organization of Securities Commissions Discussion Paper on 
Stock Exchange Demutualization’ December 2000, available at:  
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD112.pdf. (last visited, October 2007). 
63 Toronto Stock Exchange, ‘Demutualization of the TSE’ available at: http:// 
www.tse.com/tse_inc/demutual.html (last visited, October 2007). 
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and issuers; meanwhile the demutualized exchange has to balance its commercial objectives 
with those of protecting the public interest. However, many regulators and exchanges believe 
that conflicts of interest increase when exchanges convert to for-profit businesses.64 
 
First, demutualization is perceived to create new conflicts of interest between the business 
operations of an exchange and its regulatory role.65 The commercial role and objectives of an 
exchange may be contrasted with its regulatory and public interest role.66 It can be argued that 
there would be conflicts of interests between shareholders and members in a demutualized 
exchange environment that would diminish the ability of exchanges to engage in effective 
self-regulation. These worries increase when securities exchanges become for-profit 
companies, which dramatically sharpen their focus on reducing expenses and enlarging 
income. Where exchanges need to maximize profits from attracting listings and trades, their 
rules may either benefit the managements of issuers, or encourage trading. If managements of 
issuers of securities have the power to decide where the issuer’s securities should be listed (or 
re-listed) they may decide to list with the exchange with the rules that give them the most 
leeway.67 Thus, rules that would benefit shareholders in the exchange might harm the interests 
of shareholders of other issuers listed on the exchange. Exchange rules that encourage 
speculative stock trading may benefit exchange members but reduce collective investor 
welfare. The maximization of profits for the benefit of the shareholders of the exchange may 
therefore be inconsistent with the interests of investors in issuers whose securities list on, or 
trade through, the exchange.  
 
Second, with ownership separated from the customers, there is another new conflict within 
the exchanges: stockholders versus customers competing for the corporation’s profits, with 
customers demanding low prices and stockholders the opposite. Securities exchanges will 
have to please both, because if they overly favour one, the other will be deterred and change 
to a competitor (by trading on another marketplace or investing in another company). To 
make things more complicated, the stock exchanges’ customers themselves have conflicting 
interests: issuers want low listing fees; traders want low trading fees; some customers might 
                                                 
64 John W. Carson, ‘Conflicts of Interest in Self-Regulation: Can Demutualized Exchanges Successfully Manage 
Them?’ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3183, 1 available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=636602. 
65 Ibid,4. 
66 See Donnan, ‘Self-regulation and the demutualisation’, above, n.56.  
67 Marcel Kahan, ‘Some problems with stock exchange-based securities regulation’ (1997) 83 Virginia Law 
Review,1509, 1511-1512.  
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want a floor (particularly those who work on it), while others might prefer an automated 
trading system. It is important to note, however, that these conflicts are not limited to 
publicly traded stock exchanges. Every company with owners different from its customers 
faces this challenge to the same extent. The reason that this conflict attracts attention in the 
case of publicly traded stock exchanges is only that, for stock exchanges, it is a new conflict. 
 
Third, another completely new conflict presented by demutualization is that raised by the 
exchange listing on itself. When stock exchanges demutualize and go public, they have to 
make fundamental decision: where should the exchange’s own shares be traded, i.e., on 
which market should the exchange itself be listed? The answer is obvious. Not surprisingly, 
all demutualized securities exchanges have listed their shares or that of their holding 
companies on their own markets, usually referred to as self-listing.68 Examples of self-listing 
include Archipelago and Nasdaq (although before it became a stock exchange) as well as the 
Australian Stock Exchange, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (Deutsche Börse), Euronext N.V., 
the London Stock Exchange, OMX Group and the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (Hong 
Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited).The self-listing of the public issue on its own 
exchange can pose issues of conflict of interest if listing standards and its oversight are 
compromised by the exchange concerned. If the exchange self-lists, can it function 
effectively as its own regulator? This is an even more fundamental conflict than those 
inherent in a self-regulatory organization. Does self-listing make the possible conflicts with 
overseeing competing entities or business associates that are also listed on the exchange 
worse? Recognizing this, most of the Asian exchanges have developed specific arrangements 
and memoranda of understanding for regulating and oversight of self-listing.69 The common 
approach has been to lay down a credible approach and proper regulatory standards to avoid 
conflict of interest at exchange level in relation to its own prospective listing. The listing 
standards for exchanges have to be the same as for other listed companies and the listing fee 
for the exchange has to be determined and collected by the securities regulator.
                                                 
68 See IOSCO Technical Committee, ‘Discussion Paper’, above, n.62.  
69 See Akhtar, ‘Critical Issues and Challenges’, above, n.51.  
Chapter Two: Securities Regulation and Securities Markets Regulators 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Because of the special characteristics and developments that have occurred within the 
securities markets as well as within the securities exchanges it has been necessary to   
regulate securities markets along with the security regulators. The securities markets have a 
very strong relationship with economic growth stressing the importance of government 
intervention and institutional arrangements. But this has not always been the case. It is 
interesting that in its early history the securities market was unregulated. It was not until the 
1930s that modern securities regulation first started in the US. Securities regulation in order 
to function proficiently would logically need a regulator, but in many countries securities 
markets started to develop without the existence of a public regulator. Self-regulatory 
organisations (SROs), such as exchanges and industry associations, carried out the main 
regulatory function in the jurisdiction. It is now widely accepted that the existence of a public 
entity charged with the regulation and supervision of the market and market participants, is 
key to the healthy development of markets. Regardless of the institutional structure chosen, it 
is important that the responsibilities and functions of the regulator be clearly defined. The 
basic goal of this chapter is to emphasize the significance of the securities regulation and 
regulator for the success of the system. 
 
2.2 What is securities regulation? 
 
Although securities regulation has probably been around as long as securities have, it was for 
a long time not considered an independent subject till the 1930s. Before that time, to a large 
degree, securities regulation was attached to company law. Modern securities regulation in a 
systematic and sophisticated form first began in the US in 1933 with the passing of the 
Securities Act.1   Since then, securities regulation has emerged from under the wing of 
company law. But is it necessary for it to be so? If securities regulation should stand alone, 
what is it and what are its objectives? All these questions need to be explored. 
 
                                                 
1 Ben Pettet, Company Law 2nd edition  (Harlow, Pearson Education Limited, 2005). 
  
42
 
This part will include four sections: (1) The history of securities regulation; (2) The 
relationship between company law and securities regulation; (3) The scope of securities 
regulation and (4) The objectives of securities regulation.  
 
2.2.1 The History of Securities Regulation  
 
Nowadays the securities market is subject to rigorous regulation, however initially the 
securities market was in essence unregulated. In some ways the securities market was left to 
its own devices-- in other words self-regulation was tolerated. But it did not last forever. 
After financial crisis and scandals occurred, government regulation was called for and 
introduced. 
 
 2.2.1.1 The Era of Self-regulation  
 
What does “self-regulation” mean? On a purely etymological level, it suggests a process by 
which a person, organization, or group of persons establishes and enforces rules to govern its, 
or their own conduct without the need for regular outside intervention.2 Dombalagian also 
stated that self-regulation was the “result of historical accident and political expediency”.3 
Self-regulation is intended to strike a balance between “the limitation and dangers of 
permitting the securities industry to regulate itself” and “the sheer ineffectiveness of 
attempting to assure [regulation] directly through the government on a wide scale”.4 Self-
regulatory organizations (SROs) are non-governmental organizations, entrusted with quasi-
governmental authority, to establish and enforce the federal securities laws. In the context of 
the IOSCO Principles ‘SRO’ is given a broad definition: any organization other than the 
statutory regulator that is responsible for regulation.5 In the securities industries, the basic 
structure of self-regulation assumes that broker-dealers would be members of at least one 
SRO, that members would be fairly represented in the governance of SROs, and that SROs 
would undertake to enforce compliance with their rules by their members. In history, 
generally, the securities exchanges are SROs. The conceptual core of SROs is standard-
                                                 
2 Onnig H. Dombalagian, ‘Self and Self-Regulation: Resolving the SRO Identity Crisis’ (2007) 1 Brooklyn 
Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law, 317. 
3 Onnig H. Dombalagian, ‘Demythologizing the Stock Exchange: Reconciling Self-Regulation and the National 
Market System’ (2005) 39 University of Richmond Law Review, 4.           
4 S. Rep. No. 94-75, at 4 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 183. 
5Ana Carvajal and Jennifer Elliott, ‘Strengths and Weaknesses in Securities Market Regulation: A Global 
Analysis’ (2007) IMF Working Paper. 
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setting. The SROs primary regulatory duties are rulemaking for and discipline of its 
membership. Essentially, self-regulation gives members of a self-regulatory organization 
license to set collectively the ground rules for carrying out their business, subject to public 
notice, comment and Commission approval.6 No one said it better than the former chairman 
of the SEC, Justice William O. Douglas: “[Self-Regulation] is letting the exchanges take the 
leadership with Government playing a residual role. Government would keep the shotgun, so 
to speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it 
would never have to be used.” 7 Self-regulation is most effective when the self-regulatory 
organization has the power to set baseline standards of conduct or other standard terms of 
dealing for all persons involved in a particular line of business--e.g., lawyers, doctors, 
accountants, and other professionals. Failure to comply with the rules and regulations of the 
self-regulatory organization may result in a suspension, revocation, or other limitations on 
the right to exercise one’s profession.  
 
There are several advantages of self-regulation. One thing is that compared to the 
government, self-regulation organizations have more wisdom and superior knowledge of the 
regulated industry. If anyone can best understand and identify fraudulent and illegal 
behaviours, so the argument goes, it is the industry itself. Another acknowledged advantage 
of self-regulation is that self-regulatory organizations can rely on the industry’s funds and are 
therefore better and more efficiently funded than a governmental agency.8 Furthermore, rules 
enacted by the affected persons tend to be accepted and observed sooner than rules set by 
outsiders. 9  In addition, self-regulatory organizations may be better able to respond to 
misconduct that falls short of fraud.10 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 See Dombalagian, ‘Demythologizing the stock exchange’, above, n.3, 4. 
7 William O. Douglas, ‘Democracy and Finance’ (1941) 54 Harvard Law Review, 905.     
8John C. Coffee, Jr. & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials (University Casebook 
Series,2002). 
9 IOSCO Technical Committee, ‘International Organization of Securities Commissions Discussion Paper on 
Stock Exchange Demutualization’ (2000) December, available at:  
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD112.pdf. 
10 See Coffee &  Seligman, Securities Regulation, above, n.8. 
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2.2.1.2 The Era of Government Regulation  
 
Needless to say, relying solely on self-regulation bears some risks, because self-regulators 
are not disinterested but instead biased by their industry affiliation. Unfortunately, in 
practice, the pattern of self-regulation is followed by crisis and scandals. For instance, the 
burst of the South Sea Bubble in the early 18th century caused the collapse of the entire 
financial market in the United Kingdom.11 In the United States, the failure of the securities 
market added further devastation to the economic depression in the 1930s. In the main, most 
countries, including the U.S and UK, have now concluded that a heavy reliance on self-
regulation is no longer appropriate in financial markets, but some have continued to 
recognize that it can be beneficial to allow for some degree of self-regulation within the 
system.12 That is where government comes in, providing, or at least threatening, impartial 
control. Explaining the need for financial regulation, LSE Professor Charles Goodhart stated, 
“The goal of financial regulation is to influence the behaviour of intermediaries so that the 
policy objectives are achieved.”13 Now securities markets are regulated in many countries. 
Although the U.S and UK were not the first country to regulate securities markets they did 
introduce a comprehensive framework of securities regulation before other countries. The 
government regulation had precedents in U.K. law and in U.S. state law. Currently most 
countries’ regulation of securities markets is adapted from the American and UK model. For 
this reason we will focus on the UK and U.S. system of regulation. 
 
In the UK prior to the Financial Services Act 1986 (FSA 1986), the regulation stressed listing 
standards and the importance of self-regulation by market players and did not rely on a 
comprehensive securities act. The self-regulation approach, historically, is a distinctive 
feature of financial services regulation in the UK. Although before 1986 there were several 
instances of statutory intervention in the working of the financial markets, the intervention 
had a less significant influence on the operation of markets than self-regulatory rules.14 
However, this situation changed when FSA 1986 was introduced. Financial scandals in the 
                                                 
11 See Lewis Melville, The South Sea Bubble (London: D. O’Connor, 1921) vii (threatening the nation with 
political and social ruin). 
12 Iain G MacNeil, An introduction to the law on financial investment (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005), 30. 
13 Andrew Sheng, ‘Securities Regulation versus Prudential Regulation’ 2005 May, available at: 
http://www.iosco.org/library/speeches/pdf/securities_regulation_vs_prudential_regulation_may05_as.pdf. 
14 See MacNeil, Introduction to the law, above, n.12, 34-35. 
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late 1970s and early 1980s, combined with the privatization program that the Conservative 
Government had embarked upon, highlighted a growing need for investor protection 
legislation. So, in July of 1981, the Minister of Trade commissioned Professor Jim Gower to 
undertake a report on investor protection. Proposals were put forward by Gower that resulted 
in the FSA 1986. The FSA 1986 represented the beginning of the modern era of regulation of 
investment business in the United Kingdom.15  The Act created a hybrid system which 
combined the Securities and Investment Board (SIB) responsible for all investment business 
and self-regulatory organizations (SROs) responsible for the regulation of particular parts of 
the investment industry. FSA 1986 created a single statutory regime for the regulation of 
financial services. As a regulator, SIB required SROs to satisfy certain standards laid down 
by the Act in order to be recognized. During the 1990s, due to dissatisfaction with the failure 
of regulation to avert the Maxwell pension collapse and the widespread selling of 
inappropriate pension policies, the Labour administration came to office with the clear 
intention of overhauling and strengthening the system. The result was that The Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) was passed by the Houses of Parliament in 2000. 
With 433 sections and 22 schedules, FSMA certainly marks a formal shift in regulatory 
culture from the self-regulation approach. The Act 2000 has been broadly welcomed for 
enhancing investor protection and eliminating the complex system of overlapping self-
regulation organizations that previously existed.16 It is intended to curb abuses and build 
public confidence in the financial services industry by providing more governmental 
oversight. A new statutory body, the Financial Services Authority, has been created by the 
government to replace its predecessors, the SIB and its accompanying self-regulatory 
organisations. FSMA confers on the FSA responsibility for the regulation of all investment, 
banking and insurance business conducted in the UK. 
 
In the U.S. Kansas was the first state to pass a “blue sky law”17 in 1911. Other states 
followed. These laws were designed to protect investors through antifraud provisions, 
regulation of brokers and dealers and registration of securities. However, prior to the 1930s, 
no national regulation of the securities industry existed, although individual states had 
                                                 
15 See MacNeil, Introduction to the law, above, n.12, 38. 
16 Colin Mayer, ‘Regulatory Principles and the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000’ in Eilis Ferran and 
Charles A.E. Goodhart (eds) Regulation Financial Services and Markets in the Twenty First Century (Oxford, 
Hart, 2001). 
17 The term “blue sky” originated from the fact that these laws were originally enacted to prevent the offering 
and sale of worthless securities, which were worth no more than a piece of the “blue sky” in the opinion of 
some legislators. 
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enacted various antifraud laws.  The 1929 Wall Street crash changed the situation 
dramatically. It preceded a massive national depression and many blamed the problems of the 
economy on the activities of the financial markets.18  Ferdinand Pecora, counsel for the 
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, investigated practices on the stock exchanges 
and in the banking and securities markets. These investigations, known as the Pecora 
Hearings, lasted from January 1933 to July 1934.19 
 
The hearings found considerable evidence of stock price manipulation. Various schemes 
were used to manipulate the stock price so that the manipulator could make a profit at the 
expense of ordinary investors. The revelation of these practices gave rise to a huge public 
outcry and to demands for wholesale reform of the regulatory structure of the financial 
markets. The outcome was a series of new laws including the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 
Securities Act) 20 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Exchange Act). 21 
Government intervention then became a permanent feature of national financial systems in 
the 1930s, reflecting a collapse of trust in markets to deliver stability. These laws are the 
basis for the current regulatory structure in the United States. The 1933 Securities Act, called 
a “truth-in-securities” law, tackled abuses in the new-issue markets by requiring issuers of 
securities to disclose relevant financial information so that would-be investors could make 
more informed judgments about the stock on offer. The 1934 Exchange Act was more 
extensive and tackled fraudulent trading practices. The Act’s major provisions cover the 
initial securities registration, the filing of periodic financial reports, the registration of broker-
dealers, and general disclosure and anti-fraud provisions. The Act created the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to oversee trading on securities exchanges and to administer 
the provisions of the new securities laws. With the adoption of the Exchange Act, Congress 
also vested considerable authority in self-regulatory organizations (SROs), such as New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealer (NASD), both 
subject to SEC oversight.22 The regulation of securities exchanges was based on the notion 
                                                 
18 Henry Laurence, ‘Spawning The SEC’ (1999) 6 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies,  647. 
19 See Ferdinand Pecora, Wall Street under oath: the story of our modern money changers ((New York: 
Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, reprinted 1968, originally published 1939) (for a first-hand account of the 
hearings). 
20 15 United States Code §§ 77a-77aa (1933). 
21 15 United States Code A. § 78d (1934). 
22 See Exchange Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(26) (2004); Exchange Act § 15A, 15 U.S.C §78(f). The SROs 
police the activities of their members to prohibit manipulative and abusive practices and also maintain 
disclosure requirements and financial and conduct standards for companies that list securities for trading in the 
markets they control. 
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that the government should promote efficient securities markets.23 An efficient securities 
market is deemed to be essential to the efficient allocation of capital and other resources.24 
SEC regulation of securities markets thus grew out of a fear of economic collapse and 
showed a concern for the most efficient allocation of resources in the market. Although the 
SEC obtained oversight authority over the securities exchanges, they continued to have 
rulemaking and regulatory authority with respect to their members, their trading markets and 
their listed companies. The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 further enlarged the SEC’s 
oversight role over the stock exchanges and the NASD by, among other things, giving the 
SEC the power to initiate, as well as approve, SRO rulemaking,25 expanding the SEC’s role 
in SRO enforcement and discipline,26 and by allowing the SEC to play an active role in 
structuring the market. 27  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which was adopted by Congress 
in response to the collapse of several prominent U.S. companies as a result of financial fraud, 
applies to both domestic and foreign companies whose securities (including debt securities) 
are registered with the SEC and represents a broad expansion of U.S. securities laws in the 
areas of corporate governance, accounting matters, disclosure, enforcement and other topics. 
Following adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002, the SEC released a number of new 
regulations implementing the provisions of the Act and can be expected to make minor, 
ongoing adjustments to these new regulations. 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2 The Relationship between Company Law and Securities Regulation  
 
The historical origins of the disclosure and anti-fraud components of modern securities 
regulation derive from traditional company law.28 Securities regulation has long been a key 
component to corporate law in the United States. For decades, the securities laws’ disclosure 
requirements, civil and criminal liability under Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 and the stock 
                                                 
23 See Lynn A. Stout, ‘The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing 
and Securities Regulation’  (1988) 87 Michigan Law Review,613. 
24 Ibid. 
25 See Exchange Act § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2000). 
26 See Exchange Act § 19(c), (d), (g). 
27See Exchange Act § 11A, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (2000). 
28Amir N. Licht, ‘Stock exchange mobility, unilateral recognition, and the privatization of securities regulation’ 
(2001) 41 Virginia Journal of International Law, 607. 
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exchange listing standards have played a leading role in regulating the conduct of corporate 
officers and directors and protecting shareholder rights.29 In fact, some scholars argue that 
the federal securities regime has begun to overshadow traditional corporate law in defining 
standards of conduct for officers and directors.30 Even now, many issues such as public 
offerings of shares, insider dealing and takeovers are covered both in mainstream company 
law and securities regulation. Therefore we can see that there is a close and interdependent 
relationship between company law and securities regulation. This has caused the question to 
be asked: why does securities regulation need to spring out from the traditional company law 
and become a discrete field? Although they overlap in scope, there is a basic sense in which 
the two bodies of law are materially distinct. Firstly, securities as a financial product are not 
the same as search goods, such as clothing, because their quality cannot be ascertained in 
advance.31 When shares are offered to the public there is high risk of fraud if the investors 
lack the information required to make informed investment decisions. However company law 
provides limited disclosure of information to the new investors because it generally does not 
require information to be volunteered to the other side. Company law was not designed 
specifically for public listed companies and even today private companies form the majority. 
Additionally company law emphasizes the protection of the company, shareholders and 
creditors’ interests equally rather than protecting just the investors’ interests. In order to 
attempt to ensure that investors in public listed companies have accurate information and 
their interests are protected requires special laws. Securities regulation exists because of 
unique informational needs of investors. Secondly, company law is generally held to be 
private law.32 It is concerned with the contractual relationship which the various participants 
in companies enter into. Usually the various participants in companies are private individuals 
and groups. The state has a low profile in the company law. Due to the character of company 
law defining the rights and duties of private individuals and groups; it focuses primarily on 
“private law”. 33  On the contrary, securities regulation is often viewed as public law which 
involves vertical relationships. In other words, the state, in whatever capacity and shape, is a 
                                                 
29 Renee M. Jones, ‘Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforcement’ (2004) 11 
Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, 108. 
30  Robert J. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, ‘Securities Law as Corporate Governance, Reflections Upon 
Federalism’ (2003) 56 Vanderbilt Law Review, 859.  
31Nelson, ‘Information and consumer behaviour’ (1970) 78 Journal of Political Economy, 311. 
32 Iain G MacNeil, ‘Company law rules: an assessment from the perspective of incomplete contract theory’ 
(2001) 1 Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 107. 
33 Randy E. Barnett, ‘Foreword: Four Senses of the Public Law-Private Law Distinction’ (1986) 9 Harvard 
Journal of Law & Public Policy, 267.  
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party. The state has a high profile in securities regulation through the presence of a powerful 
regulatory authority to protect investors. Thirdly, company law in general is enabling. It 
offers a set of default rules that can be changed by express agreement between the parties or 
by company organizers to fit their preferences. It leads to the result that any ‘investor 
protection’ rules that arose from the company law could in principle be avoided by 
agreement. In contrast, securities regulation like other fields of public law is mostly 
mandatory and often prohibits opting out of its provisions. Thus, the basic culture of 
securities regulation and company law are public versus private law, respectively. However, 
the main reason for securities regulation being separate and distinct from company law is to 
truly protect investors. Both state intervention and mandatory rules are subject to this 
objective.  
 
2.2.3 The Scope of Securities Regulation 
 
The term ‘regulation’ is nowadays understood more specifically to refer to rules and 
procedures created by statute and administered by dedicated agencies. 34  Securities 
Regulation is designed to address asymmetries of information between issuers and investors, 
clients and financial intermediaries and between counterparties to transactions; and to ensure 
smooth functioning of trading and clearing and settlement mechanisms that will prevent 
market disruption and foster investor confidence.35 It comprises of the regulation of public 
issuers of securities, secondary markets, asset management products and market 
intermediaries. Securities regulation can be loosely defined as being concerned with the way 
in which the marketing of all the recognizable investment vehicles is regulated, either by the 
statute or administered by financial dedicated agencies. The scope of securities regulation in 
any system can be explained by reference to (a) securities and (b) regulated activities. 
Generally, over time, the scope of securities regulation has expanded both by securities and 
regulated activities. 
 
Securities are not inherently valuable. The value of securities depends on the issuer’s financial 
condition, markets, management, competitive and regulatory climate. The term “securities” 
has two definitions: a narrow one and a broad one. The US has adopted a broad-based concept. 
                                                 
34 See MacNeil, Introduction to the law, above, n.12, 20. 
35 See Carvajal and Elliott, ‘Strengths and Weaknesses’, above, n.5.  
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In its definition, securities are broadly defined so as to include all of the readily recognizable 
investment techniques. The vast ranges of unconventional investments fallen within the ambit 
of the securities regulation’s coverage is due to the broad statutory definition of a security. 36   
In deciding whether a particular investment vehicle is a security, the investors’ perceptions 
and expectations will be a significant factor.37 EC adopts the narrow definition. In Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFiD) the term ‘securities’ is only used for shares, long and 
medium term debt securities and hybrids between these two types.38 Ordinary shareholders 
provide the firm with equity capital and receive in return, at the latest with the dissolution of 
the company, an entitlement to the yield remaining after deduction of contractual liabilities. 
Like a loan, a debt security is a simple credit contract. Shares, debt securities and hybrids are 
all used by companies (and with respect to debt securities, by the state) in order to raise capital. 
Short term debt securities are called ‘money-market instruments’.39 Futures, options, swaps 
and units of investment funds are only financial instruments. The EC differ from the US in 
that they do not view financial instruments as securities. It is interesting that, different from 
the US and the EC, the UK does not define a security but rather focus on investments. FSMA 
2000 stated that an investment includes any asset, right or interest. 40  According to its 
definition, investment includes security. The term Securities used in this paper refers mainly to 
the narrow definition. Special instruments are not covered by this paper. 
 
The definition of regulated activities is central to the system of regulation because it defines 
the sphere of activity in respect of which authorization is required.41 Before turning to the 
regulated activities, we should verify who has the right to do it. FSMA 2000 states that any 
firm wishing to do a regulated activity in the UK by way of business must be authorized or 
                                                 
36 Section 2(1) of Securities Act 1933 is representative: The term “security”means any note, stock, treasury stock, 
bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, 
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, 
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other 
mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index 
of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or 
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a “security”, or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or 
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the 
foregoing. 
37 Thomas Lee Hazen, The law of securities regulation 4th edition (West Group, 2002), 30 
38 Directive 2004/39/EC (OJ 2004 L145/1) of 21 April 2004, art 4 (1). 
39 Ibid 
40 22 (4) of FSMA 2000. 
41 See MacNeil, Introduction to the law, above, n.12, 64. 
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exempt.42 Authorization is achieved by applying to the FSA for permission to engage in the 
relevant activity.43 FSMA 2000 and the secondary legislation (in particular the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001) 44  set out the exact 
circumstances where authorization is required and the consequences of not obtaining it. 
Authorization is the cornerstone of the regulatory system as it represents an initial vetting 
process for firms wishing to operate in the financial services market and ensures their 
ongoing scrutiny by the FSA. In addition to the requirement for firms to seek authorization, 
certain individuals within the firm must seek individual approval from the FSA. In the UK a 
person engaging in regulated activities without authorization and approval will be 
committing a criminal offence. 45  Regarding regulated activities, FSMA 2000 states as 
follows:46 
An activities is a regulated activity for the purposes of this Act if it is an activity of a specified kind which is 
carried on by way of business and – 
(a) relates to an investment of a specified kind; 
(b) in the case of an activity of a kind which is also specified for the purposes of this paragraph, is carried on in 
relation to property of any kind. 
Section 22 explains further that “Investment” includes any asset, right or interest.47 But more 
detailed definitions of specified activities and investments are not contained in FSMA 2000 
itself. Instead, they are found in Regulated Activities Order 200148 defined by the Treasury. 
 
 
2.2.4 The Objectives of Securities Regulation 
 
Different objectives will automatically lead us in different directions especially concerning 
legal principles and approach. Therefore to know the objectives of securities regulation is 
important. The essential goal of securities regulation is to create a dynamic and competitive 
market to protect investors. The protection of investors is the basic and most important aim 
of securities regulation. International comparisons suggest that both the UK and the USA 
                                                 
42 FSMA 2000 Part II section 19. 
43 FSMA 2000 Part IV Permission to carry on regulated activities. 
44 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001, SI 2001/544, Generally 
referred to as the “RAO”. 
45 FSMA 2000 Section 23. 
46 FSMA 2000  Section 22 (1). 
47 FSMA 2000 Section 22 (4). 
48 See MacNeil, Introduction to the law, above, n.12, 102, 107. 
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offer investors high levels of protection.49 The unique characteristics of securities markets, 
i.e. information intensive, abundance of asymmetric information and significant agency 
problems, therefore, investors can best be protected by making certain that they all trade on 
the basis of equal information, this is often referred to as ‘market egalitarianism’. In order to 
get equal information, issuers must make all the information transparent for the investors and 
make transparency in securities markets far more important than any other field. It is not 
surprising that mandatory disclosure is the mainstay principle of the securities regulation. 
The disclosure requirements have been seen as a less intrusive and more successful 
regulatory mechanism, which serves competitive, efficiency and prudential concerns in the 
securities markets.50  Furthermore, most securities regulators seeks to ensure that market 
participants behave within ethical and statutory parameters that do not harm the market. In 
other words, regulation is here to influence market behavior that can damage market 
integrity, such as market manipulation, fraud, mis-selling, insider dealing and the like. The 
UK FSMA 2000 provides four objectives, they are: to maintain market confidence in the 
financial system, to promote public awareness of the financial system, to secure the 
appropriate degree of protection of consumers and to reduce financial crime. 51  These 
objectives have their basis in the market failures that afflict financial markets; market 
manipulation, systemic problems, asymmetries in information, incomplete contracts and 
difficulties in the enforcement of contracts. Another reference may be made to the statement 
contained in the influential International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
document Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation. 52  It states that the core 
objectives of securities regulation are the protection of investors; ensuring that markets are 
fair, efficient and transparent; and the reduction of systemic risk.53 Since September 11th, 
one might add the elimination of financial crime and international terrorism as a separate 
goal. Apart from these three objectives there are other broader social objectives, such as 
combating organized crime or facilitating home ownership and provides the justification for 
many other regulations. Based on these objectives, the document sets out 30 principles of 
                                                 
49 See R.La Porta, F.Lopez-de-Silanes,, A. Schleiter and R.Vishny, ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ 
(1997) 52 Journal of Finance, 1131. 
50 Mahmood Bagheri and  Chizu Nakajima, ‘Competition and integration among stock exchanges: the dilemma 
of conflicting regulatory objetives and strategies’ (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 69. 
51 FSMA 2000, ss. 2, 3-6. 
52  See International Organization of Securities Commissions, ‘Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation’, (May 2003), 
available at:  http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf  (last visited, September 2008). 
53 Ibid,1. 
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securities regulation. According to an IOSCO spokesperson, “[a] country’s adherence to 
these 30 principles will install confidence in international investors and enhance that 
country’s participation in the global financial community.”54  
 
2.3 Securities Markets Regulator 
 
A unique feature of securities regulatory systems is the widespread use of SROs to carry out 
regulatory functions. In the past securities exchanges were used as the main regulator but this 
situation has changed because of the securities markets becoming formally regulated. It 
raises the question, if SROs are not suitable to be regulators, who should be responsible for 
regulating securities markets? Current practice indicates that national public regulators have 
now become more widely accepted around the globe. Although today the majority of 
regulation duties have already been transferred to public regulatory agencies, securities 
exchanges still undertake some responsibilities. This raises another question, in the latter, 
what role should national public regulators play? The answer to this question, as well as the 
responsibilities and functions of the regulator will be discussed in the following section.  
 
2.3.1 National Public Securities Markets Regulators  
 
Securities exchanges predate government agencies as regulators of the securities market. 
Before the 1930s in the era of self-regulation55 governments interfered little in the operation 
of securities markets, largely leaving them to regulate themselves. However, this situation 
did not last long. The first formal national regulator was established in the United States with 
the1934 Exchange Act. The result was a radical transformation in the relationship between 
securities exchanges and the government. What happened in the United States was later to 
provide a model subsequently followed by most countries reflecting the prevailing mood. 
Now the need for public regulators to oversee operations within the securities markets have 
been recognized the world over. 
 
2.3.1.1 The Rationale of National Public Regulator 
 
                                                 
54 International Organization of Securities Commissions, Press Communique 1 (1998). 
55 For more details see 2.2.1.1 ‘The era of self-regulation’. 
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Firstly, the history of securities regulation has shown that self-regulation is often followed by 
crisis and scandals.56 These crises have resulted in a high degree of government intervention 
in order to prevent a complete financial collapse. Therefore, securities regulation has been 
changed from self-regulation to government regulation. Regulators always go hand in hand 
with regulation. Thus, changes in regulation have required that the securities markets 
regulator need to be changed from SROs to a national public regulator.  Secondly, while 
exchanges arguably have a clear picture of trading activity in their markets, they often lack 
the investigative powers that government entities usually possess. SROs in the United States, 
for example, do not possess power to subpoena entities or individuals. 57 Moreover, the 
sanctions available to them are limited as they are often exhausted after expulsion from the 
exchange. Thus, the enforcement apparatus of the securities exchange has many 
imperfections. Thirdly, exchange demutualization challenged the regulatory position of 
securities exchanges. Starting from 1993, one after the other, most stock exchanges 
“demutualized”: they abandoned their traditional non-profit mutual membership structure in 
favor of a for-profit corporate format. 58  Some privatized securities exchanges took the 
additional step of listing their shares on their own markets. As a result of demutualization, 
the ownership structure of stock exchanges changed. While exchanges were traditionally 
accused of harboring a “clubby” perspective in terms of protecting the interests of their 
members, they are now oriented toward maximizing profits for their shareholders. The 
orientation of the exchange operation changes from catering to the interests of its members to 
catering to the interests of its shareholders. Demutualization of securities exchange 
ownership also introduces new and potentially significant conflicts of interest.59 The conflict 
between the exchange’s business goals and regulatory mission is apparent. The conflicts of 
interest inherent in demutualized securities exchanges raised the question: are securities 
exchanges that are designed to maximize shareholder value well-suited to regulate their own 
markets? Andreas Fleckner, for example, has questioned whether an exchange can perform 
its role as guarantor of the quality of listed firms and as a link for the transmission of accurate 
information to investors when the financial interests of the exchange’s shareholders may be 
in conflict. 60  Demutualization led to propose a restructuring of the securities markets 
                                                 
56 For more details see 2.2.1.2,  ‘The era of government regulation’. 
57 Ernest E. Badway & Jonathan M. Busch, ‘Ending Securities Industry Self-Regulation as We Know It’ (2005)  
57 Rutgers Law Review, 1351, 1355.  
58 For more details see 1.3.2.2,  ‘Securities exchanges demutualization’. 
59 For more details see 1.3.2.3, ‘Conflict of interest under demutualized securities exchanges’. 
60 Andreas M. Fleckner, ‘Stock exchanges at the crossroads’ (2006) 74 Fordham Law Review, 2541. 
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regulatory framework, for example, to create new government regulatory bodies. If the 
activities of exchanges become subject to supervision by a government agency, it will help to 
overcome the perception that exchanges are being operated only for the benefit of their 
members.  
 
2.3.1.2 The Roles of National Public Regulators 
 
A national financial regulator performs five main tasks: authorization of market participants; 
the provision of information to enhance market transparency; surveillance to ensure that the 
regulatory code is obeyed; enforcement of the code and disciplining of transgressors and the 
development of policy that keeps the regulatory code up to date.61 Based on Stavros Gadinis 
and Howell E. Jackson’s findings, three distinct models of allocation of regulatory powers 
can be identified: Government-led Model, Flexibility Model and Cooperation Model.62  
 
Countries in the “Government-led Model” (France, Germany, and Japan) preserve significant 
authority for central government to control securities markets regulation, albeit with a 
relatively limited enforcement apparatus. In all the Government-led Model jurisdictions, the 
central government has shaped the securities regulatory framework to maintain important 
channels of influence in the operation of market institutions. Sometimes, these channels of 
influence are direct, as powers to approve the establishment of a securities exchange or a 
clearinghouse rest with a central government official, such as a Minister.63 Often, these 
channels are indirect, expressed through a tight relationship between the central government 
and the administrative agency responsible for the regulatory oversight of the securities 
markets. For example, the Japanese Financial Services Agency (JFSA) is positioned under 
the Prime Minister’s Cabinet in the Japanese regulatory hierarchy, and some of its rules 
require the Prime Minister’s approval before implementation. In France, all the Autorité des 
Marchés Financiers (AMF) rules require the approval of the Ministry of Finance before 
implementation. Moreover, the Ministry can influence the AMF deliberation process through 
                                                 
61 John Eatwell, ‘New issues in international financial regulation’ in in Eilis Ferran and Charles A E Goodhart 
(eds), Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the 21st Century (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001), 239. 
62 Stavros Gadinis and Howell E. Jackson, ‘Markets as regulators: A survey’ (2007) 80 Southern California 
Law Review, 1239. 
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its directly appointed representative on the AMF board.64In this way, central governments in 
these jurisdictions maintain a strong grip over the regulation of securities markets. 
 
The “Flexibility Model” countries (the United Kingdom, Hong Kong and Australia) grant 
significant leeway to market participants in performing their regulatory obligations, but rely 
on government agencies to set general policies and maintain some enforcement. Agencies in 
the Flexibility Model enjoy greater independence from central government and greater 
flexibility in monitoring and enforcing securities laws.  Within the Flexibility Model, central 
governments have provided more independence to administrative agencies and market 
infrastructure institutions, maintaining only limited power to affect their day-to-day operation 
and decision making process. Thus for governments their power over securities markets 
operation consists only of approving the agency decision to establish a new stock exchange 
or clearinghouse.  
 
The “Cooperation Model” countries (the United States and Canada) assign a broad range of 
power to market participants in almost all aspects of securities regulation but also maintain 
strong and overlapping oversight of market activity through well-endowed governmental 
agencies with more robust enforcement traditions. The essence of the Cooperation Model lies 
in the ways government agencies and SROs work together to regulate securities markets 
effectively. For example, the SEC has delegated significant authority to private sector bodies. 
For securities firms, it has allowed many oversight responsibilities to be carried on by the 
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), a “self regulatory organization” (SRO). 
The securities exchanges are also SROs and thus exercise certain regulatory authority over 
their membership and over the corporations whose shares they list. The SEC, however, may 
veto rulings of these nongovernmental bodies and may require them to modify their rules (or 
adopt new ones) as well as to exercise further oversight over them. 
 
 
2.3.2 The Division of Regulatory Responsibilities 
 
The structure of the securities markets regulator may vary from a single-agency specialized 
in securities regulation to a unified regulator that regulates more than one sector. There are 
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two basic models of securities regulatory framework: the American type—multiple 
regulators and the British type—single regulator.  
 
 2.3.2.1 The American Type 
 
In the United States, securities markets, futures markets, government bond markets and banks 
have different regulators. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created the SEC —an 
independent regulatory body—responsible for making and enforcing securities law so as to 
protect investors. The SEC consists of five presidential-appointed Commissioners, four 
Divisions and 18 Offices. With approximately 3,100 staff, the SEC is small by federal agency 
standards. Headquartered in Washington DC, the SEC has 11 regional and district Offices 
throughout the country. 65  The SEC primary function is securities regulation and market 
efficiency. The SEC has been given broad authority to adopt rules and regulations to maintain 
fair and orderly securities markets. The federal securities laws require companies that sell 
securities to the public to register with the SEC. In addition to the SEC, the Commodities 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) regulates the futures markets, whose activities have 
expanded from trading in future contracts on agricultural commodities to trading in futures on 
securities indexes. Insurance regulation is based almost entirely at the state level. States have 
been the primary regulator for insurance for over 135 years. At this moment, three federal 
regulators (the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [FDIC] 
and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency [OCC]) have separate but overlapping 
jurisdictions with respect to commercial banks. The National Credit Union Administration 
(NCUA) is the independent federal agency that charters and supervises federal credit unions. 
 
The United States current regulatory structure may have been appropriate at one time but it 
was not built to address the modern financial system with its diversity of market participants, 
innovation, complexity of financial instruments, convergence of financial intermediaries and 
trading platforms, global integration and interconnectedness among financial institutions, 
investors and markets.66 In March 2008 the Untied States Treasury released Blueprint for a 
                                                 
65 Securities Exchange Commission website, available at: http://www.sec.gov/. 
66  Henry M. Paulson, ‘Remarks by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Blueprint for Regulatory Reform’ 
available at: http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp897.htm (last visited, September 2008). 
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Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure 67  in order to adapt to the dynamic U.S. 
marketplace while improving oversight. Blueprint recommends a regulatory model based on 
objectives. This model would have three regulators: a market stability regulator focused solely 
on market stability across the entire financial sector; a prudential financial regulator focused 
on safety and soundness of those institutions supported by a federal guarantee and a conduct 
of business regulator focused on protecting consumers and investors.68 A major advantage of 
this structure is its timelessness and its flexibility. It can more easily respond and adapt to the 
ever-changing marketplace because it is organized by regulatory objective rather than by 
financial institution category. According to the Blueprint recommendation all federal bank 
regulators will consolidate into a single prudential regulator. By its singular focus on 
prudential regulation that ensures the safety and soundness of institutions with federal 
guarantees, this regulator would serve a role similar to the current OCC. Many of the SEC and 
CFTC roles will transfer to conduct of business regulator. 
 
Another typical example of the American type is China. Similar to the United States, in 
China, securities markets, insurance business and banks also have separate regulators. The 
main securities regulatory body China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was 
created in 1992 and governs over all securities exchanges and future markets activity within 
the People’s Republic of China. Similar in its charge to the SEC, the CSRC is mandated to 
perform functions such as: creating and reviewing securities legislation; regulating the 
trading, issuing and settlement of stocks, fixed income securities and securities funds; 
supervising the conduct of shareholders and securities brokers; overseeing the issuance of 
overseas company listings and offerings (such as H-Shares listed on the Hong Kong 
Exchange). 69  The CSRC includes more than 30 regulatory bureaus that cover different 
geographic regions of the country, and two supervisory bureaus at the nation’s two largest 
securities exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen.  The China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (CIRC) was set up in 1998 to regulate the insurance market and promote its 
development. Originally, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) was responsible for insurance 
but this sector was transferred to the CIRC to deepen financial reforms, minimize financial 
                                                 
67 United States Treasury: ‘Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure’  March 2008, available at: 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf (last visited, September 2008). 
68 Ibid. 
69 See China Securities Regulatory Commission website,  
available at: http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n4001948/ (last visited, September 2008). 
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risks and shore up the fledgling financial services industry. China’s banking regulatory body, 
the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), was established in Beijing in 2003. The 
regulatory objectives of the CBRC are to protect the interests of depositors and consumers; 
maintain market confidence through prudential and effective supervision; enhance public 
knowledge of modern finance and combat financial crimes.70 
 
 
2.3.2.2 The British Type 
 
Different from the American model, the UK established a single statutory regulator- 
Financial Services Authority (FSA)-for financial services. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Gordon Brown, announced in May 1997 that the responsibilities for financial services 
regulation in the UK would be merged into a single entity.71 This would entail the bringing 
together of nine regulatory bodies,72 including those responsible for banking, securities and 
insurance business, and for markets and exchanges. The FSA is the single direct statutory 
“super-regulator” responsible for making rules, regulations, and codes that govern the entire 
financial services industry.73 It has a single handbook of rules and guidance. However, the 
UK was not the first country to introduce a single financial services regulator. The single 
regulator was created in Norway in 1986, which then was followed by Denmark in 1988 and 
Sweden in 1991. Although a few other countries already have single financial services 
regulators the FSA is the first and the most famous in a major international financial centre. 
Meanwhile, there has been a reconsideration of regulatory structures in some other countries. 
East Asian countries like Japan and South Korea followed suit in the late nineties. Japan 
introduced a single regulator (the Financial Supervisory Authority) covering banking, 
securities and insurance in June 1998, as did Korea in April 1998 with the new Financial 
Supervisory Service which was modeled explicitly on the UK’s FSA. 
 
                                                 
70 See China Banking Regulatory Commission website,  
available at: http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/home/jsp/index.jsp (last visited, September 2008). 
71  Clive Briault, ‘The Rationale for a Single National Financial Services Regulator’ (1999) May FSA 
Occasional Papers in Financial Regulation.  
72 The Securities and Investments Board, the Personal Investment Authority, the Investment Management 
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The main argument is that a single financial regulator is superior as it mirrors the nature of 
modern financial markets where old distinctions between different sectors and different 
products have broken down. Accompanied by a blurring of the boundaries between sectors 
and products, the number of the financial conglomerates (usually defined as a group which 
undertakes at least two major financial services activities) has increased. The “emergence of 
financial conglomerates has challenged traditional demarcations between regulatory 
agencies”74 and the “boundaries between regulators simply no longer reflect the economic 
reality of the industry”. 75  There is a clear need for regulatory oversight of a financial 
conglomerate as a whole, since there may be “risks arising within the group … that are not 
adequately addressed by any of the specialist prudential supervisory agencies that undertake 
their work on a solo basis”. 76  
 
Another argument in favour of a single regulator is that it will be more efficient in allocating 
resources. A single regulator’s position allows it to look across the entire financial industry 
and devote regulatory resources (both human as well as financial resources) to where they are 
most needed.  
 
The supporters of a ‘single market regulator’ system further argue that in the case of a single 
market regulator the responsibility and accountability is clear. The single regulator cannot 
transfer the blame of any failure to another regulatory body. If a single regulator is given a 
clear set of responsibilities then it ought to be possible to increase the transparency and 
accountability of the single regulator, 77  not least in terms of its accountability for 
performance against its statutory objectives, for the regulatory regime, for the costs of 
regulation, for its disciplinary policies, and for regulatory failures.78 
 
Another argument in favour of a single regulator is information sharing. Single regulators 
will have the advantage of sharing information among various regulating divisions which 
                                                 
74 Goodhart, C A E, Hartmann, P, Llewellyn, D T, Rojas-Suarez, L and Weisbrod, S, Financial Regulation. 
(Routledge, London and New York, 1998), 143.  
75 Taylor, M, ‘Peak Practice: How to reform the UK’s regulatory system’ Centre for the Study of Financial 
Innovation, London, 1996, October, p4. 
76 See Goodhart et. al., Financial Regulation, above, n.74, 148. 
77 Taylor, M, “Twin Peaks”: A regulatory structure for the new century. Centre for the Study of Financial 
Innovation, London, 1995 December. 
78 See Briault, ‘Single regulator’, above, n.71.  
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will go a long way toward preventing fraud as well as in handling crisis. Multiple regulators 
have problems in sharing information on time.  
 
2.3.3 The Functions of Securities Markets Regulators 
 
The main functions of a regulator are making and enforcing regulations. The securities 
industry is simultaneously governed by specific rules and general principles. In most cases, the 
securities industry is regulated by specific requirements set forth in rules. Simultaneously, the 
securities industry is also governed by broad principles largely set forth in statutes and the 
common law. Therefore, there are two different approaches toward making regulations: a 
rules-based approach and a principles-based approach. It is also very important for the 
regulator to be able to enforce its regulations. “Enforcement” refers to the agency’s ability to 
both affect compliance with regulation (through active supervision) and its ability to bring an 
action against a person or entity that has violated regulations.79 When conduct violates a rule, 
the regulatory response is clear – enforce the rule.  This straightforward enforcement of a rule 
can be called a “rules-based” enforcement action. When the conduct violates a broader 
principle it is a principles-based enforcement action. Principles-based enforcement actions 
reflect the demand that regulators punish conduct violating principles reflecting public values. 
For the most part, the public prefers the decisiveness of principles-based enforcement. In 
contrast, the regulated prefer the more predictable rulemaking approach. To some extent, these 
attitudes reflect different assumptions about the regulatory scheme and its goals. This paper 
does not take a position on whether a rules-based approach is better than a principles-based 
approach, as that remains an open issue that requires further research. 
 
 2.3.3.1 Rules-based Approach 
 
Before taking a rule-based approach regulator develop norms through enforcement actions, 
but that approach has been attacked as introducing uncertainty into the system. The first 
variation of the critique was set forth in a 1982 book by former SEC Commissioner Roberta 
Karmel.80 In that book, Karmel criticized the tendency of the SEC to make policy through 
enforcement actions rather than through rulemaking. As a result, she argued the SEC was 
                                                 
79 See Carvajal and Elliott, ‘Strengths and Weaknesses’, above, n.5. 
80 Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation by Prosecution: The Securities and Exchange Commission versus Corporate 
America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982). 
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unnecessarily antagonistic towards business and pursued cases that were only tenuously 
related to securities regulation. In a later article Harvey Pitt coined the phrase “Regulation by 
Enforcement”.81 Pitt used the phrase to criticize the SEC’s efforts against insider trading. 
Insider trading was and still is an offense where the SEC and Congress have not precisely 
defined the applicable legal norm. Instead, the current body of law governing insider trading 
was created in an ad hoc way through enforcement actions pursued by SEC staff and 
approved by lower courts.82 As a result, Pitt argued individuals do not have clear notice as to 
what conduct is insider trading.  
 
The Regulation by Enforcement critique reflects a general sense that norms are best initiated 
by rulemaking while enforcement actions should merely enact previously defined rules. It 
held up rulemaking as the ideal generator of norms governing the securities industry. 
 
A “rules-based” regulatory system, like those the United States uses, relies on stating specific 
requirements or prohibiting certain actions by law. Rulemaking reflects the mentality that 
securities regulation is a technical enterprise that should be left to experts who have created a 
comprehensive, efficient, administrative scheme.  
 
The main advantage of a rules-based regulatory regime is its predictability. The regulated 
want clear rules that specifically tell them what they can’t do, and more importantly, what 
they can do. The regulated may view questionable conduct as justified because the rules are 
unclear. Their preferred response is that the regulator clarifies the law not just punishes the 
conduct. The rules-based approach can satisfy industry demand for specificity with regard to 
legal duties and compliance responsibilities. It can give a clear baseline of acceptable 
conduct with regard to investor protection. It also can provide for ease of communication 
within firms with regard to standards and requirements while affording regulators clear 
standards and requirements to use in the monitoring and enforcement of those firms. The 
regulated can make decisions without the worry that their actions will be second-guessed by 
regulators. When conduct violates a rule, the regulatory response is clear – enforce the rule. 
This straightforward enforcement of a rule is called a “rules-based” enforcement action.83  
                                                 
81 See Harvey L. Pitt and Karen L. Shapiro, ‘Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead At the Next 
Decade’ (1990) 7 Yale Journal On Regulation, 149. 
82 Ibid.,178.  
83 James J. Park, ‘The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation’ (2007) 57 Duke Law Journal, 625.  
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The second characteristic is that regulatory norms be developed by experts. Because the 
securities markets are complex, only specialists with experience are qualified to govern them 
and can assess what rules are appropriate. An administrative agency such as the SEC depends 
on its expertise in establishing its legitimacy to regulate. The SEC has such expertise because 
it deals with the securities industry on a constant basis. It supervises registration of public 
offerings, does inspections of brokerage firms and encourages investor education. 
Rulemaking allows experts with deep industry knowledge to carefully define regulatory 
norms. The rules that administrative experts promulgate are part of a coherent framework 
that takes into consideration the holistic experience of the agency. 
 
The third characteristic is that rules should be defined through a process with procedural 
safeguards. Because the securities industry is so complex, even experts may make mistakes 
when promulgating rules. Thus, the rulemaking process as governed by the Administrative 
Procedure Act requires that a rule may only be passed after the regulated and other interested 
parties are given a significant amount of notice and opportunity for comment. The notice and 
comment period helps regulators ensure that they are not missing considerations that militate 
against the adoption of the rule. 
  
2.3.3.2 Principles-based Approach 
 
The term “principles” can be used simply to refer to general rules, or also to suggest that these 
rules are implicitly higher in the implicit or explicit hierarchy of norms than more detailed 
rules: they express the fundamental obligations that all should observe.84 Principles-based 
regulation means moving away from reliance on detailed, prescriptive rules and relying more 
on high-level, broadly stated rules or principles to set the standards by which regulated firms 
must conduct business.85 John Tiner, former chief executive of the FSA, has remarked that 
principles-based regulation is essentially about outcomes or ends. It allows firms to decide 
                                                 
84 Julia Black, ‘Making a success of principle-based regulation’ (2007) 1 (3) Law and Financial Markets Review, 
192. 
85 Ibid, 191. 
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how best to achieve required outcomes and as such, it allows a much greater alignment of 
regulation with good business practice.86  
 
Principles-based regulation was a response to recognize that traditional, rule oriented legal 
regimes are limited in their ability to deal with some broader organizational and cultural 
problems. It is against these backdrops that a clarion call has been raised in recent years in 
countries in the common law world to reform the way laws are drafted in those countries. 
 
Compared with the rules-based approach’s decreased flexibility, the first outstanding 
advantage of principles-based approach is to provide flexibility to regulated entities in the 
way they comply with the legislation. The need for a more flexible style of drafting is most 
keenly felt in the financial industry because of the fast pace of change in that industry. 
Flexibility makes entities free to choose the practices and controls to adopt in order to secure 
the regulatory outcomes. There may be more than one way to achieve these outcomes. The 
primary responsibility for achieving these remains is belonging to each firm’s senior 
management. This in turn encourages innovation and competition and aligns legislation with 
good business practices.87  
 
Secondly, principles-based legislation is scaleable in that the legislative requirement can be 
adjusted to fit a product or an entity.88 Based on the rules-based approach, regulators could 
set themselves the task of creating a rule for every conceivable source of risk or detriment, 
but they would not succeed in this. The complexity of the financial system means that the 
number of ways in which firms can damage markets, investors or themselves is increasing 
exponentially. It is impossible to foresee every development in the future and find a set of 
rules that works for all products or for all entities. Further, the specific nature of the rules 
also makes it more likely that something relevant will be left out. The legislator will forever 
be trying to play catch up with the rapidly changing environment. Since no system of rules 
ever can anticipate all cases, rules would need to be amended frequently. For example, the 
Singapore Securities and Futures Act was amended no less than 6 times (often substantially) 
                                                 
86 John Tiner, Speech before APCIMS Annual Conference (Oct. 13, 2006), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2006/1013_jt.shtml. 
87 See John Tiner, ‘Principles-based regulation: the EU context’ available at: 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2006/1013_jt.shtml (last visited, August 2008). 
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since its enactment in 2001.89 One reason for this is that the Act had to be modified each time 
a new investment product was introduced into the markets; this was due to the Act’s product-
specific nature. A law drafted in terms of well expressed outcomes, on the other hand, is less 
likely to become outdated or need frequent amendments.  
Thirdly, a rules-based approach can result in increased implementation and compliance costs. 
Financial firms face many different types of conflict of interest and the number grows every 
day as business practices evolve. An army of regulators could be employed solely to codify 
these and write rules specifying how they should be managed. The detailed nature of the 
rules encourages a loophole mentality where much expense and effort is wasted on looking 
for and defending loopholes in the law. It is therefore much more efficient to make it clear to 
firms that they must manage all types of conflict capable of creating detriment and to explain 
to regulators and other interested parties how they do it.  
Finally, a principles-based approach is more readily comprehensible when compared to the 
detailed, convoluted and voluminous nature of prescriptive legislation. Both the regulated 
and regulator can better understand and appreciate the policy behind the law as it is stated 
upfront rather than lost in a mass of detail.  
 
In addition, as regulatory rule book becomes thicker and more convoluted by the day, the 
purpose and spirit of each rule becomes lost to the ones it is intended to govern. Compliance 
becomes merely a matter of satisfying the regulator. In theory at least, principles-based 
legislation ought to achieve higher levels of compliance.90 By requiring entities to comply 
with the spirit of the law rather than the letter of the law,91 they are forced to come to grips 
with the reasons behind a law rather than blindly follow it. Further, it does away with the 
counter-productive practice of looking for or defending loopholes in the law. 
 
                                                 
89 Ter Kim Cheu, ‘From ‘fussy’ to ‘fuzzy’: the priciples-based approach to legislative drafting’ available at: 
http://www.agc.gov.my/agc/agc/rev/agcjc/2nd/pdf/session3/Singapore.pdf (last visited, July 2008). 
90 See Tiner, ‘Principles-based regulation’, above, n.87.  
91 The letter of the law versus the spirit of the law is an idiomatic antithesis. When one obeys the letter of the law 
but not the spirit, he is obeying the literal interpretation of the words (the letter) of the law, but not the intent of 
those who wrote the law. Conversely, when one obeys the spirit of the law but not the letter, he is doing what the 
authors of the law intended, though not adhering to the literal wording. 
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A principles-based approach has lots of advantages but also brings its own drawbacks. Some 
commentators point out that a principles-based regime shifts some of the regulatory burden 
to industry, in terms of the costs of identifying what constitutes compliance with broadly-
worded regulatory principles.92 In a principles-based system, how a principle will be applied 
remains at the discretion of the regulator, but apart from this, principles-based regulation 
reduces the rules transparency essential for a competitive market. A rules-based regime tells 
everyone what is required to enter a field and compete. A principles-based regime is open to 
interpretation by a regulator and could be used to deny entry to would-be competitors. 
 
The move towards principles-based legislation also will often create uncertainty among the 
regulated community. They now have little choice but to devise their own practices to meet 
the spirit and intent of the law when previously they need only follow it to the letter. Even so 
they will not know for certain that their practices will pass muster with the regulator or the 
courts. Additional guidance is therefore desirable to foster certainty and predictability in the 
affected industry. For example, the UK FSA is required under the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 to issue codes of practice “for the purpose of helping to determine whether 
or not a person’s conduct complies with a statement of principle”.93  
 
From an early stage, the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) has been a 
thought leader on principles-based financial services regulation. The FSA’s approach is built 
on a framework of principles, although the FSA also has a large rulebook to accompany the 
eleven different sets of principles it has laid out. The FSA claimed that they have been a 
principles-based regulator since 2001.94 The FSA moved to a comprehensive principles-
based regime in 2003.95  During the years 2007 and 2008, the FSA aimed to do away with 
roughly half of the contents of the rule book and thereby take another step closer to 
principles-based regulation.96 
 
In addition to the UK, the province of British Columbia (B.C.), Canada, is an ambitious 
champion of principles-based securities regulation and outcome oriented regulatory practice. 
                                                 
92 Louis Kaplow, ‘Rules versus Principles: An Economic Analysis’ (1992) 42 Duke Law Journal, 557, 559-60. 
93 Section 64 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. 
94 See Tiner, ‘Principles-based regulation’, above, n.87.  
95 Christie L Ford, ‘New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation’ (2008) 45 
American Business Law Journal, 1. 
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In 2004, British Columbia passed a new bill (bill 38) to create a new Securities Act with the 
intention of creating a responsive, flexible regulatory system. 97  Instead of detailed, 
prescriptive rules, a number of provisions of the Act were drafted generally and briefly. Bill 
38 and its associated proposed rules and regulations (know as the B.C. Model) would have 
established the most comprehensively principles-based regime in securities regulation in 
North America.98 
 
With the trends towards principles-based regulation the United States also cannot avoid it. 
Hank Paulson, US Treasury Secretary, has suggested that in order to preserve its global 
competitiveness, the United States should move toward a more flexible, U.K.-style approach 
to regulating capital markets.99 Even the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, often 
characterized internationally as a particularly rule-oriented and prescriptive securities 
regulator, has made recent moves toward a more principles-based approach. The primary 
U.S. accounting standard-setter, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, was criticized in 
the wake of the Enron debacle for relying too much on detailed rules to determine 
appropriate accounting treatment with respect to accounting standards. Thereafter, 
considerable work went into drafting more “principles-based” Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
97 Bill 38-2004, Securities Act, 5th Sess., 37th Parl., British Columbia, 2004, §203. Bill 38 and the research 
studies and other documents associated with it are available on the BCSC website at www.bcsc.bc.ca. 
98 See Ford, ‘Principles-Based Securities Regulation’, above, n.95.  
99 Jeremy Grant and Krishna Guha, ‘Paulson Seeks British-Style Flexibility in Capital Markets’ (2006) 21 
November Financial  Times (U.K.), at Ed1. 
Chapter Three: Internationalization 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the first two chapters we have discussed the basic concepts of securities market, securities 
exchange, securities regulation and regulator. But in order to fully understand the topic of the 
thesis we also need to know the background to international securities regulation. We will now 
look at, on what kind of platform does the international securities regulation performs. 
Today’s world is totally different from the history even as little as a decade ago. History told 
us the journey to find the trade route to China took medieval Italian traveller Marco Polo 15 
years. Now, a European trader wanting to buy goods in China can get it in a minute through 
the internet. The world is increasingly international, and many facets of society have 
undergone a global metamorphosis. It is difficult to imagine any securities market that has not 
been impacted to some degree by this kind of the trend toward internationalization. A dramatic 
internationalization trend is presently transforming the nature of securities markets and the 
nature of transactions conducted in those markets. Propelled by advancing technology, global 
linkages are increasingly being forged and significant trans-national movements of capital 
have become the norm rather than the exception. 1  As a result, securities markets have 
increased their international scope. In other words, today’s capital markets know no national 
boundaries.  
 
Internationalization provides a new platform for international securities regulation. In order to 
have a clear and full picture of international securities regulation, we must firstly establish a 
working definition of internationalization and an understanding of “securities market 
internationalization” and why it is so significant to build up the legal system of international 
securities regulation.   
 
This chapter evaluates the forces encouraging the development of international securities 
markets, the obstacles that must be overcome, and the risks. It is necessary to understand the 
causes and magnitude of this phenomenon in order to evaluate different regulatory 
                                                 
1  Kellye Y. Testy, ‘Comity and Cooperation: Securities Regulation in a Global Marketplace’ (1994) 45 
Alabama Law Review, 927, 928. 
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approaches. Finally, it outlines the influences to be faced as the span of securities trading 
stretches beyond the scope of national regulatory regimes. 
 
3.2 The Characteristics of Internationalization 
 
 3.2.1 Defining Internationalization 
 
Internationalization is a common concept used to describe the interconnectedness of the 
world’s economies and cultures. The purpose of internationalization is to make localization 
easier, faster, higher quality and more cost-effective. It allows holders of mobile assets to pick 
and choose the country in which they do business, and their decisions will be based at least in 
part on the relative attractiveness of each country’s policies.2 
 
While precise, the above definitions are highly abstract. In the specific securities regulation 
field, when internationalization is applied to securities markets, what does it mean? The 
liberalization of trade in securities market is often called “securities market 
internationalization”. Finance theorists have agreed upon a definition: markets for assets 
(bonds or stocks) are internationalized if assets with the same return and risk characteristics 
have the same price in different countries.3 The internationalization of markets means that a 
substantial number of transactions involve participants and financial assets are from different 
nations.4 It requires the removal of legal barriers and regulatory restrictions to international 
financial flows. It assumes integration of markets, mobility of actors, interconnectedness, and 
multilateral relations. A true international securities market is one in which investors and 
issuers have no incentives to restrict their securities activities to their own national 
jurisdiction.5 The institutional form of such a market might be either a central market or a set 
of competing decentralized markets. In such a market, an issuer or borrower from any part of 
                                                 
2 Henry Laurence, ‘Spawning The SEC’ (1999) 6 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies,  647. 
3 Mustafa N. Gultekin et al., ‘Capital Controls and International Capital Market Segmentation: The Evidence 
from the Japanese and American Stock Markets’ (1989) 44 Journal of Finance, 849; Rene M. Stulz, ‘A Model of 
International Asset Pricing’ (1981) 9 The Journal of Financial Economics, 383.  
4 Maura B. Perry, Note, ‘A Challenge Postponed: Market 2000 Complacency in Response to Regulatory 
Competition for International Equity Markets’ (1994) 34 Virginia Journal of International Law Spring, 701.  
5 David E. Van Zandt, ‘The Regulatory and institutional conditions for an international securities market’ (1991) 
32 Virginia Journal of International Law, 47. 
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the globe could raise funds from investors in all other parts of the globe. Likewise, investors 
around the world would compete on an equal footing for new issues of securities.  
   
Regarding the primary market, the distinctions between offerings into a domestic market and 
a foreign market would disappear. The allocation of such securities would depend not on 
domestic regulation, but rather on the distribution of risk and return preferences of investors 
around the world. 
 
The secondary market would be similarly international. Unlike today’s segmented securities 
markets, participants would trade securities through a single electronic and twenty-four hour 
market. Even if it were not feasible to do away with separate exchanges or market systems, 
each system would be linked into the international network to provide the depth and liquidity 
necessary for improved efficiency. 
 
3.2.2 The Process and Illustration of Securities Markets Internationalization 
 
Internationalization is not just a theory; it is a real. The internationalization of capital markets 
is a phenomenon associated with the 1980’s, although the economic forces that drive 
international flows of capital are not new.6 In fact, during the second half of the nineteenth 
century, British and other European investors had already provided much of the capital 
needed to construct the early American railroad system. But the 1980s and 1990s have 
witnessed the advent of a truly international marketplace.7   
 
At the end of World War II, the financial markets of most countries were closed to cross-
border trade in financial assets. In the 1970s, only a handful of countries – particularly the 
United States and Canada – were exceptions to the prevailing world of tight controls on 
international capital flows.8 Since then, many countries have sharply reduced such barriers. 
During the 1980s, restrictions on cross-border capital flows were gradually relaxed in the 
                                                 
6 See Perry, ‘Market 2000’, above, n.4. 
7 Marc I. Steinberg & Lee E Michaels, ‘Disclosure in Global Securities Offerings: Analysis of Jurisdictional 
Approaches, Commonality and Reciprocity’  (1999)  20 Michigan Journal of  International Law, 207. 
8 Malcom D. Knight (General Manager of the BIS), ‘Globalization and Financial Markets’ at the 34th Economic 
conference of the Austrian National bank, in Vienna 22 May 2006 available at: 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp060522.html (last visited, January 2008). 
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major industrial countries. Great Britain set a trend by lifting exchange controls in 1979. 
Other countries followed suit: Japan (1980); the Federal Republic of Germany (1981); 
Australia (1983); New Zealand (1984); the Netherlands (1986); Denmark (1988); France 
(1989); Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden (1989-1990); Belgium, Ireland, and 
Luxembourg (1990); Portugal and Spain (1993); Greece (1994); and Iceland (1995).9 At the 
end of 1986, the United Kingdom permitted foreign financial firms to enter the domestic 
securities market; other countries did likewise. Regulatory burdens were lightened; fees and 
charges reduced. Financial markets were increasingly liberalized, deregulated, and integrated 
in a worldwide network. The number of issuers and investors involved in international 
activities has increased significantly since the beginning of the 1980s. It is not expected to 
abate in the foreseeable future and will be a permanent mark. Internationalization of securities 
market is a term that covers a variety of related growth trends. It includes cross-listing of 
securities, cross-national portfolio investment, open national exchanges and “passing the 
book”. All of these are now growing, although at different rates.  
 
The simplest form of internationalization of securities markets is the cross-listing of securities 
in several countries. Cross-listing simply means that a company incorporated in the United 
Kingdom lists its securities on an exchange in another country. Starting from 1980s, many 
firms choose to raise capital or list their shares in foreign markets. Several statistics illustrate 
this process. In the ten-year period from 1990 to 2000, the number of foreign corporations 
listed on the two main U.S. exchanges increased 450%. 10  In the same ten year period, 
American Depositary Receipt (ADR)11  programs also increased. In 1990, 352 depository 
receipt programs from 24 countries were in effect in the United States,12 but by 1999, this 
                                                 
9  Barry Eichengreen and Michael Mussa, Capital account liberalization: theoretical and practical aspects  
(International Monetary Fund,  Washington DC, 1998), 7. 
10 See John C. Coffee, ‘Competition Among Securities Markets: A Path Dependent Perspective’ (2002) Columbia 
Law and Economics Working Paper No. 192. 
11ADRs were developed by JP Morgan in 1927 as a vehicle for investors to register and earn dividends on non-
U.S. stock without direct access to the overseas market itself. U.S. depositary banks hold ... overseas securities in 
custody in the country of origin and convert all dividends and other payments into U.S. dollars to receipt holders 
in the United States. Investors, therefore, bear all currency risk and indirectly pay fees to the depositary bank. 
Each depositary receipt denotes shares that represent a specific number of underlying shares in the home market, 
and new receipts can be created by the bank for investors when the requisite number of shares are [sic] deposited 
in their custodial account in the home market. Cancellations or redemptions of ADRs simply reverse the process. 
See Stephen R. Foerster & G. Andrew Karolyi, ‘The Effects of Market Segmentation and Investor Recognition 
on Asset Prices: Evidence from Foreign Stocks Listing in the United States’ (1999) 54 Journal of  Finance, 981, 
983. 
12 See Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, and Daniel Klingebiel, ‘Stock Markets in Transition Economies’ (2000) 
September World Bank Financial Sector Discussion Paper No. 5, 17. 
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number had grown to 1,800 programs from 78 countries13 -- an increase of over 500 percent.  
This process has continued into the 2000s.  
 
Another measure of internationalization is cross-national portfolio investment, the degree to 
which Country A’s investors buy securities listed in Country B. For all countries, investment 
in non-domestic securities was $250 billion in 1984 and $1,281 billion in 1987, a fivefold 
increase in 3 years.14 In 1950, foreign investors held a little more than 2 percent of U.S. 
securities; by mid-1988 it was nearly 12 percent.15 During the 1990s, the total dollar amount 
of cross-border securities holdings where non-U.S. investors held U.S. securities, or vice 
versa, grew from approximately $1.5 trillion to approximately $6.9 trillion.16   
 
The third illustration of securities market globalization is open national exchanges. Holding 
membership in another country’s exchanges is another form of internationalization. Many 
countries opened their exchanges for membership by foreign firms in 1980s. For example, the 
first 6 foreign members were allowed to join the Tokyo Stock Exchange in February 1986, and 
in 1988 16 more seats were made available to non-Japanese firms.17  After the “Big Bang”18 of 
1986 in London, many U.S. securities firms and banks applied to buy seats on the LSE. 
Merrill Lynch was the first U.S. firm with an affiliate on the London Exchange. By 1987, it 
had become the second largest Eurobond underwriter, and had a staff of 1600 in London.19 In 
December 1997, the World Trade Organization (WTO) finalized an accord to liberalize 
worldwide financial markets. Previously, only 45 nations offered serious market-opening 
measures in the WTO context. The current agreement commits over 102 WTO members to 
liberalize their domestic markets and provide access to foreign financial services providers. 
 
 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 Source: Securities Industries Association. Global Equity Analysis Reports. 
15  OTA-BP-CIT-66, Trading Around the Clock: Global Securities Markets and Information Technology 
(Washington DC, Diane Publishing, 1990), 31. 
16 Roel C. Campos, ‘Speech by SEC Commissioner: The Global Marketplace and a Regulatory Overview’ 2004 
September 17,   available at: http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch091704rcc.ht   (last visited, January 2007). 
17 Motohiro Ikeda, ‘Foreign Securities Firms’(1988) The Japan Economic Journal, 39.  
18 The Big Bang was a deregulation effort for British financial markets which began on October 27, 1986. 
19 Craig Forman, ‘Merrill Scales Down London Ambitions’ (1988) June 15 Wall Street Journal, 20. 
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A fourth trend in the globalization of financial markets is called “passing the book”, whereby 
control of trading is passed between traders at exchanges around the globe.20 This enables 24-
hour trading of a financial instrument. An example of this would be a U.S. investment firm 
trading from New York during U.S. and Japanese hours and from its London desk during U.K. 
hours. The more common practice of passing the position book between time zones is actually 
to transfer the handling instructions between trades. However, most 24-hour trading now is in 
foreign exchange and bullion, not equities. 
 
3.3 Driving Forces of Internationalization 
 
Many factors are attributable to internationalization. It is instructive to examine them in turn in 
order to understand their mutual influence and to evaluate the alternative regulatory 
approaches in the international market. The most important reason for this growth was the 
increase in the demand for and supply of securities in the 1980s. This growth was aided by 
radical advances in technology, international diversification as well as changes in regulation.  
 
 3.3.1 Capital Imbalances 
 
Capital market imbalances have increased the demand for an international market for 
securities.21 When more capital is needed, more issuers will sell securities to the investor 
community. The supply of securities will grow. The opposite is also true. When there is an 
excess of liquidity there will be more demand for securities. 
 
The revival of the world economy by the mid-1980s increased corporations demand for 
capital. Many businesses expanded aggressively and their needs soon began to outstrip the 
availability of local capital. Another force causing demand for private capital has been the 
privatization in the United Kingdom and Japan of-very large industries that had been owned 
by the state.22 Many stock had to be offered in several countries at the same time because they 
are too big to be absorbed by investors in a single country. Since the mid-1980s, the collapse 
                                                 
20 Jodi G. Scarlata, ‘Institutional Developments in the Globalization of Securities and Futures Markets’ available 
at : http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/92/01/Developments_Jan_Feb1992.pdf.  
21 See Zandt, ‘International securities market’, above, n.5. 
22 See OTA-BP-CIT-66, Trading Around the Clock, above, n.15, 26.  
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of Communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the economic reforms in 
China, Latin America and Southeast Asia, have also created a strong demand for capital in 
developing countries.23 These in turn, has led to the continuing need for an international 
securities market. By tapping into the international markets, many businesses and 
governments found that they could raise capital at lower costs than if they restricted 
themselves to their domestic markets. They thus began to supply an increased number of 
securities to the international market. 
  
On the other side of this equation, some countries have accumulated “excess capital” not 
matched by productive domestic investment opportunities. That money is available for 
investment through the securities markets of other countries. One example is Japan, with its 
high volume of exports. European investors also find that their domestic markets cannot meet 
their investment demands.24 Another extremely significant event on the securities demand side 
was the growth of the institutional investor, especially the pension funds and insurance 
companies in the United States and the United Kingdom. They are becoming a major supplier 
of capital in the international markets. Such investment funds began in the 1980s to find that 
the available domestic financial assets in which they could invest were insufficient to absorb 
their growing treasures of money. In other words, an increase in the supply of funds became 
available for international investment.  In 1975 institutional investors held less than 30% of 
the total outstanding equity in the U.S.25  In the 1990s institutional investors hold about 50% 
of all equity in the U.S. market.26 In the U.K. and Japan, institutional investors account for 
about 80% and 76% of overall equity ownership respectively.27 Institutional investors and 
mutual funds are more sophisticated and better equipped to act in the international market than 
are individual investors. By pooling large quantities of capital, they reduce the cost of trading 
internationally. Finally, the maturation of currency swaps allows investors to convert foreign 
income streams into whatever currency they want quickly and cheaply.28 
 
                                                 
23 Jay D. Hansen, ‘London Calling?: A Comparison of London and U.S. Stock Exchange Listing Requirements 
for Foreign Equity Securities’ (1995) 6  Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, 197, 219-20. 
24 Roy C. Smith, ‘International Stock Market Transactions’ in Thierry Noyelle (ed), New York’s Financial 
Markets: The Challenge of Globalization  (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 8. 
25 Uri Geiger, ‘The Case for the Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market’ (1997) 
Columbia Business Law Review, 250. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 See Zandt, ‘International securities market’, above, n.5. 
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3.3.2 Technological Innovations 
 
The inventions of telegraph, telephone and internet have speeded up the process of 
globalization and are reshaping the international capital markets. Four technological trends 
contributed to the globalization or internationalization: (1) expanding computer capability and 
declining costs; (2) digitization of data, and the resulting convergence of computer and 
telecommunications technologies; (3) satellite communications development; and (4) fibre 
optics development. 29  All these developments shrink distances and time differences tie 
together national securities markets. The ability to communicate instantaneously with distant 
parts of the world is a prerequisite for the creation of an international securities market.30 
Technology provides not only the basic conditions for an international market, but also the 
necessary liquidity. Internet trading lowers the costs of entry which allow a greater number of 
actors to participate in international activities and they provide the depth and liquidity that the 
market needs. Internet facilitates the breaking down of traditional walls between securities 
markets. “On-line Financial Supermarket” based on a single website has become a new model 
for financial service providers. Technology has also made possible the development of 
advanced analytical tools used for managing risk exposure in the global market and for 
arbitrage across markets. 31 
 
3.3.3 The Advent of Modern Portfolio Theories 
 
 
International diversification is another force driving the globalization of securities trading. 
Portfolio theory was developed back in the 1950s by Henry Markowitz.32 However, only 
during the 1980s did it become clear that an internationally diversified portfolio provides a 
significantly greater degree of risk reduction than a portfolio of domestic shares. This is due to 
the low correlation between returns on foreign and domestic securities.33 Many institutional 
investment managers want to diversify fund holdings outside of their own country to protect 
                                                 
29 See OTA-BP-CIT-66, Trading Around the Clock, above, n.15, 11.  
30 See Geiger, ‘The Case for the harmonization’, above, n.25.  
31 See Perry, ‘Market 2000’, above, n.4 (describing the use of computers for efficient pricing and hedging across 
markets). 
32 Henry Markowitz, ‘Portfolio Selection’ (1952) 7 Journal of  Finance, 77.  
33 See Geiger, ‘The Case for the Harmonization’, above, n.25.  
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against both potentially adverse currency fluctuations and domestic economic recessions.34The 
value of cross-border portfolio investments by U.S. private-sector pension plans grew from 
$21 billion in 1980 to $225 billion by the end of 1988.35 The ability to reduce portfolio risk by 
international diversification has become a driving force in the internationalization of equity 
markets. 
 
3.3.4 Deregulation of the Major Securities Markets 
 
The final factor behind the internationalization is the general deregulation of financial 
markets. Regulatory barriers have long been an obstacle to international securities trading. The 
removal of competitive barriers, referred to loosely as deregulation, has been both a driving 
force and a political response to internationalization. 36  Two types of deregulation are 
identifiable. The first, “access deregulation”, meaning the reduction or elimination of 
regulatory barriers, such as exchange and capital market controls, has been justified as a 
stimulus to internationalization.37  In addition, access deregulation requires that regulatory 
structures be modified to facilitate foreign participation in domestic markets. Access 
deregulation, however, must be distinguished from “prudential deregulation.” The latter 
relates to the removal of rules primarily designed to protect investors against insolvency of 
markets participants, illiquidity, and uncertainty. Prudential deregulation is often justified on 
the basis of laissez faire political policies and free market economic efficiency theories.38 
The1980s saw a wave of access deregulation across Europe. For example, in 1986, the U.K. 
went through a major regulatory revolution (the “Big Bang”).39  The United Kingdom’s “Big 
Bang” abolished numerous restrictions on brokerage companies and permitted foreign firms to 
become members of the stock exchange. “Big Bang” led to a floorless, electronic trading 
                                                 
34 From 1985 to 1987, U.S. pension plans increased their foreign equity holdings by $19 billion, while their 
holdings of U.S. equities decreased by $47 billion. See Roy, ‘International Stock Market’, above, n.188. At the 
end of 1988, U.S. private-sector pension funds had $52,5 billion in foreign investment. United Kingdom private 
pension plan investment overseas was $69 billion at the end of 1988, Japanese private pension plan investment 
overseas was $33 billion. Foreign private-sector pension plans had approximately $62.4 billion in portfolio 
investments in the United States at the end of 1988, and this had grown to $67.7 billion by June 1989. 
(Information provided by Intemec Research Corp., November 1989).  
35 Figures for 1980 and 1987 from SEC Staff Report to U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs and U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce, ‘Internationalization of 
Securities Markets’ 1987, p. 88; 1988 figure provided by Intersec Research Corp. to OTA, November 1989.  
36Manning Gilbert Warren III, ‘Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The Achievements of European 
Communities’ (1990) 31 Harvard International Law Journal, 185. 
37 See OTA-BP-CIT-66, Trading Around the Clock, above, n.15. 
38 See Stigler, ‘Public Regulation of the Securities Markets’ (1964) 37 Journal of Business Law, 117.  
39 See Hansen, ‘London Calling?’ above, n.23, 212-213.  
  
77
 
system for securities capable of adaptation to twenty- four-hour trading of the world’s 
securities. Elsewhere in Europe, France beginning in 1985, removed foreign exchange controls 
that prevented its citizens from holding foreign securities,40 and eliminated the ten percent 
withholding tax.41 In the same period, West Germany was revamping its laws to permit futures 
trading, to allow shares to be listed in foreign currencies, and to reduce barriers to exchange 
listing of foreign securities. 42  While Spain meanwhile was experiencing its “muted Big 
Bang”, which resulted in more foreign participation in its securities markets despite the 
dominance of Spanish banks.43  In 2004, the EU further reformed its financial regulatory 
regime expanding its integrated scope to Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs). 44  The 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)45 introduced a new “investment service” 
relating to the operation of MTFs. 46  This allowed the operators of such systems to be 
authorized investment firms, subject to a customized regulatory regime. Following the 
implementation of MiFID by Member states, MTF operators were able to benefit from the 
Directive’s “common passport,” and make their trading facilities and services available to 
users throughout the EU, on the basis of home country authorization.47 Europe’s deregulatory 
wave has provided unprecedented access to its capital markets. 
 
Likewise in the US, The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) took a number of 
steps to facilitate offerings by foreign issuers in the domestic United States market, including 
the promulgation in 1982 of a series of modified forms for foreign private issuers.48 In 1996 
Japan’s regulators come out with a new plan to deregulate Japanese securities laws with a 
view to making Japan a global financial center to rival New York and London. The plan, 
announced by the Japanese Prime Minister in November 1996, included the deregulation of 
                                                 
40 Nicolas Grabar, ‘France: the aftermath of exchange controls’ (1988) Oct International Financial Law Review,  
8. 
41 Maxwell Watson, International Capital Markets: Developments and Prospects (International Monetary Found, 
Washington DC,1988). 
42 See HighBeam research, ‘Sweeping Away Frankfurt’s Old-fashioned Habits’ (28 January 1989) Economist 
(US), 73; HighBeam research, ‘Fresh Air for Germany’s Stuffy Stocks’ (15 November 1986) Economist (US), 99 
43 See Warren III, ‘Global Harmonization’, above, n.36. 
44  See Emillios Avgouleas, ‘EC securities regulation, a single regime for an integrated securities market: 
harmonized we stand, harmonized we fail? Part 1’ (2007) 22 (2) Journal of International Banking Law and 
Regulation, 82, 86. 
45 Directive 2004/39/EC (OJ 2004 L145/1)of 21 Apr 2004.  
46  See MiFID Annex I – List of Services and Financial Instruments, Section A – Investment services and 
activities. 
47 Article 31 (5) of MiFID. 
48 See Zandt, ‘International securities market’, above, n.5. 
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brokers’ commissions, foreign-exchange controls and legal, tax and accounting barriers, and 
the lowering of the wall between the securities and commercial banking businesses. 49 
 
3.4 The Influences of Internationalization of Securities Markets 
 
 3.4.1 Consolidation 
 
Internationalization of securities markets brought competition to a new level, forcing 
securities exchanges to consider in earnest, for the first time, real mergers and alliances in 
order to survive. Twenty one years ago, in 1987, there were four exchanges in Hong Kong. 
Now there is only one exchange in Hong Kong, operating with a single floor and under a 
single management.50Although technically different, a similar consolidation has occurred in 
Australia and Germany. In1988 Australia had six exchanges; now there is one, which consists 
of several floors linked electronically, but centrally governed.51 Eight German exchanges have 
also merged.52 United States exchanges, of course, have been electronically linked since the 
1970s through the inter-market trading system (ITS).  
 
In Europe, the most prominent is the merger of the Paris Bourse, Amsterdam Stock Exchange, 
Brussels Stock Exchange, and Portuguese Stock Exchange to form Euronext 53  where 
companies listed on each exchange are traded across the same order book. OMX has gone the 
furthest, bringing together the Copenhagen, Stockholm, Helsinki, Iceland, Riga, Tallinn and 
Vilnius exchanges into a single exchange with uniform listing rules. The LSE acquired Borse 
Italiana.54 And both Euronext and Deutsche Börse have attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to 
merge with the LSE.55 
 
                                                 
49 Sheryl WuDunn, ‘Japan Announces New Plan to Deregulate Financial Markets’ (1996) Nov. 12  New York 
Times, at D9 (describing the new Japanese Big Bang). 
50 See Reuters, ‘Hong Kong Board Reshaped’ (21 July 1988), New York Times, at D11. 
51Aulana L. Peters, ‘Securities regulation in the nineties’ (1990) 9 Annual Review of Banking Law, 375. 
52 Ibid. 
53  Euronext website, Euronext History, http://www.euronext.com/editorial/wide/0,5371,17324427342,00.html 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2007).  
54Alistair MacDonald, ‘LSE Snags Borsa Italiana’ (2007) June 23 Wall Street Journal, at B3. 
55Alistair MacDonald, ‘For LSE Chief Furse, Takeover-Fighting Skills Could Be Put to the Test’ (21 September 
2007) Wall Street Journal, at C1. 
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There is also international consolidation. Shareholders of both the NYSE Group and Euronext 
have approved the merger of the two entities.56 In April 2007, the NYSE and Euronext merged 
into a single cross-border entity, named NYSE Euronext, to operate exchanges in Europe and 
the United States. Deutsche Börse and Borsa Italiana have also at various times been in 
negotiations to join the NYSE-Euronext combination.57 The Nasdaq has agreed to acquire 
OMX.58 As of February 27, 2008, the deal has just been completed.The Deutsche Börse and 
TSE also have been rumoured to be further participants in this global consolidation with either 
each other or other exchanges.59 Deutsche Börse has sought link-ups with several European 
exchanges. Euronext is entering into a memorandum of understanding with the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange,60 and both the London Stock Exchange and NYSE have sought to build 
alliances with the Tokyo Stock Exchange.61 Meanwhile, more modest initiatives have also 
taken place, such as the Boston Stock Exchange’s joint venture with the Montreal Stock 
Exchange to develop a common operating platform for options trading.62  
 
The message is clear: the securities exchanges of the world are uniting. Within a few years, a 
handful of securities exchanges will dominate the global equity markets, and it is not clear yet 
whether the US exchanges will be leading partners in these ventures. The economic benefit of 
exchange consolidation is to concentrate trading on a single platform. They have several 
potential benefits: cost savings; increased liquidity; reducing the transaction costs of 
purchasing foreign securities; and diversification of the exchange’s business into new product 
areas. But consolidation also raises the pressing question of how these international exchanges 
are going to be regulated?  
 
 
                                                 
56 See generally Roberta S. Karmel, ‘The Once and Future New York Stock Exchange: The Regulation of Global 
Exchanges’ (2007) 1 Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law, 355.  
57 Gaston F. Ceron, ‘NYSE Group’s Shareholders Approve Takeover of Euronext’ (21December 2006) New York 
Times, at C3. 
58 Julia Werdigier, ‘Nasdaq Agrees to Buy OMX, Operator of 7 Stock Exchanges in Europe’ (26 May 2007) New 
York Times, at C3. 
59 Gaston F. Ceron, ‘NYSE and Tokyo Tie a Knot’ (1 February 2007) Wall Street Journal, at C2. On January 31, 
2007, the TSE and NYSE announced a non-exclusive alliance to work together on trading technology, investment 
products, marketing and regulation. 
60 Euronext Sets Cooperation Pact, Wall Street Journal, (21 September 2006), at C4. 
61Andrew Morse & Aaron Lucchetti, ‘NYSE and Tokyo Exchange Discuss an Alliance’ (27 October 2006) Wall 
Street Journal, at C3; Alistair MacDonald, ‘London Bourse Flirts With Tokyo’ (6 November 2006) Wall Street 
Journal, at C3; Heather Timmons & James Kanter, ‘British Shun a New Offer by Nasdaq’ (21 November 2006)  
New York Times, at C1. 
62 See Boston Options Exchange website, available at: http:// www.bostonoptions.com/ove/ope.php (last visited, 
August 2008).  
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3.4.2 Access to International Securities Market 
 
The benefit of internationalization is access to markets otherwise inaccessible.Access to 
worldwide capital markets may allow a country to smooth its financial needs, borrowing in 
bad times and lending in good times. The internationalization of securities markets has 
increased the breadth and depth of securities markets, giving issuers’ unparalleled access to a 
global investor base, and has increased investment opportunities and diversification of 
investment risks for investors. In the past, issuers used to have their securities listed on their 
home country market. Now investors in most developed countries have access to foreign 
securities, and issuers in almost every country can tap the major securities markets in the 
United States and Europe to raise equity capital. Without leaving home, listing and investing 
abroad became a practical story. With foreign listing, firms can obtain access to more liquid 
markets, attract more easily funds at lower costs and better terms, and tap into wider investor 
bases. Cross-border securities transactions have also enabled practices developed in one 
jurisdiction to be adapted and used elsewhere. 63 
 
3.4.3 Financial Infrastructure 
 
Financial internationalization tends to improve the financial infrastructure. An improved 
financial sector infrastructure means that borrowers and lenders operate in a more transparent, 
competitive, and efficient financial system. In this environment, problems of asymmetric 
information are minimized and credit is maximized. 
 
Another most important area of progress is the speed with which information is processed and 
disseminated to market participants. Firstly, internet technology has significantly enhanced 
information disclosure. In most countries, information on the listed companies is required to 
be disclosed entirely on the websites of the stock exchange. In China, in 2001, these financial 
statements enjoyed 90 million investor visits. 5.7 million of downloads or an average of 5000 
downloads for each listed company were made.64 In an emerging market like China’s, internet 
is enabling a large number of new investors to leap frog to the new way of information 
                                                 
63 Kun Young Chang, ‘Reforming U.S. Disclosure Rules in Global Securities Markets’ (2003) 22 Annual Review 
of Banking and Financial Law, 237. 
64 Zhou Xiaochuan (Chairman of the China Securities Regulation Commission), ‘Securities Market Regulation in 
the Internet Age’  Speech at the 2001 IOSCO Annual Conference (27 June 2001), 
available at: http://www.iosco.org/library/annual_conferences/pdf/ac15-6.pdf  (last visited, September 2007). 
  
81
 
access.65 Secondly, the rapid rise of information technology increases the familiarity of foreign 
corporations and their operation. This spread of information reduces one of the traditional 
obstacles to foreign investment and opens up both savings and investment opportunities. 
Furthermore, increased flows of market data provide greater accessibility to foreign markets. 
In turn, the larger number of participants using a market, the greater the liquidity of the 
market. Final but not least, information technology makes the process of disseminating faster 
and easier. The trends toward better, faster, cheaper, sooner are so powerful that they have 
revolutionized the industry in a relatively short period of time, and there is every reason to 
believe that this pace of change will, if anything, increase.66Consider, for example, the process 
of clearance and settlement. It was once an intensely physical process. Today, however, the 
vast majority of securities ownership positions are documented in electronic book-entry form. 
When a purchase or sale of a security takes place, the only physical thing that happens is the 
transfer of bits and bytes of data among databases.  
 
3.4.4 The Risks 
 
Trading in securities markets whether done domestically or across national boundaries, 
involves risks. Some of these risks are more important in an international setting than a strictly 
domestic setting. This was demonstrated when a series of corporate scandals of a global 
magnitude unravelled. The financial crises that erupted during the 1990s in the Nordic 
countries, east Asia, Russia, and Latin America – which were often associated with periods of 
rapid liberalization of the domestic financial system and the opening up of the capital account. 
The crises in Asia and Russia in 1997–98, Brazil in 1999, Ecuador in 2000, Turkey in 2001, 
Argentina in 2001, and Uruguay in 2002 are some examples that captured worldwide interest. 
These simultaneous collapse of the securities markets worldwide, have been recognized at the 
highest levels of government. 67  
 
The most critical risks for international securities trading, but also the most concerted efforts 
at problem resolution, are in the area of clearing and settlement. The term ‘Clearing’ and 
                                                 
65 Ibid. 
66 Joseph A. Grundfest, ‘The Future of United States Securities Regulation in an Age of Technological 
Uncertainty’ (2000) September Stanford Institute For Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 00-29.  
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‘Settlement’ are used in different senses in relation to banking and investment exchanges.68 In 
banking, clearing is used in a narrow sense to refer to the calculation of payment obligations. 
Clearing in the context of investment exchanges encompasses the narrow banking definition 
but also refers to the process by which a clearing-house becomes counterparty to transactions 
undertaken on the exchange and thereby guarantees performance of the contract.69 Likewise, 
settlement in banking used in a narrow way, it refers to the transfer of value to discharge a 
payment obligation. In the investment context, settlement can also bear this meaning (eg in 
respect of exchange-traded derivatives which are settled by a monetary transfer) but it also 
refers to the performance of the mutual obligations of buyer and seller under a contract for the 
transfer of legal title to securities.70 The clearing and settlement process is a series of complex 
tasks that start with trade confirmation and continue through the clearing process up to the 
actual settlement of a trade. The successful functioning of this system or series of systems is 
largely dependent on the close interaction of a number of intermediaries, each responsible for 
a distinct part of the process. Clearing and settlement system for financial instruments differ 
greatly within and across countries, in procedures, in timing of settlement, in the institutions 
involved, and in the degree, nature, and locus of risks. 
 
Risks occur at various stages of the clearing and settlement procedures. Unlike risks 
commonly associated with price uncertainty, the risk in clearing and settlement procedures 
involve uncertainty about the timely payment of funds and transfer of assets in financial trade. 
Whenever risk in the post-trade industry is discussed, several risk categories are mentioned: 
credit risk, liquidity risk, position risk, operational risk, legal risk, and – resulting from these – 
systemic risk. The types of risk related to cross-border post-trade services (e. g. risks related to 
the settlement of a foreign security) are the same as for domestic post-trade services, although 
the risks are greater in terms of probability (but not necessarily in terms of exposure). Cross-
border transactions often involve more parties, require a larger number of interfaces, and are 
more complex in nature. They often implicate uncertainty about the financial soundness of the 
parties involved. Most importantly, differences in legal frameworks represent a source of risks 
that is absent in the domestic context. 
 
                                                 
68 Iain G MacNeil, An introduction to the law on financial investment (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005), 305. 
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Credit risk is the risk that a counterparty will not settle an obligation for full value, either when 
due or at any time thereafter.71 This risk is much the same in domestic and international trades, 
but it may be made worse by internationalization because it is harder to make judgments about 
the reliability of counterparties, the quality of assets, or the degree of protection afforded by 
disclosure rules. Credit risk is increased as participants trade in several domestic and foreign 
markets, where regulatory standards and safeguards may vary widely. On the other hand, 
greater opportunities to divers’ activities may help to reduce total credit risk. Many countries 
are now acting to improve their clearing, settlement, and payment mechanisms, and in some 
cases the sharing of information and this should moderate the increased credit risk. 
 
Closely related to credit risk is liquidity risk, which is the risk that settlement of an obligation 
will be made not on the due date, but on some unspecified date thereafter.72 At settlement, 
counterparties are exposed to both credit and liquidity risks. Liquidity risk occurs because 
settlement may not occur on the specified date; credit risk occurs because the other party may 
not deliver at all. Thus, at settlement, the parties may not know whether the problem will be 
one of liquidity or credit. The settlement of international trades can exacerbate the problem of 
simultaneously exchanging securities for payment because of time zone differences. 
Position risk is large relative to an institution’s capacity to bear loss can seriously injure or 
even destroy a financial institution.73 It is the most important category of risk facing securities 
firms because proprietary positions in a wide range of financial instruments are closely allied 
with the core activities of underwriting, trading, and dealing in securities. A long list of firms, 
including many of the most active international financial institutions, has incurred trading 
losses that have exceeded at least one quarter’s earnings.74 International trading can reduce 
position risk by offering a greater choice of markets, more opportunities to hedge, and a 
greater variety of trading strategies. On the other hand, globalization of markets tempts traders 
to trade in environments where they do not understand all of the dangers and may lack buffers 
such as back-up lines of credit. 
 
                                                 
71 CPSS publications, ‘Report on netting schemes (Angell Report)’. Basle, February 1989, (see glossary of terms) 
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72 Ibid. 
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Operational risk is the risk of a human error or a breakdown or deficiencies of some 
components of the hardware, software or communications systems that are crucial to the 
settlement process.75 It covers both operational reliability and business continuity/contingency 
issues. Technology provides powerful capabilities for getting things done, and for guarding 
against the human risks of error, inattention, incompetence, misfeasance, and malfeasance. But 
technology entails its own risks of breakdown and misuse, which almost certainly increase 
with internationalization. Technologically sophisticated systems have failed in all countries, 
including the United States, for example, telephone networks, electric power distribution 
systems, and air traffic control systems. The ability to develop and maintain technological 
systems is not the same in all countries. Technological backups may be inadequate or untested, 
or may fail for the same reasons that the primary system fails. In late 1989 and early 1990, for 
example, a severe drought in the Philippines caused a shortage of hydroelectric power, causing 
blackouts and making it impossible to depend on electric systems in the financial sector. In 
addition, dependency on technological systems increases the vulnerability when the system 
fails, because manual skills, interpersonal relationships, and alternative means of operating 
have often been forgotten or lost. In global trading, some of these alternative and backup 
procedures have never been developed. At the same time, expectations of speed and efficiency 
have increased because of technology, and so the impact of breakdown maybe greater.  
 
Legal risk is the risk that a poor legal framework or legal uncertainties will cause or 
exacerbate credit or liquidity risks.76 It relates to the unexpected application of a law or 
regulation or to the possibility that title, a legal interest, or a contract cannot be enforced. The 
regulatory environment and the legal structures covering central securities depositories are 
critical to ensure the safety of the assets and contract enforceability. Legal risks may cause one 
party to a trade to suffer losses because laws or regulations do not support the rules of the 
securities settlement system or the property rights and other interests held through the 
settlement system.  
 
 
                                                 
75 Assessment of NBB SSS against the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations for SSS, available at: 
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There is a further risk of unknown dimensions that comes with internationalization—systemic 
risk. Systemic risks are low-probability, high-impact events. That term refers to the risk that 
the failure of a very large firm might affect other firms, creating a potential domino effect, in 
other words a simultaneous collapse of the securities markets worldwide. Systemic risks arise 
because “enhanced linkages across national and international financial markets increase the 
volatility of capital flows”, thus creating the “potential for concentrated disturbances”.77 In the 
context of payment and settlement systems, the size and duration of credit and liquidity 
exposures experienced by financial institutions in the course of settling their transactions 
contributes to systemic risk because as these exposures increase so too does the likelihood that 
some institutions may be unable to satisfy their obligations.78 Systemic risk is also related to 
the relative propensity of payment and settlement systems to transmit exposures suddenly or 
unexpectedly from one participant to another - and from one market to other markets - in ways 
that increase the difficulty all participants will have in managing and containing their 
exposures.79 
 
 
The above risks are always aggravated in the international field which are often poorly 
understood by individual investors and also perhaps by professional investment managers. In 
the worst case, the failure of major market participants (e.g., securities firms or banks) with 
heavy commitments in several countries could have gravely detrimental results for national 
financial and payment systems and possibly for entire economies. This consideration to the 
fore in the recent Federal Reserve Rescue of AIG, the world’s largest insurer, which had links 
to all the major securities markets.  
 
3.5 Calling for International Securities Regulation 
 
Along with internationalization, the world’s securities markets have changed dramatically. As 
discussed above, international securities markets have already witnessed the consolidation of 
different exchanges from various regions of the world, as well as great growth of securities in 
cross border transactions. The basic aim of all regulation is to control the risks associated with 
                                                 
77 See Joseph J. Norton, ‘‘International Financial Law’, An Increasingly Important Component of ‘International 
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regulated conduct. For the international field it is more important because the risks are greater 
than those of the national field. It then becomes inevitable to consider the role and position of 
the securities regulatory body in an international financial market. The growth of cross-border 
mergers and transactions raises the pressing question of how these international exchanges 
and cross list trades are going to be regulated. Will one country’s regulator regulate them? 
Will each subsidiary market be regulated separately by a nominal home nation regulator who 
may apply different standards? Will national regulators develop coordinated regulatory 
systems based upon shared mutual principles of regulation and mutual deference to coequal 
regulators? All these changes have directly challenged regulators abilities to achieve their 
over-riding regulatory objective of protecting investors, promoting market integrity, and 
reducing systemic risk in a cross border regulatory environment. 
 
Unfortunately, the securities regulation does not keep pace with the international tide. 
Generally, most modern securities markets are regulated on a national basis. As a result of the 
disparate times and circumstances under which the various financial markets of the world 
were born, each nation developed its own regulatory regime to govern its markets in relative 
isolation.80 For a long time, each nation regulated its securities markets in different ways, and 
these differences were often significant. So each time issuers cross-list an issue, they must 
contend with regulation. There are nevertheless major obstacles, such as legal, regulatory, and 
cultural differences between nations and markets. Some of these differences impose serious 
risks to investors, market organizations, and other financial institutions. One scholar has 
described the diversity of the international securities market as “a nightmare”, 81 due in part to 
the variety of securities markets that exist worldwide. Traditional territorial based regulatory 
regimes represent significant obstacles to the development of a truly international securities 
market. The current fragmented infrastructure is increasingly perceived as a source of cost 
inefficiencies and significant risk.82 This practice creates a challenge in light of the increased 
internationalization of the securities markets and the increasing interdependence among them. 
In a more competitive and transformed capital market, historical national securities regulation 
is increasingly inapposite and in need of reform in order to bring it into the modern age.  
Thorstein Veblen, a North American social thinker in the early part of the 20th century, 
                                                 
80 See Steinberg & Michaels, ‘Commonality and Reciprocity’, above, n. 7. 
81 Peter E. Millspaugh, ‘Global Securities Trading: The Question of a Watchdog’ (1992) 26 George Washington 
Journal of  International Law & Economics, 359. 
82 Francis Braeckevelt, ‘Clearing, settlement and depository issues’  The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
Papers No 30, 284. 
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expressed the timelessness of the challenge we continue to face: “Institutions are products of 
the past process, are adapted to past circumstances, and, are therefore never in full accord with 
the requirements of the present”.83 This is true. When the environment of securities markets 
changed, the corresponding regulation also needs to change. “The only real impediment to a 
global market is regulatory, and not technological. Specifically, what is lacking is an 
appropriate regulatory framework within which the market can operate.”84 Territorial oriented 
regulatory systems must be replaced by a regulatory regime which provides the necessary 
legal infrastructure to support the development of a truly international securities market. 
 
The challenges that regulators and market participants face in building an internationally 
robust and efficient infrastructure are numerous and complex. As the world’s capital markets 
struggle to meet the ever-increasing demand for capital,85 development of a comprehensive 
global securities regulation plan is essential. Such a plan would serve two objectives: (1) 
enhancement of international economic good through capital formation; and (2) avoidance of 
an international economic crisis.86  
                                                 
83 See Knight, ‘Globalization and Financial Markets’, above, n.8. 
84 Laura S. Unger, ‘The Global Marketplace, Ready or Not Here it Comes, Remarks at the Third National 
Securities Trading on the Internet Conference (January 24, 2000) 
available at: http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch344.htm (last visited, 2007 October). 
85 See Andreas J. Roquette, ‘New Developments Relating to the Internationalization of the Capital Markets: A 
Comparison of Legislative Reforms in the United States, the European Community, and Germany’  (1994) 14  
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law, 565, 566. 
86 Samuel Wolff,  ‘Recent Developments in International Securities Regulation’ (1995) 23 Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy, 347,417. 
Chapter Four: Theory of International Securities Regulation 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Undoubtedly, as discussed in the previous chapter, the internationalization of securities 
markets presents both opportunities and challenges for issuers, investors and regulators. Since 
securities markets internationalization is on the increase, there is a great need to structure a 
regulatory regime based on an international economy. It is worth noting that the international 
market will most certainly be characterized by not only the cosmopolitan nature of the players, 
but also the differences within geographical settings. Internationalization has challenged 
traditional notions of regulation and enforcement. Administering and enforcing national laws 
against foreign companies is often limited and difficult because of the principle of state 
sovereignty, which provides a state with exclusive and supreme power within its national 
borders. It is a new reality which requires a rethinking of securities regulations for the world. 
It requires an appropriate international legal and regulatory response. Although international 
regulators can usually agree on the basic goals and objectives of regulation, there exist 
fundamental differences in the regulatory approach taken, including the form and content of 
regulation. The large number of participants and the massive dollar amounts involved in 
international activities make it vital to determine which regulatory regime can govern these 
activities most efficiently. In general, alternatives to the conventional territorial based 
regulation falls somewhere along a spectrum of models of international securities regulation, 
with the concept of harmonization at one end, and regulatory competition at the other. There is 
also a third approach that falls somewhere between the two extremes of harmonization and 
regulatory competition which is cooperation. In response to various market failures, different 
regulatory regimes are introduced but, naturally, regulatory responses can overlap or conflict. 
Therefore, a regulatory system is not only conditioned on the economic, political, legal, 
cultural and administrative environment but also depends on how different regulatory 
measures are organized to combat market failures in an efficient manner. The management of 
the coexistence of diverse regulatory objectives therefore poses a challenge to policy makers 
and regulators. To understand the various regulatory models, it will be helpful at the outset to 
clarify certain regulatory concepts. Therefore this chapter will focus on a discussion of the 
theory. Thereafter, the following chapters will discuss the practice. 
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4.2 Main Theories 
 
Internationalization has challenged regulators to seek new mechanisms to deal with cross 
border regulatory issues. So what can regulators do in the rapidly evolving world? Put simply, 
there are at least three options: harmonization, competition and cooperation. Although 
different in approach, one thing is for certain: any regulatory theory considered for 
international application must appreciate the diverse, complex and pluralistic world in which 
we live, as well as the quickness in which international financial transactions are conducted. 
This part will analyze these three leading current theoretical arguments in turn as paradigms 
for international securities regulation. 
 
4.2.1 The Theory of Harmonization 
 
It is not difficult to give a definition of harmonization. The problem lies in the fact that in the 
securities regulation field there are other concepts that exist at the same time which could 
possibly confuse people. Harmonization is not the only word that has been used to describe 
efforts to move towards a single system of regulation. The terms unification and convergence 
have also been used. It is not uncommon to see that harmonization has been replaced by 
unification and convergence. Do they have the same meaning or is there a fundamental 
difference between them? Without answers to these questions, we can not fully understand 
harmonization of securities regulation. Firstly, this part will give a brief definition of 
harmonization. Secondly, the thesis will analyze the relationships between these concepts in 
order to make a clearer picture of harmonization. 
 
4.2.1.1 Defining Harmonization  
 
Harmonization can be loosely defined as making the regulatory requirements or governmental 
policies of different jurisdictions identical, or at least more similar.1 A “Harmonization claim” 
is a normative assertion that the differences in the laws and policies of two jurisdictions should 
                                                 
1 David W.Leebron, ‘Lying Down with Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization Claims’ in  International and 
European Law Department (eds), Harmonization in the European Union  Part I: Capita selecta EU Law 
(Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, 2001). 
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be reduced.2 It is one response to the problems arising from regulatory differences among 
political units, and potentially one form of inter-governmental co-operation. Harmonization is 
the process of reconciling two or more models in order to achieve greater similarity. Countries 
may achieve harmonization by ceding lawmaking authority to an international body or agency; 
alternatively, countries may agree to enact similar rules through their normal, domestic rule-
promulgating procedures. Harmonization allows for at least two approaches. The first, 
“commonality”, means the development of uniform international rules enforced in all 
countries. 3  The second, “reciprocity” or “comparability”, calls only for substantially 
equivalent minimum standards. 4 This approach has as its goal the mutual recognition by one 
country of the regulatory scheme and related documents of another country as long as certain 
minimum standards are met. Arguably, harmonization through reciprocity is easier to achieve, 
particularly in view of the fact that there is not a single international regulator charged with 
overseeing global offerings. 5 
 
 4.2.1.2 The Relationship between the Concepts  
 
 Firstly, consider harmonization versus unification. Harmonization should be used to refer to 
the process of reducing, so far as is desirable and possible, the discrepancies between the 
national legal systems by inducing them to adopt common principles of law. Unification, in 
comparison, can be described as harmonization with a zero margin6, where no, or minimal, 
differences are tolerated. The degree to which a harmonization requirement continues to 
tolerate difference is the harmonization “margin”. When the margin is zero, this is called 
unification. In other words, unification is full harmonization. The difference between 
harmonization and unification is often one of degree, and one indicator may be the effect of 
the instrument that is produced by the process and whether it is binding.  
 
Secondly, consider harmonization versus convergence. The original meaning of convergence 
is the observed tendency of living forms, which are quite unrelated systems, to respond to 
                                                 
2 Conference, ‘Seoul Conference on International Trade Law: Integration, Harmonization, and Globalization’ 
(1996) 10 Columbia Journal of Asian Law, 305. 
3 Manning Gilbert Warren, III, ‘Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The Achievements of the European 
Communities’ (1990) 31 Harvard International Law Journal,  185-186.  
4 See Bevis Longstreth, ‘A Look at the SEC’s Adaptation to Global Market Pressures’ (1995) 33 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law, 319, 320.  
5 Ibid. 
6 See Leebron, ‘Harmonization claims’, above, n.1. 
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similar contingencies of life by developing similar structures.7 It is the development of similar 
characteristics by organisms of different ancestry. In this thesis, the convergence is regulatory 
convergence. It is the process by which the rules, regulations, or political institutions 
governing economic activity in different countries become more similar. Under this definition, 
regulatory convergence implies that regulations in two or more countries become more similar 
over time, but it does not necessarily imply that regulatory structures are, or will become, 
identical.8 It is possible to distinguish three forms of regulatory convergence: voluntary, semi-
voluntary and mandatory. Mandatory convergence is typical of the EC process of 
approximation of national laws, and depends on some form of authority being given to a 
supranational body. Harmonization does not adopt a one-size-fits-all approach, but 
accommodates national differences. Convergence on the other hand is moving together 
towards a common result. Harmonization has evolved into convergence: soft harmonization 
provides for a flexible and effective convergence of different legal systems. 
 
All in all, we can see that although they are similar, harmonization is different from 
unification and convergence. They should not interchange each other from time to time. It also 
can be included that harmonization may have a greater chance of success compared with 
unification and convergence in securities regulation.  
 
4.2.2 The Theory of Regulatory Competition 
 
Regulatory competition is not a new concept. It has more than a 200 year history. It originated 
from Adam Smith’s famous theory of the “invisible hand of the market.” According to Adam 
Smith there is a kind of natural force guiding free market capitalism through competition for 
scarce resources.9 Since Smith, many economists have believed that a competitive market is 
the perfect way to allocate social resources.10 The “mature theory of regulatory competition” 
can be traced back to a classic 1956 article by Charles Tiebout.11 While Tiebout’s model was 
essentially applied to the provision of public goods, it was quickly and logically applied by 
                                                 
7 See The Meaning of Convergence, available at: http://custance.org/old/evol/3ch1.html (Last visited, 2005 
November). 
8 See Henry Laurence, ‘Spawning The SEC’ (1999) 6 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 649. 
9 Invisible hand definition available at http://www.investorwords.com/2633/invisible_hand.html.  
10 Uri Geiger, ‘The Case for the Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market’ (1997) 
Columbia Business Law Review, 241.  
11 Charles M. Tiebout, ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures’ (1956) 64 Journal of Political Economy, 416.  
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others to the private market and the regulation of business firms. The basic rationale for 
competition is that law is a product, competition among suppliers results in products that 
better satisfy consumer preferences.12 In our modern day, the theory of regulatory competition 
has had its most prominent explication in the area of corporate law. The paradigmatic example 
of this regulatory competition phenomenon is the market for corporate charters in the United 
States. Corporate charter competition among U.S. states has been held out as a model of 
welfare-enhancing regulatory competition. It offers a plausible success story. In this system, 
corporations are free to choose - independent from their physical location - the state of 
incorporation and therefore the substantive rules applicable to their internal corporate affairs. 
According to Romano, this competition produces corporate law that maximizes firm values 
and investor returns.13 The securities law competition model was derived from it. Since inter-
state regulatory competition in the U.S. has been effective in producing high regulatory 
standards, advocates of regulatory competition have extended the logic of state securities law 
competition to the international realm by proposing multinational securities law competition.14 
In Romano’s view, competition over securities regulation will similarly cause regulatory 
regimes to converge around the rules that issuers and investors want.15 
 
Generally speaking, regulatory competition theories are based on the premise that different 
regulators (whether nations, states, agencies, stock exchanges, or the like) compete to attract 
regulated subjects. It can be defined as a contest among regulatory jurisdictions to attract 
market participants by offering them the most efficient regulatory environment in which to 
operate.16 Along with the competition theory’s development, the argument about a race to the 
top or a race to the bottom is becoming topical. The terms “race to the top” and “race to the 
bottom” have become familiar shorthand expressions in a longstanding academic debate in the 
United States over whether competition among states for corporate charters produces more or 
less efficient legal rules. The “race to the top” hypothesis predicts that in an open world 
economy states will engage in competitive re-regulation. Romano, a leading race-to-the-top 
                                                 
12 Roberta Romano, ‘Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle’ (1985) 1 Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization, 225.  
13 Roberta Romano, ‘Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation’ (1998) 107 Yale Law 
Journal, 2359. 
14 Ibid, 2418-24; also see Roberta Romano, ‘The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation’ 
(2001) 2 Theoretical Inquiries Law, 387, 388; Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, ‘Choice and Federal 
Intervention in Corporate Law’ (2001) 87 Virginia Law Review, 961, 982-83.  
15 See Romano, ‘ Empowering Investors’, above, n.13. 
16  Maura B. Perry, Note, ‘A Challenge Postponed: Market 2000 Complacency in Response to Regulatory 
Competition for International Equity Markets’ (1994) 34 Virginia Journal of International Law Spring, 701.  
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exponent, analyzed empirical evidence as showing that the race is more to the top because the 
many markets in which firms operate--the capital, product, and corporate control markets--
constrain managers from choosing a legal regime detrimental to shareholders’ interest.17 David 
Vogel argued that increased levels of international trade have been accompanied by an upward 
shift in the regulatory standards for consumer and environmental protection. In his words, the 
“California effect” has outweighed the “Delaware effect”.18  On the contrary, the original 
expression of a “race to the bottom” was coined by William.L. Cary, who defined the race-to-
the-bottom as a system where the legal infrastructure, enforced by the courts, allows an 
environment in which corporate management is able to benefit most from their decisions 
without regard to the needs of the shareholder.19 The “race to the bottom” hypothesis posits 
that regulations are costly to business. Therefore, businesses will whenever possible migrate to 
the country with the lowest level of regulations. As soon as financial investors are able to 
transact in foreign markets, they will flock to the country with the lowest level of regulations. 
Ralph Bryant writes that because: financial intermediation is more “footloose” than most other 
economic activities ... the scope exists for an individual locality or nation to try to lure 
financial activity within its borders by imposing less stringent regulation, taxation, and 
supervision than that prevailing elsewhere.20  
 
According to the above theory, in the securities regulation field, companies should be free to 
choose from a menu of securities regulation options offered by nations around the world and 
the world’s stock exchanges. Professor Romano and Professors Choi and Guzman envision 
companies being able to choose to be governed by the laws of countries that provide for much, 
little, or no disclosure; much, little, or no fraud protection; and many, few, or no corporate 
governance rules.21 Whereas Romano generally posits a sprint to the top, Choi and Guzman 
admit that some issuers may choose regimes of little or no fraud protection for investors, but 
suggest that investors, being “rational and informed,” will simply discount what they are 
                                                 
17 Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (AEI press, 1993), 14-24.  
18 David vogel, Trading up: consumer and environmental regulation in a global economy (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1995),248.  
19 William L Cary, ‘Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware’ (1974) 83 Yale Law Journal, 
663, 666 (explaining the competition for corporations leads to a “race to the bottom” because states have 
“watered [down] the rights of shareholders vis-à-vis management.”). 
20 Ralph Bryant, International Financial Intermediation (Brookings Institution Press,1987), 6. 
21 Robert A. Prentice, ‘Regulatory competition in securities law: A Dream (that should be) deferred’ (2005) 66 
Ohio State Law Journal, 1155. 
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willing to pay for those shares.22 However, Merritt B. Fox23and James D. Cox24 claim that 
competition would result in a race to the bottom, with issuers choosing the lowest level of 
disclosure possible. 
 
4.2.3 The Theory of Cooperation 
  
Cooperation theory is based on empirical (as opposed to theoretical) reasoning; it recognizes 
that decentralization might not enhance market welfare or generate sufficient competitive 
pressure on territorial regulators. 25 Cooperation traditionally is an instrument to reduce 
conflicts and tensions. International cooperation is defined as conscious policy coordination 
among states.26 However, cooperation has its problems. Opponents of cooperation argue that 
efforts on the part of countries to construct workable international cooperation into securities 
regulation, although fine in theory, it is most likely to fail. In theory, countries may design 
efficient securities regulations through international cooperation that would be enforced 
globally. Parties engaging in securities fraud, for example, would find it difficult to escape 
enforcement under a perfect global regulatory regime. In practice, of course, the existing 
global regulatory regime is far from perfect. Although the SEC has met with some success in 
gaining cooperation from other countries regarding insider trading laws, international 
cooperation remains limited. Opponents also state that cooperation is not readily attainable, 
and assume that unilateral regulation measures will be the paradigmatic form of regulation in 
the foreseeable future. 27  They further argue that the fundamental incentive of securities 
regulators is not to cooperate with their colleagues to the extent that such cooperation might 
undermine their country’s competitive position.28 Despite the above, it cannot be denied that 
the confluence of an international world economy and diverse national regulations prompts 
cooperation. Cooperation supporters hold that states in general and in particular should 
                                                 
22 Stephen Choi, ‘Promoting Issuer Choice in Securities Regulation’ (2001) 41 Virginia Journal of international 
law,815, 816.  
23Merritt B. Fox, ‘Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment’ 
(1999) 85 Virginia Law Review, 1335. 
24James D. Cox, ‘Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets’ (1999) 99 Columbia Law Review, 1200 
25 See Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, ‘Regulatory Co-opetition’ (2000) 3 Journal of International Economic 
Law, 241-42.  
26 See Kenneth A. Oye, ‘Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies’ in Kenneth A. Oye 
(eds) Cooperation Under Anarchy  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986),6. 
27 Amir N. Licht, ‘Games Commissions Play: 2x2 Games of International Securities Regulation’ (1999) 24 Yale 
Journal of International Law, 61. 
28 Ibid. 
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enhance cooperation and assist their fellow-regulators.29 Strengthening the inter- and intra-
jurisdiction cooperation of regulatory agencies can lead to improved regulatory effectiveness. 
Faced with the growing complexity of modern securities markets, some national securities 
regulators have recognized the need for greater cooperation. For example, in the area of 
enforcement of judgments, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan have already 
expressed the view that means should be developed to enhance cooperation.30  
 
There are some reasons to support cooperation. Firstly, internationalization and technological 
advances affecting financial markets facilitate both cross-border flow of capital and cross-
border flow of fraud.31 This indicates the need to fight organized crime and drug trafficking.32 
Among the challenges to combat financial crimes effectively in an international marketplace, 
it is particularly difficult for a regulator in one territory to accurately assess a firm’s capital 
risk exposure unless that regulator has access to information relating to such firm’s operations 
in other jurisdictions. In many instances, no single regulator will have access to all of the 
information necessary to protect the interests of investors and the integrity of domestic 
securities markets.33 If any one particular country had sufficient unilateral power, it might not 
take into consideration the possibility that another country could object to its attempts to seek 
information, evidence, and enforcement of court orders in their jurisdiction. However, no 
country today has such power, and each country must concern itself with the willingness of 
other countries to cooperate. A primary objective of any securities regime must be to maintain 
justifiable public confidence in the integrity of the securities markets by ensuring the flow of 
reliable information to investors. To accomplish this goal, a securities regime must provide 
investors adequate remedies for fraud and deter wrongdoing by promising public enforcement 
efforts to detect and punish fraud. Effective enforcement of securities laws requires that 
                                                 
29  David Charny, ‘Competition among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American 
Perspective on the “Race to the Bottom” in the European Communities’ (1991) 32 Harvard International Law 
Journal, 423; Steven R. Salbu, ‘Regulation of Insider Trading in a Global Marketplace: A Uniform Statutory 
Approach’ (1992) 66 Tulane Law Review, 837; Manning Gilbert Warren, III, ‘Global Harmonization of 
Securities Laws: The Achievements of the European Communities’ (1990) 31 Harvard International Law 
Journal, 185. 
30 Trilateral Communique on Cooperation between the SEC, the DTI and the SIB of the United Kingdom, and the 
Securities Bureau of the Ministry of Finance of Japan, 47 SEC Docket 373 (October 1, 1990). 
31  SEC staff, ‘International cooperation in securities law enforcement’ (2004 Prepared for the international 
training institute) available at: http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_enforce/intercoop.pdf (last visited, 
September 2008). 
32  Caroline A.A. Greene, ‘International Securities Law enforcement: Recent Advances in Assistance and 
cooperation’   (1994)  27 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law,  635. 
33 Michael D. Mann, William P. Barry, ‘Developments in the internationalization of securities enforcement’ 
(2005) 39 International Lawyer, 667.  
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regulators be able to thwart the dissipation or secreting of the fruits of international securities 
fraud, and to facilitate the return of the illicit profits to injured investors.34 Accordingly, an 
important step toward the recovery of funds is the ability to seek asset-freezes.35  In the 
absence of such asset-freezes, the effectiveness of a final judgment commanding disgorgement 
may be undermined by a defendant dissipating or secreting the funds.  
 
Secondly, in a world of separate sovereignties, it becomes necessary for one sovereign to 
seek the cooperation of another in order to make the first sovereign’s law effective. This is 
because it is possible for persons who break the first sovereign’s laws to travel to the territory 
of the second sovereign, or to locate their business records or their properties that might be 
used to satisfy a judgment in the territory of the second sovereign. For example, someone 
who was an inside trader could evade detection by using a Swiss bank account. Also, in the 
midst of contagious crises, governments tend to lack sufficient resources to stop a currency 
attack, and individual governments can do little to stop crises being originated in foreign 
countries. In these cases, international financial coordination can help individual governments 
achieve their goals. 
 
The unilateral acts of foreign states who enact blocking laws to shield investors from the 
onslaught of imposition, if continued, could be harmful to the internationalization of the 
securities markets, relations between states, and individual investors. Cooperation on an 
international level is necessary to resolve this conflict in state practice.36 Conflicts of law 
which currently frustrate enforcement efforts must be resolved. New means must be 
developed to investigate and prosecute those who transact business from abroad in violation 
of national securities laws. Cooperation holds the key to any solution. As a result, regulators 
must be able to gather and share information with their regulatory partners world-wide to 
detect, investigate and prosecute fraud effectively.  
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Michael D. Mann, Paul A. Leder, Elizabeth Jacobs, ‘International Regulatory Competition and The Securities 
Laws’ (1992) 55 Law and Contemporary Problems, 303. 
35 Ibid, 332. 
36  Roger A. Patkin, ‘Arbitration of extraterritorial discovery disputes between the securities and exchange 
commission and a foreign broker-dealer: a new approach to the restatement balancing test’ (1987) 5 Boston 
University International Law Journal Fall, 413. 
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4.3 The Relationship among Harmonization, Competition and Cooperation 
 
Among scholars of international regulatory reform, harmonization is often viewed as the polar 
opposite—the nemesis—of competition. In the securities regulation sphere, the main 
arguments opposed to regulatory competition are its incompatibility with harmonization and 
its potential to create bigger barriers rather than covering the gaps. 
 
Harmonization and competition, however, may not necessarily be antipodal in all contexts. Far 
from incompatible, competition and harmonization may be complements in some 
circumstances. Tung argues that minimal harmonization is required for certain forms of 
regulatory competition to exist such as the portable reciprocity which underlies the European 
passport. 37  Furthermore, in theory, competition should cause a tendency toward 
harmonization, provided economic agents have similar concerns. In fact, the principle of 
mutual recognition has been associated with regulatory competition since its inception. 
Lannoo also said some degree of competition between jurisdictions can do no harm.38 On the 
other side, harmonization is a means of improving competition by reducing investment 
barriers, increasing mobility, making information cheaper and diminishing market power 
effects. Harmonization would eliminate the major obstacles to competition. 39  Issuers and 
investors would find access to foreign markets easier, and this would increase sound 
competition among domestic markets. Harmonization would also increase inter-firm 
competition. Companies from all around the world would have easier access to foreign capital. 
For their part, investors would be much more receptive to foreign investment. They would 
face lower information costs and would be able to compare the risk-return characteristics of 
companies in all markets using a single set of documents. The goal of abolishing barriers can 
also be achieved through a regulatory competition between States. It is inferred that it cannot 
absolutely be said that regulatory competition is incompatible with harmonization and it also 
would not be convincing to say that only harmonization by directives can lead to uniformity 
and that competition among rules will lead to diversity.  
                                                 
37  Tung, F, ‘Passports, Private Choice, and Private Interests: Regulatory Competition and Cooperation in 
Corporate, Securities, and Bankruptcy Law’ (2002) SSRN Working Paper & Chicago Journal of International 
Law 3(2). 
38  Karel Lannoo, ‘Updating EU securities market regulation’ Report of a CEPS task force, available at:  
www.fese.be/initiatives/european_representation/2001/ceps.pdf. 
39 Uri Geiger, ‘The Case for the Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market’ (1997) 
Columbia Business Law Review, 250. 
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Both harmonization and competition have a close relationship with cooperation. Without a 
sound cooperation system, harmonization or competition maybe unsuccessful. The process of 
harmonization will require compromises among many domestic regulators that hold different 
views about securities regulation. Political opposition by various interest groups can hinder, if 
not stop, the process of harmonization. Moreover, when standards are “formally” harmonized, 
their enforcement and interpretation might differ among nations. All these things required 
substantial cooperation between different regulators and interest groups. If different regulators 
do not all cooperate, nations might be forced to offer securities regulation that are below the 
level of stringency which they think are desirable. The result could be a race to the bottom. 
Furthermore, regulatory competition also can exist in a cooperative framework that permits 
different regimes to coexist. Such systems encourage potential subjects of regulation to choose 
which regime they will follow. These choices in turn encourage states to offer regulatory 
packages that will attract transactions, from which they can extract taxes and other rents.
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Chapter Five: Harmonization 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
According to internationalization, as discussed in chapter 3, there is a definite need to reform 
the present national regulatory system. The creation of a harmonized regime for securities 
regulation has been said to be one way of regulating the phenomenon of internationalization. 
The movement towards and support of international harmonization has already gathered 
momentum. This chapter will examine the harmonization efforts1 being made in order to 
improve international securities regulation.  
 
 The structure of this chapter is as follows. Firstly this chapter will examine the rationales for 
harmonization. Secondly it will proceed to examine briefly the processes of 
harmonization. Thirdly it will discuss how to harmonize and what kinds of techniques have 
been used. The last two sections will considers the scope of harmonization and then discuss 
the roadblocks to harmonization. 
 
5.2 The Rationales for Harmonization 
 
It is true that harmonization of the securities regulation is now broadly accepted, but we 
should not take it for granted. The reasons as to why we need harmonization still need to be 
explored. Such an examination will provide guidance as to the goals or objectives of 
harmonization. Harmonization has been pursued for a host of reasons, both internationally and 
nationally.  
 
5.2.1 Common Reasons 
 
Firstly, one of the reasons is the influence of internationalization. The internationalization of 
the world’s securities markets has become a well-established phenomenon.2 It has resulted in a 
                                                 
1 In this thesis, the harmonization efforts which examined referred to harmonization as to content. 
2  Uri Geiger, ‘Harmonization of securities disclosure rules in the global market—a proposal’ (1998) 66 
Fordham Law Review, 1785. 
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rapid increase in securities transactions that cut across the national borders of more than one 
country. In the past, the vast majority of securities transactions involved only residents of the 
same country, regulators could simply focus on their own individual jurisdictions. Today, 
investors in most developed countries have access to foreign securities, and issuers in almost 
every country can tap the major stock markets in the United States and Europe to raise equity 
capital. Hence, individual country regulators can no longer avoid the question of how 
regulatory authority should be allocated for such transactions.3 The present territorial approach 
to securities regulation suffers from numerous flaws. As in the case of other forms of 
mandatory regulation, territorial regulators may make errors and are subject to pressure from 
special interest groups in the securities industry. Regulators might also seek to maximize their 
own prestige and power through overly complicated regulations. Harmonization of different 
country securities regulatory regimes is not the only way, but at least, it is a response to it.  
 
Secondly, the harmonization of rules is, from the economist’s perspective, regarded as 
justified where it is necessary to correct a market failure, which extends beyond national 
boundaries and cannot be corrected by the action of an individual State. The scholarly 
literature has also begun to embrace the notion that harmonization is the mechanism by which 
unfair differences in legal and other regimes are eliminated, and the level playing field, the 
metaphoric symbol of fairness, is restored.4 In the securities regulation sphere, harmonization 
is typically regarded as justified where markets interact such that intermediaries, investors, and 
transactions move between them, leading to the potential for cross-border externalities such as 
fraud and systemic risk. Harmonization is a means of achieving goals such as greater 
efficiency or fairness as well.5  
 
Thirdly, harmonization reduces transaction costs. Currently, both issuers and investors bear 
significant transaction costs when participating in international activities. A company seeking 
to expand its operations into a foreign country must continue to comply with home country 
regulations, and additionally, undertake certain actions to comply with host country 
regulations. More recently, in 2005, an E.U. regulator indicated that he believed that among 
                                                 
3  Stephen J. Choi, ‘Assessing regulatory responses to securities market globalization’ (2001) 2 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law,613. 
4 David W.Leebron, ‘Lying Down with Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization Claims’ in  International and 
European Law Department (eds), Harmonization in the European Union  Part I: Capita selecta EU Law 
(Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, 2001). 
5 Ibid, 25. 
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the approximately 250 E.U. issuers listed in the United States, the largest companies spend 
between $1 million and $10 million per year to reconcile International Accounting Standards 
(IAS) to the United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP). 6 
Investors who trade in foreign markets also incur high transaction costs because of the 
numerous forms of disclosure documents and their need to gather the additional information 
required for efficient pricing in these markets. These costs reduce the advantages of investing 
internationally and might prevent many investors from participating in the international 
market. Harmonization ameliorates this problem, and in particular, full harmonization 
eliminates the problem completely, as companies only need to comply with one set of 
regulatory requirements. Harmonization also has other benefits. Proponents argue that it 
reduces the cost of information production, internalizes externalities across jurisdictions, 
achieves economies of scale, enhances the mobility of market participants, and prevents a 
regulatory “race to the bottom.”7 
 
5.2.2 EC Reasons 
 
Europeans have long dreamed of a single European market. Securities markets constitute an 
integral part of the single market. It is generally recognized that integration of European 
securities markets is economically beneficial to the Member States of the European Union and 
the European Economic Area.8 In a 1985 white paper9, it reconfirmed the importance of single 
European securities market, stating: 
 Work currently in hand to create a European securities market system, based on Community 
stock exchanges, is also relevant to the creation of an internal market. This work is designed to 
break down barriers between stock exchanges and to create a Community-wide trading system 
for securities of international interests.  
 
                                                 
6 Charlie McCreevy, ‘E.C. Strategy on Financial Reporting: Progress on Convergence and Consistency’  
available at: 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/750&format=HTML&aged=0&langua
ge=EN&guiLanguage=en.  
7 Roger Van den Bergh, ‘Regulatory Competition or Harmonization of Laws? Guidelines for the European 
Regulator’ in Alain Marciano & Jean-Michel Josselin (eds.), The Economics of Harmonizing European Law 
(Northampton: E. Elgar, 2002), 27. 
8Hallgrímur Ásgeirsson, ‘Integration of European securities markets’  
available at http://www.sedlabanki.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?itemid=2819. 
9 Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (85)310 
final, paras 102-103. 
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In order to fulfil the goal of an internal single securities market, EC regulators must harmonize 
the different securities laws within the individual European nations. Harmonization is deemed 
necessary for the completion of the ‘single securities market’. It claims that the differences in 
the laws and policies of member states should be reduced. It clearly facilitates cross-border 
activity by issuers, reducing the transaction costs inherent in diverging regimes. It also 
protects investors by ensuring that minimum standards apply to issuers who access the capital 
markets.  
 
5.2.3 US Reasons  
                                                                                                                                                                      
Generally speaking, the beginning of harmonizing US securities regulation at national level 
was a response to the 1929 stock market crash. Although the 1929 crash was a direct factor 
leading to harmonization, it was not the only reason for harmonization. In fact, before the 
1930s, US securities markets were fragmented and largely self-regulated. Every state in the 
union had its own set of securities laws known as “blue sky” laws.10 Although states enacted 
blue-sky laws, they were not thought to effectively protect stockholders.11 The state laws, 
standing alone, were generally recognized to be inadequate. For example, they were not 
effective in protecting citizens in one state from sales efforts that originated in a second state; 
inadequately funded by most states to provide for effective enforcement of fraud provisions; 
and the state law were riddled with exceptions and exemptions. These issues were among 
those that provided the incentive for the enactment of many federal securities laws. The 
purpose of federal laws is to protect investors from abuses in the market and to restore their 
confidence.  
 
5.3 The Process of Harmonization 
 
An analysis of how harmonization in securities regulation was developed can start with a short 
overview of developments in a historical perspective. Looking back can help us to understand 
clearly, why today, we are at this particular point of development, but more importantly, it can 
help us to know where we should go from here. 
                                                 
10 The term “blue sky” originated from the fact that these laws were originally enacted to prevent the offering and 
sale of worthless securities, which were worth no more than a piece of the “blue sky” in the opinion of some 
legislators. 
11 Shalini M. Aggarwal, ‘From the Individual to the Institution: The SEC’s Evolving Strategy for Regulating the 
Capital Markets’ (2003) 2 Columbia Business Law Review, 581, 585. 
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5.3.1 The Evolution of US Harmonization  
 
Compared with the EC’s harmonization, the process in the US is not too complicated. 
Historically, states led the way in providing legislation to protect investors from exploitation 
by unscrupulous securities promoters. Until the adoption of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 
“Securities Act”) states were the only regulators of securities transactions. Kansas adopted the 
first blue sky statute in 1911. Other states quickly followed suit, so that by the time Congress 
adopted the Securities Act, every state except Nevada had a securities law.12 Despite their 
prevalence, state securities laws were largely ineffective in eradicating fraud.13 The failure of 
state regulation and the abuses that preceded the Great Depression set the stage for the 
adoption of the federal securities laws.14 The dual regulatory structure created by Congress, 
and recognized the states’ experience and expertise in the field would be necessary to provide 
remedies beyond those which the new federal statutes created. From 1933 to 2002, Congress 
has enacted many federal securities laws in order to federalize US securities regulation. The 
process of uniformity, at the national level, can be divided into four stages. Between 1933 and 
1940 the United States Congress adopted six federal statutes. Four of these 1930s laws form 
the core of the United States federal securities law today. Apart from 1933 Act, the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) was adopted the following year creating the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Securities Act of 1933 is largely concerned with the 
initial distribution of securities rather than with their subsequent trading. The Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 addresses the post-distribution period, that is, subsequent trading. The 
Investment Company Act of 1940 is a regulatory measure for mutual funds and other 
investment companies that engage primarily in the business of investing and reinvesting in 
securities of other companies.  The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 requires registration with 
the SEC of persons engaged for compensation in the business of rendering advice or issuing 
analyses or reports concerning securities. Despite the advent of federal securities regulation 
the 1933 and 1934 Acts included explicit provisions preserving existing state authority to 
regulate intrastate activities. Through these “savings” clauses the era of a federal-state dual 
system of regulation was created.15    
                                                 
12 Today all 50 states have a securities statute. 
13 Thomas Lee Hazen, The law of securities regulation 4th edn., (West Group, 2002), 21. 
14 Ibid. 
15 The federal government may regulate all or virtually all aspects of securities trading involving interstate 
commerce given the authorization of the Constitution’s Commerce Clause “to regulate commerce . . . among the 
several states.”  A state generally may regulate all aspects of securities trading within its jurisdiction. 
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In 1956, the second stage began. In order to minimize the diversity in state laws and to 
promote uniformity, the Uniform Securities Acts were produced. They include (1) the 1956 
Act, (2) the Revised Act of 1985, and (3) the New Uniform Act of 2002. Uniform state 
securities laws were developed in order to reduce variations in state securities laws, and not as 
an alternative to concurrent federal-state regulation. The drafters of the Uniform Securities 
Acts, whenever feasible, used phrases that had acquired fixed meanings from having been 
construed by courts and administrators. Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia 
substantially have adopted the Uniform Securities Acts of 1956 or 1985. The new 2002 Act 
has yet to be adopted in any states.  
Beginning in the 1990s the dual regulatory regime was subject to a full-scale legislative 
assault.16 In 1996, recognizing the costs and unduly burdensome nature of a dual registration 
system, Congress restructured federal-state securities regulation through National Securities 
Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) ,17  which is the mark of a third stage. The adoption of 
NSMIA was a step towards a single regulatory system which, however, left certain powers to 
the States. States retain the authority to investigate and bring enforcement actions with respect 
to fraud, deceit, or unlawful conduct by a broker or dealer, in connection with securities or 
securities transactions.  NSMIA pre-empted state law from establishing additional capital, 
custody, margin and other requirements for brokers, dealers, municipal securities dealers, 
government securities brokers, or government securities dealers. As a general matter, NSMIA 
did not cause states to reduce the size of their securities regulatory bodies, despite the 
increased scope of federal pre-emption that NSMIA introduced.  
In the final stage, reacting to corporate governance scandals within U.S.-based Enron 
Corporation, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002,18 which is generally viewed as the 
largest single reform in corporate governance since the US securities laws were first enacted 
during the Great Depression. The crisis of confidence in the capital markets in the United 
States was the impetus behind the swift enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley. The Act radically 
redesigns federal regulation of public company corporate governance and reporting 
obligations. 
                                                 
16 See Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., ‘The Insidious Remnants of State Rules Regarding Capital Formation’ (2000) 
78 Washington University  Law  Quarterly,  407, 411-13.  
17 Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996). 
18 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
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Securities regulation in the US is now found primarily in the federal securities laws as 
administered by the SEC. Although states have rights to administer intrastate or local 
securities offerings, broker-dealers, and investment advisers, federal standards have been 
established for covered securities, broker-dealer firms registered under the Securities 
Exchange Act, and investment advisers above specified assets under management threshold. 
5.3.2 The Evolution of EC Harmonization  
 
The harmonization of the EC securities regulation is more than 40 years old, taking the 
publication of the Segré Report 19  in 1966 as a starting point. The first stage of the 
harmonization approach, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, was to introduce detailed 
harmonized rules in order to make national standards equivalent.20 This was the approach 
taken in the preparation of the first generation of EC Directives, such as the Admission 
Directive,21 the Listing Particulars Directive22  and the Interim Reports Directive. 23 These 
three directives, plus the Major Share-holdings Directive,24 were consolidated by a single 
directive 25  in 2001 in order to simplify the legislative framework for common market 
exchanges. Within this stage, all of these laws were helpful in beginning to structure a more 
uniform system of regulation. However, neither the scope nor the degree of harmonization is 
broad and deep. 
 
The 1985 White Paper, 26   the 1987 Single European Act27  and the 1992 Single Market 
Programme for completing the internal market intensified efforts to develop greater 
harmonization.28 This second series of directives included, among others: the Undertakings for 
Collective Investments in Transferable Securities Directive,29 which attempted to open the EC 
market for particular investment funds, or undertakings for collective investment in 
                                                 
19The name of the report is Development of a European Capital Market which identified obstacles to the 
integration of capital and securities markets and proposed corrective measures, notably with regard to the capital-
raising process and the harmonization of disclosure standards. 
20Vanessa Edwards, EC Company Law (Oxford University Press, 1999),  231-233. 
21 Council Directive 79/279/EEC (OJ 1979 L66/21) of 5 March 1979. 
22 Council Directive 80/390/EEC (OJ 1980 L100/1) of 17 March 1980. 
23 Council Directive 82/121/EEC(OJ 1982 L66/21) of February 1982. 
24 Council Directive 88/627/EEC( OJ 1988 L348) of 12 December 1988. 
25Council Directive 2001/34/EC (OJ 2001 L184/1) of 28 May 2001. The Consolidated Admissions and Reporting 
Directive (‘CARD’).  
26 COM(85) 310 of 14 June 1985. 
27 Single European Act (OJ 1987 L169) of 29 June 1987. 
28 Warren, M.G, ‘The harmonization of European Securities Law’ (2003) 37 International Lawer, 213. 
29 Council Directive 85/611/EEC (OJ 1985 L375/3) of December 1985. 
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transferable securities; the Public Offers Directive,30 which partly harmonized the rules for 
public offers of securities; the Insider Dealing Directive,31 which provided the first common 
market prohibition on insider trading; and the Investment Services Directive,32which is often 
described as the cornerstone of EC securities regulation. The second stage introduced a new 
era of EC securities regulation based on the model of mutual recognition and minimum 
harmonization. Mutual recognition represented a shift from commonality to reciprocity. This 
means that compliance with the legal and regulatory processes in the home Member States is 
recognized as being compliance with those in the host Member States.  
 
During the latter part of the 1990s, there was a widespread view that although some progress 
had been made in the previous decade, insufficient work had been done to fulfill the single 
securities market. In 1999, The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP)33 was adopted which is 
an extensive reform program of 42 measures, designed to finalize the integration of national 
financial markets and provide a coherent regulatory framework for the pan-EC capital market. 
The FSAP led to extensive changes in securities market regulation: new laws; new law-
making processes; and more attention to the mechanisms for the supervision of securities 
market activity and enforcement. With the adoption of the cornerstone Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID) in April 200434which is a core investor protection and market 
integration measure, the FSAP is now, in large part, complete.35 
 
The Lamfalussy Report 200136 is central to post-FSAP generation of EC securities measures. 
At the core of the Report is the realization that securities-market legislation is comprised of 
two layers: basic political choices which can be articulated as broad, but sufficiently precise, 
framework rules; and detailed technical measures, which conform to and implement the 
objectives of the framework rules. 37 A four-level approach to harmonization and 
                                                 
30 Council Directive 89/298/EEC (OJ 1989 L124) of 17 April  1989. 
31 Council Directive 89/592/EEC (OJ 1989 L334) of 13 November of 1989. 
32 Council Directive 93/22/EEC (OJ 1993 L141) of 10 May 1993. 
33 Financial Services: Implementing the Framework For Financial Markets: Action Plan, COM(99)232 final at 6 
(hereinafter Financial Services Action Plan). 
34 Council Directive 2004/39/EEC (OJ 2004 L145/1) of April 2004. 
35 Niamh Moloney, ‘Time to take stock on the markets: the financial services action plan concludes as the 
company law action plan rolls out’ (2004) 53 International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 999. 
36 The Committee of Wise Men, Final Report of The Committee of Wise Men On The Regulation of European 
Securities Markets (2001), available at  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/general/lamfalussyen.pdf.  
(hereinafter Lamfalussy Report) 
37 Niamh Moloney, EC Securities Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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implementation of financial services regulation throughout the EC is set up based on this 
duality in the report. Following the Lamfalussy report, the two committees were newly 
constituted: the European Securities Committee (ESC)38, which is comprised of high- ranking 
officials of Member State governments and Commission officials, and the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR)39, which is an advisory committee comprised of 
representatives of Member States’ national regulators and Commission representatives. 
Framework principles are the level 1 legislation and involve the EU Commission, Council and 
Parliament. Level 1 legislation is followed by level 2 legislation (implementing measures) 
which involves the EU Commission, the ESC and the ESRC.  Level 3 rules are imposed by 
national regulators through co-ordinated EU action, following consultation within the CESR, 
and should be applied consistently across the European Union in order to ensure common and 
uniform implementation of level 1 and 2 legislation. Level 4 refers to implementation and 
enforcement of enacted legislation and involves the Commission and the member states. In the 
Lamfalfussy report, the Committee of Wise Men set forth the following priority items: a single 
prospectus for issuers with a system of shelf registration; modernization of listing standards; 
mutual recognition for wholesale markets; modernization of rules for investment funds and 
pension plans; adoption of international accounting standards; and a single passport for 
recognized stock markets. 40 In harmony with it, a surge of new legislatives from the UCITS 
Management Company and Prospectus Directive 200241 to the Transparency Directive 200442 
were adopted in order to fulfil its goals. The main technique, used at this stage was to provide 
a single passport through home state authorization. All of these directives constitute important 
milestones in the development of a unified capital market in the EC.  
 
Although the harmonization of EC securities regulation produced remarkable achievements, 
many areas still demand legislative and regulatory attention, such as internet-accessible 
                                                 
38 Commission Decision establishing the European Securities Committee, COM (2001) 1493 final, June 6, 2001. 
39 Commission Decision establishing the Committee of European Securities Regulators, COM (2001) 1501 final, 
June 6, 2001. 
40  See Initial Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets 
(Novermber 7, 2000), available at http:// www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/banks/report.pdf. 
41 Council Directive 2001/07 (OJ 2002 L41/20). 
42 Council Directive 2004/109/EC of December 2004. The other directives are The International Accounting 
Standards Regulation 2002, Council Regulation 1602/2002 (OJ 2002 L243/1); The Prospectus Directive 2003, 
Council Directive 2003/71/EC (OJ 2003 L345/64) of 31 December 2003; The Market Abuse Directive 2003, 
Council Directive 2003/6/EC (OJ 2003 L96/16); The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) 2004, 
Council Directive 2004/39/EEC (OJ 2004 L145/1) of April 2004. 
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electronic filing system for all prospectuses and periodic reports and clearance and settlement 
system. The process of harmonization needs to continue to accelerate at an unprecedented rate.  
 
5.3.3 The Evolution of International Harmonization 
 
Despite differences underlining national regulatory regimes, endeavours to create a 
harmonized securities regulation acceptable to all participants of the global securities market 
have progressed. The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)43  is 
playing critical rules for developing a process of harmonization of the international financial 
market. In 1987, in response to concerns raised by the increasing internationalization of the 
securities market, the Technical Committee of IOSCO established a Working Party on 
Multinational Equity Offers (later renamed the Working Party on International Equity Offers ) 
to perform a study of the world’s capital markets and the issues related thereto. At the 
November 1988 meeting of IOSCO, the US SEC released a policy statement entitled 
Regulation of the International Securities Markets.44 The policy statement identified three 
areas of regulation that should be addressed in an effective international securities market 
regulatory system: efficient structures, sound disclosure systems, and fair and honest 
markets.45 In its statement the SEC said that “in seeking solutions to common problems, 
securities regulators should be sensitive to cultural differences and national sovereignty 
concerns. As regulators seek to minimize differences between systems, the goal of investor 
protection should be balanced with the need to be responsive to the realities of each 
marketplace.” In May 1998, following the meetings of the Executive and Technical 
Committees in Paris, IOSCO released for public consultation four documents relating to 
global securities regulation. The first, entitled Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation (Objectives), sets forth thirty fundamental principles of securities regulation. The 
Objectives adopted in 1998 and updated in 2002, are based on three purposes: protecting 
investors; ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent; and the reduction of 
systemic risk. 46  The second, entitled International Disclosure Standards for Cross-Border 
Offerings and Initial Listings by Foreign Issuers (International Disclosure Standards) presents 
                                                 
43 For more details see 8.5.2, ‘The IOSCO’. 
44 Regulation of International Securities Markets, Exchange Act, Release No. 6807, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P84,341[hereinafter Release No. 6807]. 
45 See Release No. 6807, The SEC further advised that “securities regulators in each nation should work closely 
with their foreign counterparts and seek coordinated international solutions to world market problems”. 
46 IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (2002), at available  
http://www.iosco.org/download/pdf/2002iosco_objectives_and_ principles_of_securities_regulation.pdf. 
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a set of non-financial statement disclosure standards aimed at facilitating cross-border 
offerings through the use of a single disclosure document. These standards address non-
financial statement disclosure requirements and do not relate to accounting or auditing 
principles. The basis of IDS is to assist cross-border offerings by creating a single disclosure 
document to be used by foreign issuers.47 Today about twenty countries around the world have 
already adopted the IDS. The acceptance of the International Disclosure Standards 
demonstrates a considerable movement towards the harmonization of the mutual efforts to 
fulfil the common goal. 48  Perhaps the greatest obstacle facing multinational offerings in 
developed markets has been accounting practices. Accounting standards provide the essential 
means of disclosing information for valuation of companies to provide a comparison for 
investors’ decisions. The absence of the same accounting language on the global securities 
market hinders the reduction of investors’ burdens of protection. From1989, IOSCO has 
supported the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) to set international 
accounting standards.  By 1992, IOSCO’s Working Party on Multinational Disclosure and 
Accounting had completed a review of the IASC auditing standards. The Presidents 
Committee of IOSCO adopted a resolution urging members of IOSCO to recognize 
International Accounting Standards (IASs) for use in international offerings as well as 
continuous reporting by foreign issuers.49 In an attempt to promote uniformity in international 
accounting standards, in 1994 IOSCO completed a review of the accounting principles issued 
by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). In May 2000, IOSCO 
announced its examination of the accounting standards issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Committee and recommended that its members use thirty IASC standards, as 
“supplemented by reconciliation, disclosure and interpretation where necessary”50 to facilitate 
cross-border offerings and listings by multinational enterprises.51  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 IOSCO, International Disclosure Standards for Cross-Border Offerings and Initial Listings by Foreign Issuers 
(1998), at http:// www.iosco.org/download/pdf/1998-intnl_disclosure_standards.pdf. 
48 See Release No. 6807, above, n.42 
49 Samuel Wolff,  ‘Recent Developments in International Securities Regulation’ (1995) 23 Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy. . 
50 International Accounting Standards Committee Standards Press Release (May 17, 2000),  
Available at, http://www.iosco.org/iosco.html. 
51 Ibid. 
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5.4 The Techniques of Harmonization 
 
Harmonization of law constitutes a purposive instrument for the realisation of market 
integration. It is therefore not surprising that different techniques have been developed which 
are used to address the different stage of harmonization. The techniques can be distinguished 
as discussed below. 
 
5.4.1 Detailed Harmonization   
 
In the early EC securities directives, detailed harmonization was introduced. At that time, “the 
leading idea was to enact similar regulation, which would necessarily be very detailed so that 
double vetting of the prospectus and other disclosure documents would become 
unnecessary.”52 The purpose of detailed harmonization is to remove regulatory barriers by 
making rules equivalent. But it is not practical as the EC capital markets are not fully 
integrated and display national characteristics. In practice detailed harmonization proved 
unsuccessful because it had presented difficulties relating to over-regulation, cumbersome 
implementation and inflexibility. Therefore it is not surprising to see minimum harmonization 
has been used.  
 
5.4.2 Minimum Harmonization 
 
Compared with detailed harmonization, minimum harmonization is intended to remove 
significant differences between the regulatory systems of Member States and thereby to ensure 
that “basic public interests” are protected in a single market. It was designed to safeguard 
national autonomy and to keep open competition between legal orders.53 It seeks to ensure the 
adoption of agreed essential standards into the domestic law of each member state, without 
seeking to achieve identical laws throughout the Community. Most EC directives seek to 
harmonize the laws of the EU Member States by providing minimum standards to be followed 
                                                 
52 Wymeersch, E, ‘Regulating European Markets:The harmonization of Securities Regulation in Europe in the 
New Trading Environment’ in Eilis Ferran and Charles A E Goodhart (eds), Regulating Financial Services and 
Markets in the 21st Century (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001), 189.  
53 Johannes Kondgen, ‘Rules of Conduct: Further Harmonization?’ in Guido Ferrarini (eds), European Securities 
Markets: The Investment Services Directive and Beyond (Kluwer Law International, 1998), 129. 
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by each Member State in the regulation of securities within its borders. 54  Minimum 
harmonization is a basic technique that been used by EC harmonization. 
 
However, minimum harmonization is not perfect. According to the principle of minimum 
harmonization, member states are required to harmonize what are considered the essential 
areas of financial regulation while being free to surpass EU minimum standards and to 
maintain national regulation in areas not harmonized. It easier to cause implementation 
problems because it gives member states considerable discretion in applying the harmonized 
rules.  
 
5.4.3 Mutual Recognition  
 
This concept came from the Cassis deDijon judgment.55 In the field of financial services the 
Cassis jurisprudence developed the concept of mutual recognition of Member States’ rules on 
the right to provide financial services. The essence of mutual recognition is that compliance 
with the legal and regulatory processes in one Member State is recognized as being 
compliance with those in another Member States. After grappling with the immense 
difficulties posed by its ambitious harmonization program, EC securities regulation changed 
their technique from detailed harmonization to the mutual recognition. It represented a shift 
from commonality to reciprocity. Mutual recognition first appeared in the 1985 UCITS 
Directive.   
 
The advantage of mutual recognition is that it generates a competitive process of regulation 
that may lead eventually (in theory) to convergence of regulatory standards. However, mutual 
recognition is widely regarded as having failed rather than having been successful. One reason 
is that the insistence of many Community competent authorities on full translation of the entire 
approved prospectus or listing particulars is particularly burdensome and restricts the mutual 
recognition regime in practice to only the largest issuers, while the requirement to include 
local information with respect to taxation, paying agents, and notification procedures can also 
represent a significant obstacle.  
                                                 
54  Samual Wolff, ‘Recent developments in European Union Securities Law’ (2002) 30 Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy, 292. 
55 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 
649. 
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5.4.4 Home Country Control   
The ‘home country control’ principle concedes to the home Member State the primary role of 
authorizing and supervising an undertaking. In the White Paper of 1985,56 it states that: 
The principle of ‘home country control’…means attributing the primary task of supervising 
the financial institution to the competent authorities of its Member State of origin… The 
authorities of the Member State which is the destination of the service, whilst not deprived of 
all power, would have a complementary role. 
The ‘home’ State is essentially the State where the firm’s true head office is located. The 
‘host’ State is defined57  as the State ‘in which’ a firm establishes a branch or provides 
services. 
By now, none of the parties questioned that the principle of home Member State control 
constitutes the guiding principle, which has prevailed in the harmonization of the financial 
services sector.58 The first financial services directive to adopt the ‘home country control’ 
approach was the UCITS Directive. Then it became the basis harmonization approach of the 
Investment Services Directive (ISD). However, the ISD also allocate regulatory responsibility 
to host member state which may exercise the rules can be characterized as general-good rules. 
Because inappropriate application of host-member-state conduct rules has the potential to 
impede integration of stock market, it led to move away from partially home/host-member-
state control to a whole home-member-state control. In the new generation EC directives such 
as the UCITS Management Company and Prospectus Directive, the Prospectus Directive, the 
Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID) Directive and the Transparency Directive, ‘home 
country control’ combined with ‘single passport’ have become the dominant harmonization 
approach. Comparing with the ISD, the new directives fulfil the real home-member-state 
control. For example, in the Prospectus Directive, it provides that a prospectus which is 
approved by the competent authority of one member state will be valid for the public offer or 
admission to trading of securities in any other member state (host member state). The host 
                                                 
56 Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (85)310 
final, paras 102-103. 
57 Article 1 of  Insider Dealing Directive. 
58 Eva lomnicka, ‘The home Country Control Principle in the Financial Services Directives and the Case Law’ In  
Mads Andenas and Wulf-henning Roth (eds), Services and Free Movement in EU Law (Oxford University Press, 
2002), 295. 
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competent authority is expressly prohibited from approving the prospectus for use in its own 
jurisdiction and therefore cannot require additional information to be included.59 
 
Generally, the home country principle has functioned effectively in integrating EU markets. It 
is a useful concept in allocating prudential regulation over financial services undertakings to 
one State — the State where they primarily operate from. The concentration of regulatory 
competence in one primary regulator is sensible in that it avoids both regulatory gaps on the 
one hand, importantly from the point of view of establishing a single market, regulatory 
duplication with its unnecessary burdens on enterprise on the other. 
 
5.4.5 Single Passport 
The ‘single passport’ established by the Investment Services Directive (ISD), as the new 
constitution of the EC’s securities markets, proved most influential in reshaping market 
structure in the European Union. The essence of the “single passport” concept in ISD is that 
issuers, investment firms and securities exchanges authorized in one host state can gain access 
to other Member States without the need for further, local regulatory approvals. In 2004, this 
“host state” rule has been reversed by Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID). 
The idea of a single passport in MiFID is that an investment firm, once authorized by the 
competent authority in its home member state, should then be able to operate through-out the 
EU under the continuing supervision of that home authority. MiFID requires compliance with 
rules of the member state in which business is done. Under MiFID, a company whether 
offering services in another member state through a branch or cross-border may follow the 
rules of the “home state” in which it is based.  The passport concept was conceived as being 
crucial to the development of a properly integrated pan-European financial market in which 
issuers, investment firms and investors could operate freely and seamlessly, unimpeded by 
national boundaries. 60  In 2002, UCITS Management Company and Prospectus Directive 
establish a regulatory, home Member State passport for management companies. The ‘single 
passport’ for issuers is produced by the Prospectus Directive 2003 which introduces a full 
home Member State passport for the prospectus. When issuers place the prospectus, as long as 
it has been approved by one member state, it can be used without further adaptation in all 
                                                 
59 See article 17 (1) of Prospectus Directive. 
60 Eilís Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market (Cambridge University Press,  2004), 4. 
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Member States. With respect to the secondary markets and investment services, MiFID 
supports a full regulatory passport for firms and exchanges.  
 
The European passport for issuers is a unique opportunity to simplify regulatory compliance 
for issuers without their having to produce duplicative sets of documentation or respond to 
numerous additional national requirements.61 The single passport regime reduces transaction 
costs for issuers and generates greater enthusiasm for pan-EC capital rising. 
 
5.4.6 Maximum Harmonization 
 
The opposite of minimum harmonization is maximum harmonization. According to the Green 
Paper,62 maximum harmonization states that no member state could apply stricter rules than 
the ones lay down at Community level. It means that national law may not exceed the terms of 
the legislation. In practice, this prohibits gold-plating63 of European legislation when it is 
transposed into national law. Traditionally it was fairly uncommon for European legislation to 
be drafted on this basis. The Prospectus Directive (PD) introduced the concept of ‘maximum 
harmonization’ which places more emphasis on home state supervision. This is a change from 
the prior EU financial service legislation which featured a ‘minimum harmonization and 
mutual recognition’ concept. PD is intended to create common disclosure standards for public 
issues of securities throughout the EU. As a maximum harmonization directive PD sets out the 
maximum limit of national regulation and individual member states are not permitted to 
impose content or disclosure provisions additional to those contained in the PD. Maximum 
harmonization could make free choice of the competent authority self-evident, as the standards 
will be the same in every jurisdiction. By imposing maximum harmonization the EU has 
deliberately forgone a mechanism that could alleviate deficiencies in its laws, namely 
intervention by member states to exceed the general EU-wide standards.64 The maximum 
harmonization approach was also used in the recent MiFID. Since EU harmonization has been 
developing over time, maximum harmonization maybe the way forward.  
                                                 
61 Commission of the European Communities. COM (2001) 280 final.2001/aaaa (COD). Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of The Council on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to 
the public or admitted to trading (presented by the Commission). 
62 Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis COM (2006) 744 final (8 February 2007). 
63 Gold-plating refers to the practice of national bodies exceeding the terms of European Community directives 
when implementing them into national law. 
64 Ferran,  EU Securities Market, above, n.58, 144. 
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5.5 The Scope of Harmonization 
 
The breadth or scope of the harmonization effort is closely linked to the harmonization 
procedure. As the process of harmonization goes deeper the scope of harmonization is 
becoming wider and wider. Although harmonization has not fully covered all the aspects of 
securities regulation, the basic areas have already done. This section will pick some very 
important aspects to examine.  
 
5.5.1 The Disclosure Regime  
 
Disclosure is a core principle of securities markets regulation.65 In the US, disclosure has been 
described variously as the ‘bedrock’ 66  and as ‘a-if not the-defining characteristic’ 67  of 
securities law. Disclosure regime also occupies a central position in the EC’s efforts to build 
the regulatory framework for an integrated pan-European securities market. In undertaking 
global offerings involving simultaneous offers and sales in multiple jurisdictions, issuers must 
comply with the disclosure requirements in each such jurisdiction. These varying disclosure 
laws and regulations across jurisdictions remain an impediment to undertaking cross-border 
offerings and also are arduous burdens for foreign issuers. Very often, the offering and 
disclosure rules in foreign jurisdictions are not in harmony with, or even directly conflict with, 
the offering and disclosure rules in an issuer’s home jurisdiction. There is a need for the 
development of common disclosure standards to be used uniformly in all securities markets 
The harmonization of disclosure rules may be the most significant change to affect the 
securities markets of many nations.  
 
5.5.1.1 At National Level 
 
The U.S. disclosure regime is one of the most rigorous regimes of the international securities 
markets. The premise underlying the Securities Act of 1933 and the securities Exchange Act 
                                                 
65 Karel Lannoo, ‘The emerging Framework for disclosure in the EU’ (2003) 3 Journal of Corporate Law studies, 
329. 
66 J.R. Macey, ‘A pox on both your houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the debate concerning the relative 
efficacy of mandatory versus enabling rules’ (2003) 81 Washington University Law Quarterly, 329, 330. 
67 S.M. Bainbridge, ‘Mandatory Disclosure: A behavioural Analysis’ (2000) 68 University of Cincinnati Law 
Review, 1023. 
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of 1934 is that full disclosure of all material information is the best way to protect investors 
from fraud and manipulation and the best way to promote efficient and fair pricing of 
securities.68 The enactment of the federal securities laws was simply a form of harmonization 
of the old state securities laws of the pre-1933 period. 69 Disclosure obligations are imposed on 
the issuers of securities. Firstly, the 1933 Securities Act requires that issuers selling securities 
in a public offering must disclosure important financial information through the registration of 
securities and thereafter comply with the periodic disclosure regime.70 Second, the interplay of 
Sections 12, 13 and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides, in general, that 
issuers whose securities are publicly traded become subject to an on-going obligation to 
provide information, commonly called the “continuous disclosure system”. It applies to 
information disclosed in conjunction with registration and public offering of securities, 
solicitation of proxy votes, tender offer and periodic public reporting. Finally, The Securities 
and Exchange Commission adopted Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure) that is a new issuer 
disclosure rule that addresses selective disclosure in 1999.71 The regulation provides that when 
an issuer, or person acting on its behalf, discloses material non-public information to certain 
enumerated persons (in general, securities market professionals and holders of the issuer’s 
securities who may well trade on the basis of the information), it must make public disclosure 
of that information. 
 
5.5.1.2 At Regional Level  
 
U.S.-Canada Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS) concept was originally released 
for public comment in a 1985 SEC release entitled “Facilitation of Multinational Securities 
Offerings.” 72 The MJDS was adopted in final form in June of 1991 and became effective in 
                                                 
68  Robert Repetto, Andrew MacSkimming and Gustavo Carvajal Isunza, ‘Environmental Disclosure 
Requirements in the Securities Regulations and Financial Accounting Standards of Canada, Mexica and United 
States’(25 March 2002) is available at: http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/ECONOMY/env-disclosure-25-03-02_en.pdf 
(last visited, November 2007).  
69 See generally Joel Seligman, ‘The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System’ (1983) 9 
Journal of Corporation Law.         
70 See section 7 of 1933 Act. 
71 The new rules and amendments were proposed in Exchange Act Release No. 42259 (Dec. 20, 1999) [64 FR 
72590]. 
72 Securities Act Release No. 6568, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,743 (Feb. 28, 
1985). 
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the United States and throughout Canada on July 1, 1991.73 Prior to the MJDS, companies in 
US and Canada had to prepare two sets of disclosure documents, one according to U.S. 
securities laws and the other according to Canadian laws. MJDS was created to permit U.S. 
and Canadian issuers to conduct public offerings in both countries on the basis of their home 
disclosure standards.74 The agreement was based upon the premise that “Canadian and U.S. 
accounting, disclosure, supervisory, and enforcement standards are so similar that each 
country’s documents can be used in the other country without harm to investors.” 75 The 
MJDS is comprised of two different sets of rules working together. The Canadian MJDS 
permits U.S. issuers who meet specified eligibility requirements to conduct public offerings in 
Canada, on the basis of disclosure documents prepared in accordance with U.S. disclosure 
rules, while the U.S. MJDS allows Canadian issuers who meet certain criteria to satisfy SEC 
registration requirements by complying with the disclosure rules of the Canadian authorities. 
Home country regulators have primary responsibility for reviewing disclosure documents, and 
host country regulators generally forgo review.76 The respective regulatory authorities will 
only review the disclosure documents of the issuer from the other country to the extent 
necessary to ensure compliance with the specific requirements of the MJDS. The MJDS 
covers cross-border offerings, issuer bids, take-over bids, business combinations, and 
continuous disclosure and other filings. 77  The implementation of the MJDS is important 
because it has resulted in the significant harmonization of a substantial segment of securities 
regulation between two sovereign nations. The MJDS is the first truly multilateral response to 
internationalization of the securities markets and should be viewed as a significant first step 
towards greater internationalization of securities regulation.78 
 
The EC harmonization plan serves as a good case study for the applicability and effectiveness 
of harmonized disclosure rules. At present, the new framework of issuer disclosure regime 
within the EC is divided into three parts: the regime for initial disclosure; periodic disclosure 
                                                 
73 Securities Act Release No. 6902; Notice of National Policy Statement No. 45, 14 OSC BULL. 2844 (June 28, 
1991); National Policy Statement No. 45--Multijurisdictional Disclosure System, 14 OSC BULL. 2889 (June 28, 
1991). 
74 See Edward F. Greene, Daniel A. Braverman & Jennifer M. Schneck, ‘Concepts of Regulation--The US 
Model’ in Fidelis Oditah, ed., The Future for the Global Securities Market (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 164 
75 David S. Ruder, ‘Reconciling U.S. Disclosure Policy with International Accounting and Disclosure Standards’ 
(1996) 17 Northwestern Journal Of International Law & Business, 1.  
76 56 Fed. Reg. 30036 (1991); BCSC 71-101CP, The Multi-jurisdictional Disclosure System (Oct. 23, 1998) 
available at http:// www.bcsc.bc.ca/policy.asp?id=1299. 
77 Ibid.  
78 Anna T. Drummond, ‘Securities law internationalization of securities regulation—multi-jurisdictional 
disclosure system for Canada and the US’ (1991) 36 Villanova Law Review, 775. 
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and rules on market abuse and insider trading which are regulated by the Prospectus Directive, 
the Transparency Directive, and the Market Abuse Directive respectively. At the core of the 
Prospectus Directive is the obligation to publish a prospectus when making an “offer of 
securities to the public”79 or “seeking admission to trading on a regulated market80.” It sets out 
the disclosure requirements to be included in different models of prospectuses. According to 
the Directive, the prospectus must contain all information about the issuer, its securities and 
the offering.81 The PD introduced a single prospectus passport, valid EC-wide, covering all 
listing and public offers of securities, whereby, once a prospectus is approved by the home 
member state’s regulatory authority, it must be accepted throughout the EU for public offers 
of securities and admission to trading on a regulated market. The term “regulated market” 
encompasses both primary and secondary EC exchanges. Member States will each provide a 
list of regulated markets within their jurisdiction. The Prospectus Directive contains 
exemptions from the obligation to publish a prospectus upon an offer of securities (but note 
that these exemptions are irrelevant in determining whether a prospectus needs to be published 
to obtain the admission to trading on an EC regulated market of the offered securities) 
Disclosure is only regulated in principle in the Directive. Hence, most of the specific 
disclosure requirements were left to the Commission to determine through level 2 
implementing measures.82  Prior to the Directives, continuous disclosure of price-sensitive 
information by publicly traded corporations in the EU was largely governed by stock 
exchange rules, and price transparency of markets was left to the self-regulation of exchanges. 
Article 10 of the Prospectus Directive provides that issuers of securities traded on a regulated 
market of the EC have to disclose changes made to the information in their original 
prospectuses issued when their securities were first floated, on a yearly basis.83 This is a form 
of periodic disclosure. Further, periodic continuous disclosure consists of yearly and half-
yearly financial and non-financial information on the issuer’s performance and operations 
specified in Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the Transparency Directive.84 Under Article 6 of the Market 
Abuse Directive, issuers also must disclose, on an ad hoc basis, specific information about the 
                                                 
79 Article 2(1) (d) of Prospectus Directive. 
80 Defined by reference to the Investment Services Directive (93/22/EEC). 
81 For more details see article 5 (1) of the Prospectus Directive. 
82 See Article 7 (1) of the Prospectus Directive. 
83 Article 10 of Prospectus Directive. 
84 Article 4,5,6 of Transparency Directive. 
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issuer or its securities that may materially affect the price of those securities in the market (i.e., 
inside information).85 
 
5.5.1.3 At International Level 
 
The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), a group comprised of the 
securities regulators from countries around the world, has made efforts to harmonize 
international disclosure standards. Rather than focusing on mutual recognition of standards, 
IOSCO has attempted to develop a single set of non-financial statement disclosure standards. 
In September 1998, IOSCO issued its International Disclosure Standards (IDS) for Cross-
Border Offerings and Initial Listings by Foreign Issuers.86 IOSCO encouraged its members to 
adopt these standards by incorporating them in their domestic regulations. IDS is divided into 
two parts. Part I includes the introduction and sets out the disclosure standards (the 
“Standards”) for use by companies in connection with cross-border public offerings. Part II 
discusses additional disclosure issues that are outside the scope of the Standards but that still 
may need to be addressed.87 The IDS allow issuers to rely on a single disclosure document as 
an “international passport” to capital raising and listing in more than one jurisdiction at a 
time. 88  The I.D.S. was in turn to be implemented by the membership through domestic 
legislation, and it has garnered support from some key national regulators, including the U.S. 
SEC which has adopted it in relation to foreign issuers as part of U.S. federal securities laws.89 
The essence of the IOSCO’s vision of an international passport is that an issuer seeking a 
cross-border share offering will only have to prepare a single prospectus reflecting the IDS 
which after being reviewed by a regulator of a country involved in the multinational offering, 
will thereafter be recognized by all other securities regimes in which the issuer subsequently 
seeks to sell its shares. The IDS is only to be used for multinational offerings, and the scope of 
                                                 
85 Article 6 of Market Abuse Directive. 
86 International Organization of Securities Commissions, ‘International Disclosure Standards for Cross Border 
Offering and Initial Listings by Foreign Issuers (1998)’ at IOSCO Document Library. available at: 
http://www.IOSCO.org/doc-public/1998-intnl_disclosure_standards_html.  
87 Ibid. 
88 International Organization of Securities Commissions, ‘IOSCO Announces the Release of Four Documents of 
Vital Interests to Securities Regulators and Market Participants’ IOSCO Press Release (May 1998), available at: 
http://www.iosco.org/news. 
89 See J. William Hicks, ‘Harmonization of Disclosure Standards for Cross-Border Share Offerings: Approaching 
an ‘International Passport’ to Capital Markets?’  (2002) 9 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 361. 
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the common standards does not apply to purely domestic issues.90 The exceptions to the 
application of the Standards, including offerings between the U.S. and Canada that are 
governed by the Multi-jurisdictional Disclosure System between the two countries as well as 
offerings made within the EC.91 Implementation of IDS standards by different jurisdictions 
appears to fall into four groups: adopted for foreign and domestic issuers; optional for foreign 
and domestic issuers; inapplicable to domestic, applicable to foreign issuers; inapplicable to 
domestic issuers, optional for foreign ones.92 Duplicative disclosure costs must hence still be 
borne by issuers in having to comply with different standards for domestic and foreign 
markets. The IOSCO further suffers from the absence of a single arbiter for resolving disputes 
relating to the interpretation and enforcement of the common standards.93 This can prove 
especially problematic because the test for deciding whether a particular piece of information 
needs to be disclosed under the IDS is that of materiality, a concept inherently vague and 
capable of diverse constructions. 94 
 
5.5.2 Accounting Standards 
 
At the heart of many of the issues encountered in the harmonization of securities regulation 
has been the diverse accounting practices employed throughout the nations. In particular, the 
preparation of disclosure documents is burdensome due to the lack of universally accepted 
accounting practices. 95  As recognized in the IOSCO 1989 Report, 96  harmonization of 
international disclosure regulations through use of a single disclosure document cannot be 
achieved without establishing international accounting and auditing standards. The Report also 
recommended the development or recognition of internationally acceptable accounting and 
                                                 
90 IOSCO, ‘International Disclosure Standards for Cross-Border Offerings and Initial Listings by Foreign Issuers, 
Report of the Technical Committee’ September 1998,  
available at: http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm? whereami=pubdocs, (IOSCO—Documents Library) 
Singapore is the only country that uses the IOSCO standards for domestic issues. 
91 Ibid. Other exceptions include offerings by companies incorporated in New Zealand that are listed or seeking 
to be listed on an Australian Securities Exchange, certain offerings in Hong Kong, and companies organized in a 
foreign country wishing to make an offering in the U.S. who do not meet the SEC’s definition of a “foreign 
private issuer”. 
92 Samuel Wolff, ‘Implementation of International Disclosure Standards’ (2001) 22 University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Economic Law, 91. 
93 See Hicks, ‘Cross-Border Share Offerings’, above, n.87. 
94 Parikshit Dasgupta, ‘Regulation of Cross-border Share Offerings: Trends towards Multi-jurisdictional 
Securities Laws’ (2003) 3 Global Jurist Advances, Issue 3, Article 1 at 6. 
95 See Samuel Wolff, ‘International Securities Regulation’, above, n.47.  
96 International Equity Offers, Report of the Technical Committee of IOSCO 7 (September 1989) (manuscript on 
file with IOSCO). 
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auditing standards that would “greatly facilitate the development of the use of a single 
disclosure document”.97 
 
5.5.2.1 At National Level 
 
In the United States, under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC has authority to 
establish accounting principles for businesses under its jurisdiction. Generally, the SEC 
permits the accounting profession and the private sector to self-regulate the accounting 
practice. Since 1973, the SEC has designated the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB), a private organization, as the standard-setter of accounting principles.98 FASB sets 
the accounting standards to be used in preparing the financial statements for firms that are 
registrants with the SEC. Thus, domestic firms that are registrants with SEC must file financial 
reports using US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).99 FASB establishes 
U.S. accounting standards by publishing several types of documents. The most important 
publication is the Statement of Financial Accounting Standard. The Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standard sets forth new accounting standards, the effective date and method of 
transition, background information, a brief summary of research done on the project, and the 
basis for the Board’s conclusions. 100 To further clarify the application of its Statements, 
FASB issues Interpretations. Interpretations modify or extend existing standards. 101 Finally, 
FASB publishes Statements of Concepts. Statements of Concepts do not announce new 
accounting standards; instead, they provide a general framework and agenda that FASB will 
follow to formulate new standards in the future. 102  Together, these various FASB 
pronouncements, along with non-superseded statements by FASB’s predecessors and certain 
SEC’s accounting rules, form U.S. GAAP. 
 
Until 2002, Congress placed few restrictions on the SEC’s authority to delegate the power to 
establish accounting rules to a private entity. Then in 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, which requires that before the SEC may recognize a private entity as the standard 
setter of accounting principles, it must verify that the private entity meets several 
                                                 
97 Ibid. 
98 See Financial Accounting Standards Board website, available at: http://www.fasb.org. 
99 17 C.F.R. §§ 210-4.01(a) (2), 210.2-02(b) (2000). 
100 See Financial Accounting Standards Board website, above, n.96, Facts about FASB. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
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requirements.103 The entity must (1) have a board of trustees, the majority of whom are not 
associated with any public accounting firm, (2) be funded as provided in section 109 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, (3) have procedures to ensure prompt consideration of changes 
to accounting principles necessary to reflect emerging accounting issues and changing 
business practices, and (4) consider the extent to which international convergence on high 
quality accounting standards is necessary or appropriate in the public interest. 104 In response 
to an ever-increasing number of accounting “restatements” (corrections of past financial 
statements) by public companies during the 1990s and record-setting bankruptcies by large 
public companies, notably those in 2002 involving WorldCom and Enron, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). As an auditor 
oversight body the PCAOB is an independent, private-sector and non-profit corporation. The 
PCAOB’s mission is to oversee the auditors of public companies, protect the interests of 
investors, and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and 
independent audit reports. The PCAOB does this through its standards setting, inspections, 
enforcement, and outreach programs. Since the PCAOB opened its doors in January 2003, it 
has registered more than 1,750 accounting firms that audit, or wish to audit, U.S. public 
companies. 105  Once registered, these firms become subject to the PCAOB’s supervisory 
oversight and must use PCAOB standards when they audit public companies.  
 
5.5.2.2 At Regional Level 
 
Before 2002, Europe lacked a set of continent-wide accounting rules; instead, accounting was 
the domain of national governments. It varies widely among the EC member states, running 
from sparse regulatory requirements to comprehensive, complex systems.106  In 2002, the 
European Council and Parliament adopted IASB as the E.U. counterpart to FASB by passing 
the IAS Regulation, which required EC companies listed in the European Union to use IAS 
                                                 
103 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 108(a), 116 Stat. 745, 768 (2002). 
104 Ibid. 
105 Mark W. Olson (Chairman of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board), ‘Global Risk and Regulation: 
the Role of the PCAOB’ February 2, 2007, 
available at: http://www.pcaobus.org/News_and_Events/Events/2007/Speech/02-02_Olson.aspx (last visited, 
September 2008). 
106 Peter E. Millspaugh, ‘Global Securities Trading: The Question of a Watchdog’ (1992) 26 George Washington 
Journal of  International Law & Economics,  355, 359-60. 
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starting in January 1, 2005.107 While the European Union recognizes IASB as the standard-
setter, the European Union does not automatically defer to the IASB on accounting issues. 
When the IASB promulgates a new accounting standard, this standard undergoes an 
endorsement process in which the European Commission reviews whether the standard meets 
several requirements. 108  The proposed standard must (1) not be inconsistent with the 
requirement that annual accounts shall give a true and fair view of the company’s assets, 
liabilities, financial position and profit or loss, (2) be conducive to the European public good, 
and (3) meet the criteria of understand ability, relevance, reliability and comparability required 
of the financial information needed for making economic decisions and assessing the 
stewardship of management.109 Only when the Commission is satisfied that an IASB standard 
meets these requirements may it adopt the standard by passing a new regulation. Hedge 
accounting under International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39 (Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement) 110  is currently the only area where there is a difference 
between EU IFRS and IASB IFRS.111 Under EU IFRS, companies are permitted to “carve out” 
and not comply with certain requirements of IAS 39. Financial statements of companies that 
have chosen to rely on this carve-out are not in compliance with IASB IFRS. Recently, 
however, the European Union passed two Directives--the Prospectus Directive and the 
Transparency Directive--that require foreign companies listed in Europe to state their financial 
statements in IFRS as of January 1, 2007. Under the Prospectus Directive, non-E.U. issuers 
conducting a public offering within the European Union will need to publish a prospectus, 
which must include financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS.112  Under the 
Transparency Directive, non-E.U. issuers whose securities are traded on an E.U. market will 
have to provide annual and half-yearly financial statements prepared in accordance with 
IFRS.113  
 
 
 
                                                 
107 Council Regulation 1606/2002, ‘On the Application of International Accounting Standards’ 2002 O.J. (L 243) 
1, 2 (EC). 
108 See Regulation 02/1606, art. 3(2), 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1-4 (E.C.). 
109 Ibid. 
110 IAS 39 deals with fair value and hedge accounting for certain financial instruments. 
111 See comment letter on the Adopting Release from the European Commission to the SEC, dated September 26, 
2007, available at: http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-07/s71307-111.pdf.  
112 See the Prospectus Directive, Council Directive 2003/71/EEC (OJ 2003 L345/64) of February 2003. 
113 See The Transparency Directive, Council Directive 2004/109/EEC (OJ 2004 L390/38) of 2004. 
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5.5.2.3 International Level 
 
Before 2008 many of the foreign companies attracted to the international capital markets had 
basically three choices for their accounting reports: (1) to adopt the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS); or (2) to adopt the US GAAP; or (3) to reconcile their financial 
information with SEC requirements. IFRS is the product of the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) which is the world’s most influential accounting standards board. 
The IFRS has achieved the status of a worldwide accounting standard. Nearly one hundred 
countries around the world, including Australia, Russia and New Zealand, currently use or will 
use IFRS.114  Due to the increased competition on capital markets, and given the global 
importance of US market, IFRS and US GAAP are competing to become the one who sets 
world standards. 
 
The IASB has been trying to harmonize international accounting principles since 1973. IASB 
like FASB, is a private organization, but one difference is that IASB purports to be an 
international organization, which aims to set accounting standards for the world’s capital 
markets. The IASB and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
have been jointly working on harmonization since July 1995, and in May 2000, the IOSCO 
finished its review of the IAS and recommended usage of certain IAS, supplemented with 
reconciliation, disclosure and interpretations. 115  Now IAS has been incorporated into the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). IFRS is a set of international accounting 
standards that can be used by issuers in preparing their financial statements. 
 
Since 2000, the IASB started to harmonize the differences between IFRS and US GAAP. The 
IASB continues to work on IFRS through their “Improvements Project”, which focuses on 
improving the quality of IFRS and increasing compatibility with US GAAP.116 A crucial 
landmark was reached in October 2002, when the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
                                                 
114 Use of IFRSs for Reporting by Domestic Listed Companies, by Country and Region Status as of 2005, IAS 
Plus (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu), available at http://www.iasplus.com/country/useias.htm. 
115 See Press Release, Int’l Accounting Standards Comm., IOSCO Endorses IASC’s Core Standards (May 17, 
2000), http:// www.iasb.org/docs/press/2000pr14.pdf. In 2005, IOSCO reaffirmed its support for IFRS. Press 
Release, Technical Comm. of the Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’n, Statement on the Development and Use of 
International Financial Reporting Standards in 2005, (Feb. 2005), available at: http://www.iasb.org/uploaded_ 
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116 Sir David Tweedie & Thomas R. Seidenstein, ‘Setting a Global Standard: The Case for Accounting 
Convergence’ (2005) 25 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, 589, 596. 
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(FASB) of the USA and the IASB signed The Norwalk Agreement i.e. Convergence 
Agreement to create a set of key international standards. 117 The Norwalk Agreement was not 
an official agreement between the U.S. government and the EU government, but a private 
agreement between two nongovernmental entities. Nevertheless, it was an important 
development and was praised by U.S. and E.U. regulators. The two Boards have agreed on the 
following matters: to undertake a short-term project aimed at removing the various differences 
between US GAAP and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) which include the 
IAS; to remove the other differences between the IFRS and US GAAP that will remain at 
January 1, 2005 through coordination of their future work programs. Consequently, 
differences in the accounting for inventory, asset exchanges, discontinued operations and 
many other areas are diminished. On July, 2007, revolutionary changes are occurred in 
accounting and financial reporting in the US. The SEC released a proposal to accept financial 
statements prepared in accordance with IFRS from foreign-private issuers without 
reconciliation to US GAAP.118 On November 15, 2007, the SEC voted in favor of the proposal 
and issued the final rule release on December 21, 2007.119 The new rules become effective 
March 4, 2008. Following the SEC’s decision to accept the proposal, reconciliations are no 
longer required for the subset of foreign private issuers 120  that prepare their financial 
statements in accordance with IFRS. SEC’s decision is intended to foster the use of IFRS as a 
set of high-quality, internationally accepted accounting standards. As the SEC Chairman 
Christopher Cox has indicated that “we have got to be able to demonstrate that IFRS is indeed 
a single set of international accounting standards and not a multiplicity of standards going by 
the same name”. 121  Acceptance of IFRS by SEC was an important step towards the 
                                                 
117 Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), Memorandum of Understanding: The Norwalk Agreement 
(September 18, 2002), available at http://www.fasb.org/news/memorandum.pdf. 
118 SEC Release No. 33-8818 (Proposed Rule: Acceptance From Foreign Private Issuers Of Financial Statements 
Prepared In Accordance With International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation To U.S. 
GAAP) (July 2, 2007) (the “Proposing Release”). Available at: http://www.404.gov/rules/proposed/2007/33-
8818.pdf  (last visited, September 2008). 
119 SEC Release No. 33-8879 (Final Rule: Acceptance From Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements 
Prepared In Accordance With International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation To U.S. 
GAAP) (December 21, 2007) (the “Adopting Release”),  
available at:  http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/33-8879.pdf (last visited, September 2008). 
120 A “foreign private issuer” is defined in Rule 405 of the Securities Act of 1933 to mean any foreign issuer, 
other than a foreign government, except an issuer that meets the following conditions: (i) more than 50 percent of 
its outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned of record by residents of the United States and 
(ii) any of the following: (a) the majority of the executive officers or directors are U.S. citizens or residents; (b) 
more than 50 percent of the assets of the issuer are located in the United States ; or (c) the business of the issuer is 
administered principally in the United States. 
121 Christopher Cox (SEC Chairman), ‘Chairman’s Address to the SEC Roundtable on International Financial 
Reporting Standards’ March 2007,  
available at: http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch030607cc.htm. 
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harmonization of international accounting. Based on these efforts, acceptance of IFRS in 
virtually all countries, including the US, appears imminent, perhaps occurring within the next 
few years.122 
 
5.5.3 Capital Adequacy Rules for Securities Firms 
 
Capital adequacy has been defined as the “extent of capital that should be required of brokers 
or others carrying on the business of trading in securities.”123 The purpose of capital adequacy 
is limitation of client and systemic risks. Harmonizing international capital adequacy standards 
for securities firms will be critical so securities regulators may fulfil their key objectives: 
protect investors, protect fair competition and promote an efficient market.124 Global banking 
supervisors have been successful in obtaining international capital adequacy standards, 
however, global securities regulators have not accomplished this goal although at a regional 
level have been gotten massive progress. 
 
5.5.3.1 At Regional Level 
The Capital Requirements Directive (CRD)125 was adopted on 14 June 2006 within EC. The 
Directive is one of the measures required to complete the EU Financial Services Action Plan. 
The objective of the CRD is to have in place a comprehensive and risk-sensitive framework 
and to foster enhanced risk management amongst financial institutions. This will maximize the 
effectiveness of the capital rules in ensuring continuing financial stability, maintaining 
confidence in financial institutions and protecting consumers. The framework under the CRD 
reflects the flexible structure and the major components of Basel II 126  rules on capital 
measurement and capital standards agreed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision127 
                                                 
122 L. Murphy Smith, ‘Are International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) an Unstoppable Juggernaut for US 
and Global Financial Reporting?’ (2008) The Business Review, Cambridge, 1  
available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1125069 
123 Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, Securities and Federal Corporate Law 2nd ed (Clark Boardman 
Callaghan,1998), 27.72. 
124 Elene Spanakos, ‘Harmonization of international adequacy rules for securities firms: an argument to 
implement the value at risk approach by adopting Basle’s internal model methodology’ (2000) 26 Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law, 221. 
125 Directive 2006/48/EC and Directive 2006/49/EC. 
126 Basel II is the second of the Basel Accords, which are recommendations on banking laws and regulations 
issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The purpose of Basel II is to create an international 
standard that banking regulators can use when creating regulations about how much capital banks need to put 
aside to guard against the types of financial and operational risks banks face. 
127 For more details about Basel Committee see 8.4.2, ‘The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision’. 
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in 2004. It has been based on the three ‘pillars’, but has been tailored to the specific features of 
the EU market. In terms of scope of application, the CRD goes wider than the framework to 
incorporate investment firms and credit institutuions as well as banks.128 This directive is 
making significant changes to two directives that were implementing Basel I129 : The Banking 
Consolidation Directive and The Capital Adequacy Directive. Broader risk management, 
flexibility and greater risk sensitivity are key concepts of the CRD. The CRD applies to all 
credit institutions and those investment firms defined by Article 4(1), Market in Financial 
Instruments Directive. 130  By transposing internationally agreed capital standards into a 
common EU legal framework, the Directive ensures that all EU countries will be in line with 
Basel 2, thereby creating a level playing field for all banks, building societies and affected 
investment firms across the EU. This in turn will further deepen the Single Market in financial 
services.131 Member States are to apply the Directive from the start of 2007. Institutions can 
choose between the current basic indicator approach and the Standardized Approach132 that 
evaluates the business lines as a medium sophistication approach of the new framework. The 
most sophisticated approaches, Advanced IRB approach and advanced measurement approach 
for operational risk (AMA)133 will be available on the beginning of 2008. From this date, all 
EU firms will apply “Basel II”. 
 
5.5.3.2 At International Level 
 
It was international banking regulators who took the first step to harmonize international 
capital adequacy rules. Their successful experiences encouraged international securities 
                                                 
128 Article 1 of the Capital Requirements Directive. 
129 Basel I is the term which refers to a round of deliberations by central bankers from around the world, and in 
1988, the Basel Committee (BCBS) in Basel, Switzerland, published a set of minimal capital requirements for 
banks. This is also known as the 1988 Basel Accord, and was enforced by law in the Group of Ten (G-10) 
countries in 1992, with Japanese banks permitted an extended transition period. 
130 Article 3 of the Capital Requirements Directive. 
131  ‘Transposition of the Capital Requirements Directive: Consultation and Partial Regulatory Impact 
Assessment’ available at: 
http://www.europeansecuritisation.com/pubs/capital_requirements_directive280206.pdf. 
132 The standardized approach is a set of risk measurement techniques for banking institutions. The term may be 
used in the context of credit risk or operational risk. 
133Under AMA, financial institutions can use their internal loss data in combination with external loss data and 
scenario analyses as input in the estimation of the capital required. The instituions must use the results of expert 
assessments to estimate exposure to very serious events (tail value at risk). Moreover, the approach specifies a 
number of qualitative requirements for the collection of data and internal controls that must be met by institutions 
that want to apply AMA. The AMA is the most sophisticated model for estimating operational risk. Banks who 
would like to use this method need an approval from their national FSA. 
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regulators to accelerate efforts to set forth harmonized capital requirement rules for securities 
firms. The first fruit of international capital adequacy rule making was Basle I. In July 1988, 
representatives of bank supervisory authorities from twelve countries meeting in Basle, 
Switzerland, agreed to uniform capital requirements as reflected in the Basle Accord on 
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards. Basle developed a 
“framework for assessing an institution’s capital adequacy by weighing its assets and off-
balance sheet exposures on the basis of counterparty credit risk”.134 The Basle I framework 
endorsed a risk-weighted approach to the assets denominator of the capital assets ratio.135 
Basle I deal with only on credit (counterparty) risk and much less on other important risks 
such as currency risk, interest rate risk, and market risk. The weaknesses of Basle I led to an 
extensive round of negotiations for the drafting of a new accord. The process of reforming the 
Basel Accord, begun in 1999, has been motivated by the goal of more closely matching 
regulatory capital to the risk profile of banks’ asset portfolios. In June 1999, the BIS issued a 
proposal that would significantly change the capital adequacy Accord through extensive 
revision and refinement of Basle I and by providing an alternative approach to measuring risk 
that would bring the capital framework closer to global market risk management practices.136 
Following several rounds of consultation, the revised Accord was finally published in June 
2004137 and further additions were released in 2005.138 The purpose of Basel II, which was 
initially published in June 2004, is to create an international standard that banking regulators 
can use when creating regulations about how much capital banks need to put aside to guard 
against the types of financial and operational risks banks face. 
 
The Basle II framework for the assessment of the capital adequacy of international credit 
institutions and monitoring of their compliance is based on three pillars: Pillar 1 provides 
minimum capital requirements; Pillar 2 describes the process for the supervisory review of 
capital adequacy; and Pillar 3 provides the mechanisms to facilitate and enforce market 
discipline through public disclosure. Under the revised capital adequacy framework (Basel II), 
                                                 
134 Risk-Based Capital Standards: Market Risk, 61 (1996) Fed. Reg. 47,358.  
135 Michael Malloy, ‘Emerging International Regime of Financial Services Regulation’ (2005) 18 Transnational 
Lawyer, 332-333. 
136 A New Capital Adequacy Framework, Basle, Bank for International Settlements, 1999,  
available at:http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs50.pdf. 
137 BIS, Press Release, ‘G10 Central bank governors and heads of supervision endorse the publication of the 
revised capital framework’, 26 June 2004, available at www.bis.org/press/p040626.htm. 
138 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
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banks will be allowed to calculate regulatory capital using either a standardized approach to 
credit risk or a more sophisticated internal rating based (IRB) approach.139 The IRB approach 
should bring capital requirements closer to credit risk profiles and all major banks can be 
expected to adopt it. As an international securities regulation organization, IOSCO is fully 
supportive of the Basel II Accord. This is particularly so with the joint working group which 
has been formed between the Basel Committee and IOSCO. In 2005, the group issued the 
paper the Application of Basel II to Trading Activities and the Treatment of Double Default 
Effects.140 The paper particularly focuses on the treatment of counterpart credit risk for over-
the-counter derivatives, repurchase agreements and securities financing transactions. Mr. 
Andrew Sheng, Chairman of the IOSCO Technical Committee and the Securities said 
“IOSCO fully endorses these new rules, which represent a significant step forward in the 
regulation of capital requirements for trading activities.”141 
 
5.5.4 Clearing and Settlement Systems 
 
Clearing and settlement systems have become an important component of the domestic and 
global financial infrastructure as securities markets have become an increasingly important 
channel for the flows of funds between borrowers and lenders, and investors have started 
managing their securities portfolios more actively. Thus, weaknesses in clearing and 
settlement systems can be a source of systemic disturbance for securities markets and for other 
payment and settlement systems. It is for this reason that the regional and international 
community has increasingly focused on the soundness, safety and resilience of the post-
trading infrastructure, when assessing the strengths and vulnerabilities of the financial markets 
in various countries. The international debate on the regulation of the clearing and settlement 
industry has now a longstanding history, dating back to the Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems (CPSS) and IOSCO initiatives, and has recently culminated with the 
release of a Communication by the European Commission142 and the final version of a joint 
                                                 
139 See International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, available at:bis.org. 
140 Basle Committee press release, ‘Basel Committee and IOSCO finalize solutions for the application of Basel II 
to some trading-related exposures and the treatment of double default effects’ 
18 July 2005, available at: http://www.cnmv.es/publicaciones/IOSCOPD201_Nota_prensa.pdf. 
141 Ibid. 
142  Clearing and Settlement in the European Union – The way forward, Communication of the European 
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document by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR).143 
5.5.4.1 At Regional Level 
 
Efficient and secure payment and settlement systems are crucial to the homogeneity and 
effectiveness of the EU internal market. EU institutions have therefore promoted 
developments in this area. Some success has been achieved in harmonizing rules for payment 
intermediation and payment systems in Europe. The main existing EU legislation in this area 
is the Settlement Finality Directive of 1998144 and the Collateral Directive of 2002.145 Further 
relevant provisions can be found in the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive of 2004.146 
The Settlement Finality Directive, which was required to be implemented by the Member 
States by 11 December 1999, has made a significant contribution to the reduction of systemic 
risk within designated EU payment and securities settlement systems. Originally, Settlement 
Finality Directive was drafted only with payment systems in mind, but it was later extended to 
cover securities settlement systems as well, due to the ‘close connection between such systems 
and payment systems’.147 The Directive has a rather narrow personal scope of application, 
being limited to qualifying payment and securities settlement systems. The second legal act 
which is relevant in clearing and settlement context is the Collateral Directive. Collateral is the 
provision of assets to secure the performance of an obligation, whereby there can either be 
transfer of the full ownership of the assets from a collateral provider to a collateral taker (e.g. 
under a repurchase or transfer of title arrangement) or the giving of rights over assets (e.g. 
pledge, charge or lien), where the ownership of the assets remains with the collateral 
provider.148  Collateral is of particular importance in financial markets. Yet, as shown by 
various market studies, before the advent of the Collateral Directive the laws and practices on 
collateralization differed considerably between the EU Member States. 149  The Collateral 
Directive has established a largely harmonized framework for collateral in the EU that not 
only supports modern financial market needs, but at the same time facilitates the cross-border 
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147 Recital 2 of the Settlement Finality Directive. 
148 The definitions also in article 2 (1) (a) to (c) of the Collateral Directive.  
149 International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), ‘Collateral arrangements in EU financial markets’, 
March 2000; European Financial Markets Lawyers Group (EFMLG), ‘Proposal for an EU directive on 
collateralisation’, June 2000, available at: www.efmlg.org. 
  
131
 
use of collateral throughout the EU. The Collateral Directive pursues a number of 
complementary aims, all converging on the intention to create clear, effective and simple 
regimes for financial collateral arrangements. According to its recitals, the aims of the 
Collateral Directive are: first, the removal of the major obstacles to the (cross-border) use of 
collateral; second, the limitation of administrative burdens, formalities and cumbersome 
procedures; and third, the creation of a clear and simple legal framework.150 The MiFID 
requires the Member States to harmonize their rules governing investment services and the 
pursuit of investment activities. The MiFID is a framework directive, in line with the 
comitology procedure. The MiFID seeks to establish, for the first time, a comprehensive 
regulatory framework governing the organised execution of investment transactions by 
exchanges, other trading systems and investment firms. While being aimed primarily at the 
trading of securities, a number of the MiFID provisions have a bearing on the clearing and 
settlement infrastructure. The provisions which may have the biggest effect in this respect 
relate to the safekeeping of client’s assets and the access of investment firms to central 
counterparties and clearing and settlement facilities. MiFID requires Member States to ensure 
that investment firms from other Member States have non-discriminatory access to ‘central 
counterparty, clearing and settlement systems in their territory for the purposes of finalizing or 
arranging the finalization of transactions in financial instruments.’151 Furthermore, MiFID 
provides that, subject to certain qualifications, Member States must require regulated markets 
in their territories to offer all their members or participants ‘the right to designate the system 
for the settlement of transactions in financial instruments undertaken on that regulated 
market’.152 
 
In developing securities settlement systems, EU institutions aim in particular to strengthen the 
integration and functionality of European financial markets, reduce the costs and inefficiencies 
associated with securities settlements between member countries and enhance the international 
competitiveness of European exchanges. The Lamfalussy Report, published in February 2001, 
identified more efficient arrangements for securities settlements as a prerequisite for the 
successful harmonization of European securities markets.153 Arrangements for cross-border 
settlements were then addressed in the first Giovannini Report published in November 
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2001.154 This report states that the widely divergent arrangements for securities settlements 
between individual member states make them complex, costly, time-consuming and risky. A 
second Giovannini report,155 issued in April 2003, presented a road map for removing the 
barriers identified in the first report, and assigned action and follow-up responsibilities. 
Finally, the report contained a detailed description of possible consolidation models and policy 
responses. In 2004 October, The Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) and 
the CESR have jointly approved the report entitled “Standards for securities clearing and 
settlement in the European Union”, prepared by the joint the ESCB-CESR Working Group. 
The report contains 19 standards that aim to increase the safety, soundness and efficiency of 
securities clearing and settlement systems in the European Union. The standards are based on 
the CPSS- IOSCO Recommendations for securities settlement systems issued in November 
2001, adapting them to the European context. 
 
5.5.4.2 At International Level 
 
At the international level, various bodies have responded to the challenges posed by the cross 
border clearing and settlement of financial instruments. In 2001, the CPSS of the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) and the Technical Committee of the IOSCO jointly prepared 
and released a report, the Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems,156  giving 
guidance on the reduction of legal and systemic risk in clearing and securities settlement 
systems.  The recommendations were developed by the Task Force on Securities Settlement 
Systems that the CPSS and the Technical Committee of IOSCO created in December 1999. 
The Task Force comprises 28 central bankers and securities regulators from 18 countries and 
regions and from the European Union. In January 2000 the Task Force received input from 
central bankers and securities regulators who together represented about 30 countries, as well 
as from representatives of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In January 
2001 the CPSS and the Technical Committee of IOSCO released a version of this report for 
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public comment. Nearly 90 comments were received, and the commentary included a wide 
variety of interested parties, mostly from Europe, but also from Asia, Africa and the Americas. 
As a result of these comments, several recommendations have been changed significantly and 
a new recommendation on cross-border links between settlement systems has been added. The 
reports set out 19 recommendations for securities settlement comprise international standards 
that should be met by securities settlement systems and the markets in which they operate. The 
recommendations address three areas: (i) risk mitigation, (ii) efficiency, and (iii) governance 
and oversight. These recommendations have been included in the “Key Standards for Sound 
Financial Systems” highlighted by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and represent a 
“benchmark” for comparing and evaluating the degree of safety of SSSs around the world.157 
The recommendations are designed to cover SSSs for all types of securities, for securities 
issued in industrialized and developing countries and traded among domestic and cross-border 
counterparties. SSSs are broadly defined to include the full set of institutional arrangements 
for confirmation, clearance, and settlement of securities trades, and safekeeping of securities, 
and therefore the recommendations are applied broadly to various institutions, from central 
securities depositories, operators of trade confirmation systems, central counterparties, cash 
settlement agents, custodian banks, to other relevant parties. The CPSS-IOSCO reports 
emphasize that the recommendations are “minimum standards” (so stricter measures may be 
welcomed and in some cases warranted according to the specific environments in which the 
systems operate) and that various aspects would need to be further clarified by the relevant 
local authorities before the recommendations are implemented. In 2002, the CPSS-IOSCO 
document, Assessment Methodology for Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems 
outlines how the standards should be applied and identifies the key requirements for meeting 
the standards. For each recommendation, it suggests the criteria necessary for the observance, 
broad observance, partial observance, or non-observance of each standard. The assessment 
methodology of the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations leaves open the possibility for the 
relevant authorities to extend the scope of application of the recommendations beyond SSSs to 
other major providers of similar services. Securities custody and settlement services are 
offered by various categories of intermediary, depending on the business practice, legal 
tradition and history of the country concerned. 158  As a result, while a principle of 
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specialization generally applies to financial intermediaries (e.g. banks and insurance 
companies), clearing and settlement services for securities can be provided by several entities. 
Furthermore, in January 2003, the Group of Thirty (G30) published its ‘Plan of Action’ for 
global clearing and settlement, 159  which basically confirmed the CPSS-IOSCO 
recommendations and identified some additional questions of substantive law that need to be 
tackled. These included the need for: effective protection against the risk of losing assets in the 
event of an intermediary’s insolvency; simplifying pledge formalities and the realization 
procedures relating to collateral; and harmonized rules of finality of settlement. 
 
 
5.5.5 Regulation of Market Conduct 
 
This is a major element in many securities regulation regimes. Systematic regulation against 
insider dealing is the result of SEC administrative and judicial interpretation in the USA. The 
regulatory stance against insider dealing toughened from the 1960s.160 However, within the 
EC, as late as 1990, nine of the twelve member States failed to impose any criminal penalties 
for insider trading of securities.161 But in light of the need to combat insider dealing in the 
interests of investor confidence, EC regulators recognized that harmonization is necessary, 
given the absence of insider-dealing prohibitions in some Member States and the divergences 
between those rules which have been adopted by Member States.162  
 
5.5.5.1 At National Level 
 
The US has a long history of regulating insider dealing. Statutory regulation was introduced in 
the United States by the Securities Exchange Act 1934, and even before then the common law 
in some states has already begun to control insider dealing.163 However, no statutory definition 
of insider trading exists under the US securities law. It has only the general anti-fraud 
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provisions expressed in rule 10 b-5164  which was promulgated by the SEC in 1942 under s.10 
(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934. Rule 10 b-5 states that:  
It is unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to: (a) employ any device or scheme to defraud, (b) make any 
untrue statement of material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) engage in any act, practice or 
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.  
 
Specific types of insider trading are addressed by Exchange Act Section 16(b), which prohibits 
short swing profits by designated statutory insiders, and Exchange Act Rule 14e-3, which 
prohibits anyone other than a tender offeror from acquiring any securities while in possession 
of material information that he knows or has reason to know is non public and was acquired 
from the bidder, the target or any person associated with either one of these. 
 
5.5.5.2 At Regional Level  
 
By the time the EC 1989 Insider Dealing Directive (IDD) was adopted, the European 
Commission’s programme of creating the EC-wide capital market was well advanced and it 
seemed possible to take some bold steps with insider dealing policy. In 2003, the Market 
Abuse Directive (MAD) replaced the limited 1989 Insider Dealing Directive with a view to a 
more detailed harmonization Europe-wide of regulation in this area. The MAD introduces for 
the first time an EC prohibition on market manipulation. It creates a harmonized framework 
for protecting the integrity of the financial markets by preventing insider dealing and market 
manipulation.165  It defines and prohibits both forms of market abuse and provides for a 
number of preventive measures such as prompt disclosure of inside information and 
management transactions or safeguards of impartiality of investment research.166 The MAD 
establishes extensive new definitions for insider dealing and market manipulation and without 
prejudice to the right of member states to impose criminal sanctions, requires member states to 
ensure that an administrative sanctions regime is in place, given the well-documented 
difficulties in policing market abuse through the criminal law. In addition, it would be 
“administratively simpler and reduce the number of different rules and standards across the 
EU” to treat both topics under the same directive.167 MAD uses two main regulatory tools: ex-
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post sanctions for those who engage in insider trading or manipulate the market and 
prophylactic rules to limit the risk that the prohibited conducts occur upfront. 
 
 
5.6 The Road-block of International Harmonization 
 
In many ways, international harmonization is a good thing. Harmonization can overcome 
piecemeal regulation of global securities problems and most importantly it can beget further 
harmonization and create an expanding zone of international cooperation. MJDS, EC 
harmonization Plan and the efforts of the IOSCO does give hope that harmonization on an 
international scale is possible. It can be seen that lots of hard work have been done but at the 
same time, it is still exist significant roadblocks in the path towards achieving the ideal 
international harmonization. Critics fear that harmonization could raise the threat of 
“regulatory imperialism” in which less regulated markets are forced to become more 
regulated.168 Pessimists fear that the effort to achieve harmonization may itself encourage 
regulatory arbitrage as market participants aim to exploit differences between national 
regimes. 
 
Firstly, although international regulators can usually agree on the basic goals and objectives of 
regulation, there exists fundamental differences in the regulatory approach taken, including the 
form and content of regulation.169 These differences may be explained in large part by some or 
all of the following factors: 
• differences in history, culture and national customs and practices; 
• legal or juridical distinctions among jurisdictions, for example, common law versus civil 
code; 
• universal banking and non-universal banking or mixed jurisdictions; 
• differences in level of market maturity; 
• differences in objectives of statutory framework, that is, market integrity, customer 
protection, or both; 
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• differences in the role of markets, for example, public or private markets, and type of market 
and market participants, for example, physical delivery market with predominately 
commercial participation or market with significant retail participation; 
• differences in market structure, for example, floor based or electronic.170 
 
Therefore to find a single solution that will be viable for every country is an arduous task. 
The process of harmonization will require compromises among many domestic regulators 
that hold different views about securities regulation.171 Such as MJDS, although this approach 
was promising for Canada, in most other foreign jurisdictions, this model will not work, 
precisely because of differences between the regulatory systems in the U.S. and those 
countries, particularly in the accounting and disclosure areas.  
 
Secondly, the harmonization process is not cost free. It will entail substantial transition costs, 
both for regulators as well as market participants. Regulators will have to invest a great deal 
of resources and capital to develop the common standards. The MJDS rests on the substantial 
effort on the part of the securities regulators in both Canada and the United States in learning 
and understanding each other’s system. It took six years to develop MJDS. Each of the U.S. 
and Canadian securities regulators took almost three years to review the other’s rules, 
regulations and regulatory practices before agreeing to the system. One must keep in mind 
that this amount of time was required even though the United States and Canada have very 
similar securities regulatory systems. The prolonged period of negotiation and modification 
of existing rules even between two countries with strongly connected economies clearly 
highlights the difficulty associated with any harmonization project. It is not practical to 
assume that the international securities regulators would be willing to make such an 
investment. Investors and professionals such as lawyers and accountants may incur costs 
which arise due to the need to learn new rules, and such costs are especially high if they have 
relied upon old rules and had taken actions with long-term consequences. Issuers may also 
bear greater costs in having to prepare disclosure documents in accordance with new 
standards. This will prove particularly onerous for issuers from markets which traditionally 
imposed less stringent requirements than the uniform standards that are promulgated.  
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Columbia Business Law Review, 250. 
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Thirdly, another problem arises from the degree of flexibility permitted in the implementation 
of the common standards. 172   Within EC, although each member state must adopt EC 
harmonizing Directive into legislation; each member state retains the choice as to the form 
and method of implementation it wishes to employ to move the directive into national law.173 
Thus, the result is a wide variation in the degree of securities regulation from one member 
state to another. At the international level, the situation is same. The IOSCO proposal 
specifically states that each securities document is subject to host country review or approval 
process and contemplates that supplementary disclosure may sometimes be necessary for 
issuers from certain industries or for certain unusual forms of securities instruments.174 It will 
be not surprising to see substantial modification of the IDS upon its implementation through 
domestic legislation. With such qualifications, one must surely doubt the extent of uniformity 
in standards that can actually be attained in practice.  
 
Fourthly, perhaps the most important and difficult obstacle confronting the harmonization 
right now is that it lacks of absolute authority. The nearest entity approximating a formal, 
centralized regulatory authority in the world is the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO). In recent years, IOSCO currently serves as the principal forum for 
discussions of international securities issues.175 Despite speculation, IOSCO’s agenda has not 
indicated an intention to assume the role of a global securities watchdog.176 IOSCO, and 
similar organizations, are special-interest groups with a narrow focus, lacking both the 
objectivity and credibility to serve effectively as an international regulatory authority.177 
Additionally, IOSCO lacks mandate authority to adopt and implement binding international 
regulatory principles.178 IOSCO frequently finds it difficult to obtain a consensus amongst 
regulators.  
 
                                                 
172 See Hicks, ‘Cross-Border Share Offerings’, above, n.87. 
173 Andreas J. Roquette, ‘New Developments Relating to the Internationalization of the Capital Markets: A 
Comparison of Legislative Reforms in the United States, the European Community, and Germany’  (1994) 14  
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law, 588.  
174 The IDS. Report states that companies engaged in specialised industries such as banking, insurance and 
mining may have to provide additional disclosure in certain countries. Similarly, it is acknowledged that 
additional information may need to be disclosed in respect of equity instruments like depositary receipts and 
voting trust certificates. 
175 See Wolff, ‘International securities regulation’, above, n.47, 399-400. 
176 See Millspaugh, ‘Global securities trading’, above, n.104,371.  
177 See Millspaugh, ‘Global securities trading’, above, n.104, 373-374.  
178 See Wolff, ‘International securities regulation’, above, n.47, 399. 
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Last but not least, even if an international regulatory authority did exist, it would still have 
problems. To create such a regulatory body, the nations must be willing to relinquish their 
sovereign authority over their market. Release of governmental control over economic 
markets is a precursor to the implementation of a harmonized securities market. Such a 
release of control by all nations, however, would require inconceivable diplomatic efforts and 
is extremely improbable, short of a market collapse or an event of extreme political 
embarrassment to demand such a change.179 Thus, the threats to political sovereignty seem to 
be an insurmountable hurdle to achieving significant securities harmonization in international 
securities regulation. 
 
                                                 
179 See Millspaugh, ‘Global securities trading’ above, n.104. 
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Chapter Six: Regulatory Competition 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Regulatory competition, apart from harmonization, has been said to be another regulatory 
answer in moving towards an integration system of international securities regulation. 
Different from harmonization which wants to unify the regulation, regulatory competition 
could yield a diversified set of regimes from which market players could pick and choose. 
Importantly, it can also be argued that regulatory competition produces superior standards in 
terms of investor protection when compared to the standards promulgated through 
international harmonization efforts because the international organizations responsible for the 
development of the uniform standards are not subject to political discipline and are potentially 
susceptible to rent-seeking.1 Unfortunately, not every one agrees that it is necessary to have 
regulatory competition in international securities regulation. The reason is that the 
consequence of competition is not guaranteed as being positive. Competition can go in two 
different directions, a “race to the top” or a “race to the bottom”. The former approach argues 
that competition will produce a positive result; however, the latter argues that it has the 
opposite effect. The argument regarding which way competition is moving is on going. 
Whether regulatory competition leads international securities regulation to a race to the top, a 
race to the bottom, or somewhere in between is the basic question that will be explored in this 
chapter.  
 
Firstly there is a brief analysis of the rationales for regulatory competition. Secondly, this 
chapter describes the feasibility of international regulatory competition. How regulatory 
competition works on an international level will be examined in section D. Since the main 
purpose of competition in international securities regulation is to attract more market 
participants, in other words, to attract more issuers to come to list, therefore these sections will 
concentrate not on the macrostructure but on the cross-listing competition among exchanges. 
Finally section E will explore the consequences of regulatory competition.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Roberta Romano, ‘The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation’ (2001) 2 Theoretical 
Inquiries Law. 
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6.2 The Rationales for Regulatory Competition 
 
Regarding the rationales of regulatory competition, many reasons can be mentioned, but some 
of them overlap. This section will just focus on two core reasons: first, it can correct market 
mistakes quicker; second, it can provide a superior regulatory regime. 
  
Firstly, regulatory competition is argued to be the fastest means to correct market mistakes. In 
a competitive market, there is a built-in self-correcting mechanism, as the actions of numerous 
actors aggregate information efficiently.2A single regulator is not able to do it quickly. The 
flow of firms and investors into and out of particular regulatory regimes provides information 
concerning which rules are thought to be more desirable by investors. The result of 
competition will give regulators a good signal to show whether or not they need to improve 
their regulatory systems. When a regulator finds that its jurisdiction is subject to a net outflow, 
it will reassess its regulatory regime so as to stem the decline in its jurisdictional sphere. As 
national and regional markets lose liquidity and trading volume to international exchanges, 
usually a regulatory reaction has followed.  
 
 
Secondly, regulatory competition among securities regulators would not only protect 
investors, both large and small, but also would provide a superior regulatory regime. 3 
“Survival of the fittest” is the common principle for competition. Where there is competition, 
there must be failure. One direct result of competition is to purge out-of-date or inefficient 
regulation from the legal systems; this possible result will place pressure on regulators to tailor 
regulations for the needs of issuers and investors. On the contrary, regulatory monopolists 
have insufficient incentive and insufficient information to offer optimal regulation. In addition 
to the creation of competitive equilibrium, competition enables regulators to learn from the 
efficient regimes of other regulators and it fosters regulatory innovation. In those countries 
where the local market has been most adversely affected, legislative and regulatory reforms 
have been adopted to enhance governance and disclosure standards in the hope of stemming 
the flight of firms and trading to foreign markets.4 
                                                 
2 See Romano, ‘The need for competition’, above, n.1. 
3 See Romano, ‘The need for competition’, above, n.1 
4 John Barham, ‘A Compromise Solution’ (2001) Oct Latin Finance, 40, 41-42. Since late 2000, significant 
securities markets reforms have been adopted in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico; in addition, Colombia has 
  
142
 
6.3 Feasibility of International Regulatory Competition 
 
After discussing the rationales of regulatory competition, the natural question is whether it is 
feasible to have regulatory competition in international securities regulation? This part tries to 
give an answer.  
 
6.3.1 The New Structures of Securities Exchanges  
 
As discussed in chapter one, the traditional model of an exchange is a locally organized 
mutual or membership association. Each exchange operated in isolation from the others.5 
Historically, the exchange’s trading system was based on mutuality and floor trading which 
required physical location and verbal interaction. Access to the exchange had to be rationed to 
prevent overcrowding.  Rationing access to the exchange was generally done through a 
combination of substantial initial and annual membership fees. As the trading system was so 
simple, stock exchanges were organized as not-for-profit organizations, founded and owned 
by brokers and dealers who managed “their” stock exchange like an exclusive club.6 This kind 
of closed membership organization had high barriers to potential entrants and was sheltered 
from competition by national regulation and policies. 7  As such, they behaved more like 
sluggish monopolies than dynamic entrepreneurs.  
 
This pattern, however, has changed due to the economics of automated trading. There is a big 
difference between automated trading and floor trading. The placement and matching of buy 
and sell orders can now be done on computer systems, access to which is inherently 
constrained neither by the location nor the members of desired access points.8 Commission 
                                                                                                                                                         
revised its regulations regarding pension funds to encourage more active participation in corporate governance by 
institutional shareholders. Chile approved a new tender offer law in late 2001, and Argentina and Mexico adopted 
new capital markets laws in 2001. Global Investing: Be Nice to Minorities in Latin America, Fin. Times, July 23, 
2001, at 20. After a four-year struggle, Brazil also approved a compromise statute in 2001 that significantly 
revised its corporate governance standards, at least prospectively, in order to enhance the rights of minority 
shareholders. 
5 M. Pagano, ‘The Changing Microstructure of European Equity Markets’ (1997) Working Paper No. 4, Centre 
for Studies in Economics and Finance, revised version published in G. Ferrarini, The European Securities 
Markets: The Investment Services Directive and Beyond (London, 1998), 4. 
6 See Andreas M. Fleckner, ‘Stock exchanges at the crossroads’ (2006) 74 Fordham Law Review, 2541. 
7  See Mahmood Bagheri and Nakajima Chizu, ‘Competition and integration among stock exchanges: the 
dilemma of conflicting regulatory objectives and strategies’ (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 69.  
8 B. Steil, ‘Changes in the Ownership and Governance of Securities Exchanges: Causes and Consequences’ 
(2002) Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, available at:  
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/02/0215.pdf (last visited, December 2007). 
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rates became unfixed, single capacity was eliminated, exchange floors disappeared and new 
marketplaces in the form of proprietary trading systems were launched.9 In this new trading 
system the traditional concept of mutual or membership became economically untenable. The 
direct product of automation trading is to cause securities exchanges to become a for-profit 
public company with non-member ownership. With the membership gone there is no point for 
an exchange to continue to impose membership fees. Rather, only transaction-based charging 
is sustainable.  
 
As a normal commercial enterprise, new securities exchanges are radically different from the 
traditional exchange floor, whose value derives wholly from the physical—presence of 
traders. New Exchanges attempt to exploit economies of scope and scale in securities trading 
by listing new firms and by attracting volume in existing securities.10 Because exchanges 
profit from trading volume they do have a clear incentive to compete for listings, both 
domestic and foreign. Clearly the LSE wishes to take listings away from NASD, and vice 
versa. The emergence of commercial rather than mutualized trading operations has made 
competition a more tangible fact in the securities field. Competition between the world’s 
exchanges is now a reality. 
 
6.3.2 The Impact of Technological Advances  
 
Today when we mention information technology, the words faster and cheaper are always 
coming to our mind. Technological advancements such as the Internet have had, and will 
continue to have, a tremendous impact on securities markets. First of all, trading is no longer 
tied to a physical location but takes place in a ubiquitous computer network. Internet trading 
lowers the costs of entry. Because it reduces the costs of performing transactions, the internet 
is expected to continue to cause the number of cross-border transactions to increase. Another 
obvious contribution of technological advances to the securities markets is to make 
information flows seamless and borderless, instantaneous and almost costless. Modern 
technology enables market participants to exploit simultaneous and multiple sources of 
                                                 
9 R.S. Karmel, ‘The Case for a European Securities Commission’ (1999) 38 Columbia Journal of International 
Law, 9 at 33; P. Arlman, ‘European Equity Markets after the Euro: Competition and Co-operation Across New 
Frontiers’ (1999) 2(1) International Finance, 139 at 141; M. Blair, ‘Book Review; International Securities 
Regulation: London’s “Big Bang” and the European Securities Markets’ (1992) 26 (3) The International Lawyer, 
840.  
10 T. Arnold, Ph. Hersh, J.H. Mulherin and J. Netter, ‘Merging Markets’ (1998) 54 Journal of Finance, 1083.  
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liquidity from remote locations. Such as through the internet, investors in China may obtain 
information on companies listed on the London Stock Market. Thirdly, in securities markets, a 
unified global capital market, working in real time, is emerging. A twenty-four hour global 
securities market is not impossible anymore. 
 
As a result of advances in technology, securities markets can compete on a global basis which 
was previously infeasible. For example, in the past it was not easy to learn about competitive 
prices offered somewhere else. The wall between competitors, built by geographic boundaries 
and time zones that once dictated and furthered nationalistic views toward commerce will 
continue to fall because of better and lower-cost communications and analytics. 11  Rapid 
improvements in information technology and the creation of innovative financial instruments 
have paved the way for the international regulatory competition. 
 
6.3.3 Cross-listing  
 
So far, the principal mechanism that produces competition among market centers has been the 
issuer’s decision to cross-list its stock on a foreign exchange, typically in the United States. 12 
Cross-listing appears to be producing a new and desirable form of regulatory competition. 
This raises the question, why do companies have the desire to cross-list? 
 
One reason is that the country in which a company is incorporated does not have the scale of 
capital market which is appropriate to the company’s requirements. 13  To overcome this 
problem, issuers may seek the opportunity to gain access to a larger investor base with a larger 
pool of capital available for investment. Cross-listings were first thought of as a means to 
lower firms’ cost of capital by enabling the firm to get more money from investors when 
offering its securities to the public.14 By cross-listing its securities, a firm could expand its 
potential investor base more easily than if it traded on a single market. With cross-listing, 
firms can make their securities more liquid which will lead to more trading chances.  
                                                 
11 Steven M. H. Wallman, ‘Information Technology & the Securities Market The Challenge for Regulators’ 
(1998) 16 The Brookings Review, 26-29. 
12 John C. Coffee, Jr., ‘Racing towards the top?: The impact of cross-listings and stock market competition on 
international corporate governance’ (2002) 102 Columbia Law Review, 1757. 
13 Iain MacNeil and Alex Lau, ‘International corporate regulation: listing rules and overseas companies’ (2001) 
50 International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 787. 
14 For a summary, see René M. Stulz, ‘Globalization of Corporate Finance and the Cost of Capital’ (1999) 8 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 30. 
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Secondly, the bonding hypothesis 15  offers another potential motivation for cross-listings. 
Essentially, the ‘bonding’ explanation for overseas listings predicts that high standards of 
regulation in one country will attract listings from countries with lower standards of 
regulation.16 Issuers migration to superior capital markets, for example the U.S. market, is an 
evident signal to show the investors that they want to voluntarily subject themselves to the 
higher disclosure standards and greater threat of enforcement (both by public and private 
enforcers). Academic research suggests that foreign companies come to the United States in 
order to “bond” themselves to the rigorous legal standards of the United States, which include 
submitting to enforcement oversight by the SEC, opening themselves to civil litigation, 
preparing detailed disclosure of their operations and financial condition (in accordance with 
US GAAP), and providing guidance to investors.17 By submitting to US requirements, these 
companies become more attractive to investors and are rewarded with higher valuations for 
their securities and a better market reputation. A 1999 study by Darius Miller found a positive 
1.15 percent average abnormal return in a broad sample of ADR-listing announcement dates; 
even more interestingly, the stock market reaction was greater for emerging market firms 
(1.54 percent) and for firms listing on the major U.S. exchanges (2.63 percent).18 Cross-listing 
on a foreign stock market can also serve as a bonding mechanism for corporate insiders to 
credibly commit to a better governance regime. This idea that foreign firms actually engage in 
cross-listing to improve their corporate governance is often attributed to Jack Coffee.19 In this 
view, cross-listing firms import aspects of the corporate governance systems that they consider 
superior.  
 
 
The putative benefit of increased visibility in the host country is another incentive to have 
cross-listing. In addition to greater demand for its stock, listing a corporation’s stock abroad 
provides the company with greater access to foreign product markets and facilitates selling 
                                                 
15 For more details see this chapter 6.6.2. 
16 See MacNeil and Lau, ‘International corporate regulation’, above, n.13. 
17 See René M. Stulz, ‘Globalization of Corporate Finance’, above, n. 446, 8–25;  John C. Coffee, ‘The Future as 
History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications’ (1999) 93 
Northwestern University Law Review, 641; See also Jordan Siegel, ‘Can foreign firms bond themselves 
effectively by renting US securities laws?’ (2005) 75 Journal of Financial Economics, 319-359 (arguing that the 
reputation bonding effect is stronger than the legal bonding effect). 
18Darius Miller, ‘The Market Reaction to International Cross-Listing: Evidence from Depositary Receipts’ (1999) 
51 Journal of Financial Economics, 103.  
19 See Coffee, ‘Racing towards the top’, above, n.12. 
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debt in the foreign country.20 It also brings foreign securities closer to potential investors and 
increases their awareness of investment opportunities, which could increase expected 
returns.21 New cross-listings in Western Europe, Australia, and Canada are consistent with 
firms pursuing increased visibility in growing overseas product markets. A company becomes 
more credible by providing information to the local capital market because the continuous 
flow of information allows the capital market to make quicker and more accurate decisions.22 
 
6.4 The Regulation of Foreign Listing Companies 
 
Securities exchanges as for-profit entities have natural incentives to compete and attract 
listings and orders from their rivals. The subject of competition among stock exchanges has 
two dimensions: competing for listings and for trading business. Internationalization and 
technological progress has dramatically increased foreign listing. Competition for listings is 
now more compelling. That is why only this kind of competition will be researched in this 
paper. How well the current policies of world exchanges regulators address this competition 
will also be discussed. This section will focus on four selected nations. They are United States, 
United Kingdom, Hong Kong and Singapore. These were chosen mainly because they are 
representatives of the international stock exchanges and cover the American, European and 
Asia areas.  
 
6.4.1 United States 
 
A foreign issuer contemplating the listing in the United States must make an initial choice 
between issuing its securities by means of a public offering on the Exchange, registered with 
the SEC pursuant to the Securities Act or by means of a non-public offering, pursuant to a 
private placement. 
 
Foreign firms that list on U.S. exchanges have to register with the SEC and become subject to 
U.S. securities laws. When a foreign company makes an offering in the United States and lists 
                                                 
20 See Kent H. Baker, ‘Why U.S. Companies List on the London, Frankfurt, and Tokyo Stock Exchanges’ (1992) 
6 Journal of International Securities  Markets, 219, 221. 
21 See Robert Merton, ‘Presidential Address: A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete 
Information’ (1987) 42 Journal of  Finance, 483. 
22 See Edward B. Rock, Greenhorns, Yankees, and Cosmopolitans, ‘Venture Capital, IPOs, Foreign Firms, and 
U.S. Markets’ (2001) 2 Theoretical Inquiries Law, 711.  
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its equity securities on a US stock exchange, its shares are often sold and traded in the United 
States in American Depositary Receipt (ADR) form. 23  Therefore, foreign companies 
commonly offer equity securities in the United States through the issuance of ADRs which are 
negotiable receipts registered in the name of the holder that evidence underlying shares of 
non-U.S. equity securities. ADRs are issued by a U.S. depositary, usually a bank, against the 
deposit of a foreign company’s equity securities with a custodian bank, usually located in the 
foreign company’s home country that acts as agent for the U.S. depositary bank. The attitude 
of the SEC staff long has been that if a foreign issuer was going to tap the U.S. capital markets 
then it should play by the SEC’s rules. However, the internationalization of the world’s 
securities market has exposed the U.S. market to foreign competition and has posed new 
challenges to the SEC. The SEC has to balance its mandate to preserve investor protection 
with its responsibility to maintain the competitive position of the U.S. in the securities market. 
During the internationalist era, the SEC provided a number of accommodations to foreign 
issuers in order to entice them to register with the SEC and cross list on U.S. exchanges. In 
1979, the SEC expressly adopted an integrated registration and annual reporting requirement 
embodied in Form 20-F, which was aimed at reducing the informational disclosure 
requirements imposed upon foreign issuers in certain key areas.24 Subsequent to the adoption 
of Form 20-F, the SEC also adopted three simplified Securities Act registration forms F-1, F-
2, and F-3, which collectively, alleviated the disclosure impositions on foreign issuers, to a 
large extent.25 Based upon these forms, foreign issuers have the option not to disclose certain 
categories of information or to have less stringent disclosure obligations.26 Similarly, in 1994, 
the SEC continued on with its mission to make U.S. securities markets more hospitable to 
foreign investors. In the 1994 “Simplification of Registration and Reporting Requirements for 
Foreign Companies” release, 27  the SEC adopted additional revisions designed to further 
streamline the registration and reporting process for foreign companies entering the U.S. 
securities markets. The SEC also permitted more flexible accounting standards for foreign 
issuers. Since 1994, first time registrants have been required to reconcile their financial 
                                                 
23 See above, chapter three footnote 11 
24 Emmanuel U. Obi, ‘Foreign issuer access to U.S. capital markets – an illustration of the regulatory dilemma 
and an examination of the securities and exchange commission’s response’ (2006) 12 Law and Business Review 
of the Americas Summer, 399. 
25 Exchange Act Release No. 6437 P 72407, 1982 SEC LEXIS 355 (Nov. 19, 1982). 
26 Marc I. Steinberg & Lee E Michaels, ‘Disclosure in Global Securities Offerings: Analysis of Jurisdictional 
Approaches, Commonality and Reciprocity’  (1999)  20 Michigan Journal of  International Law, 207. 
27 Securities Act Release No. 7053, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P85,331 (April 19, 
1994). 
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statements for only the last two years.  Particularly, the SEC accepts a foreign issuer’s cash 
flow statement without reconciliation if prepared in accordance with International Accounting 
Standard No. 7; and the widened use of both the short-form registration statement and the 
shelf rule.28 The SEC characterized these actions as “part of [its] ongoing efforts . . . to ease 
the transition of foreign companies into the U.S. disclosure system, enhance the efficiencies of 
the registration and reporting processes and lower costs of compliance, where consistent with 
investor protection”.29 In 2002, with the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC utilizes a 
“unilateralist” approach in its treatment of foreign issuers, in that very few registration and 
disclosure exemptions are granted to foreign issuers. Traditionally, foreign listings have been 
exempt from many of the corporate governance requirements applicable to U.S. companies, 
both under exchange rules and federal securities law.30 But after 2002, foreign issuers were 
shocked to discover that various corporate governance provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley applied 
to them. Sarbanes-Oxley’s provisions impact the operation of internal corporate governance 
systems of foreign companies subject to U.S. regulation, and impact the relationships that 
these issuers have with their outside auditors.31 The SEC presents foreign issuers with an all or 
nothing deal--either comply with Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the enumerated requirements or 
look to other securities markets.32 Therefore, it is unquestionable that “the extraterritorial 
effects of [Sarbanes] burden foreign issuers with unjustified requirements and hinder the 
process of reciprocity and harmonization of international capital markets”.33 
 
A common method of selling securities in the United States without registration under the 
Securities Act is through a “private placement.” Rule 144A, adopted by the SEC in April 
1990, provides a non-exclusive safe harbor from the registration requirements of the Securities 
Act for resale’s of certain securities issued in a non-public offering to “qualified institutional 
buyers” (“QIBs”). 34  “QIBs” include insurance companies, banks, investment companies, 
employee benefit plans, savings and loans institutions, or an entity owned entirely by qualified 
                                                 
28 See Bevis Longstreth, ‘A Look At the SEC’s Adaptation to Global Market Pressures’ (1995)33 Colum. J. 
Transnat’l L. 319, 329-30 (citing Exchange Act Release No 7053). 
29 See generally Exchange Act Release No. 7053. 
30 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78n (a) (limiting the application of proxy rules to U.S. public issuers). 
31 Irina Shirinyan, ‘The Perspective of U.S. Securities Disclosure and The Process of Globalization’ (2004) 2 
DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal, 515.  
32 Roberta S. Karmel, ‘The securities and exchange commission goes abroad to regulate corporate governance’ 
(2004) 33 Stetson Law Review, 849, 853-56. 
33 Ibid. 
34Peter V. Darrow,Philip J. Niehoff and Michael L. Hermsen, ‘U.S. Equity Markets for Foreign Issuers: Public 
Offerings and Rule 144A Placements of American Depositary Receipts’ March 2007 
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investors.  In contrast with listing on the exchange, foreign companies that list in the U.S. via 
Rule 144a are exempt from SEC registration35 and many disclosure requirements and therefore 
face very few additional obligations when they list. Issuers relying upon Rule 144A may avoid 
compliance with the relatively burdensome obligations involved in the preparation of a 
Securities Act registration statement. They may also avoid compliance with SEC requirements 
concerning disclosure, accounting (including reconciliation of financial statements to U.S. 
generally accepted accounting principles) and ongoing periodic reporting requirements 
pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), in 
addition to the disclosure and other requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The existence of 
such a market enhances the attractiveness of the U.S. private market to foreign issuers that 
wish to avoid the burden of complying with the registration requirements of the Securities Act. 
. 
6.4.2 United Kingdom 
 
Foreign companies that wish to access the London capital market can list on the Main Market 
(London Stock Exchange) or on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). There are different 
requirements for each listing type.  
 
Foreign companies wanting to list on the London Stock Exchange (LSE main board) must 
seek admission to the official list of the UK Listing Authority (UKLA) and comply with the 
UKLA’s disclosure requirements as set out in the Listing Rules of the UK Listing Authority.36 
Foreign companies also need be admitted to trading by LSE. 
 
Companies not already listed on their home exchange may apply for a ‘primary’ listing in 
LSE, while companies which already have a listing on another exchange may apply for a 
‘secondary’ listing. The Listing Rules apply in the normal manner to all listed companies 
irrespective of where they are incorporated unless exceptions or additional requirement are 
expressly created. Some concessions are made for overseas companies in the form of 
modifications to the listing rules (chapter 17). The most significant concessions are made in 
the case of overseas companies which seek a secondary listing, while the concessions for those 
                                                 
35 Under Section 4 (2) of the Securities Act 1933, the registration requirements of the Securities Act do not apply 
to “transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.” 
36 Section 3.1 of the Admission and Disclosure Standards of the UKLA Listing Rules 
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seeking a primary listing are relatively limited. Most foreign companies list in LSE seek a 
secondary listing or alternatively list on AIM which has lower entry requirements.  
 
Foreign companies with a secondary listing are exempt from the more rigorous disclosure 
regime applicable to U.K. companies and overseas companies with a primary listing in the 
U.K. The exemptions most pertinent to foreign issuers are those concerning companies with 
either prior listings on an EC member’s exchange, 37  or simultaneous listings on a EC 
member’s exchange,38 Securities that have been listed for at least three years on the exchange 
of a European Member state, in full compliance with the EC Directives, may supply 
abbreviated disclosures, rather than the full disclosures mandated for listing particulars.39 
Overseas companies that simultaneously seek a listing on a non-U.K. EC member’s exchange 
may use the issuing documents prepared for that listing, provided that a series of conditions 
are satisfied.40 The UKLA may also allow an overseas applicant to omit certain information 
otherwise required in its listing particulars, depending on the nature of the regulation to which 
the applicant is subject in its home country.41 Although there are some exemptions, secondary 
listing are nonetheless obligated, among other things, to publish annual accounts42 as well as 
an annual report, to publish a half-year report, to disclose major corporate developments, to 
inform of changes in their capital structure and to announce acquisitions and disposals as 
required by the stock exchange on which the companies have their primary listing. Different 
from other securities market, foreign companies with a secondary listing on LSE are not 
required to comply with the Combined Code on Corporate Governance. 43  But foreign 
companies with a primary listing on the official list must disclose significant ways in which 
their corporate governance practices differ from those set out in the Combined Code.44 The 
main requirement for companies listing on the Main Market is to file financial information 
                                                 
37 Listing Rules 5.23 (b). 
38 Ibid, 17.68. 
39 Ibid,5.23 (b). 
40 Ibid, 17.68 (a). 
41 Ibid, 17.6. 
42 These accounts can be prepared according to U.K. GAAP, U.S. GAAP, International Accounting Standards or 
another appropriate standard, approved by the UKLA and which “protect the interests of investors” (Section 17.3 
of the Listing Rules). 
43The Cadbury Report, published in 1992 included a “Code of Best Practice”. In 1998, the Hampel Report led to 
the publication of the Combined Code of Corporate Governance (“Combined Code”). The Combined Code, 
which is annexed to the UKLA’s listing rules, contains two sections, “Principals of good governance” and “Code 
of best practice.” In 2003, the code was further revised. UK’s Listing Rules make clear that the Combined Code 
on Corporate Governance applies only to companies incorporated in the United kingdom, with the result that it 
does not apply to foreign listed companies. 
44 FSA Handbook LR 9.8.7R 
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prepared in accordance with U.K. or U.S. GAAP or International Accounting Standards, 
although exceptions are made to this requirement in some cases. For example, the UKLA will 
accept local accounting standards from Japanese firms.45  
 
AIM is a London based securities exchange that started in 1995. To gain admission to AIM 
foreign companies must in general produce an admission document that includes information 
about the company’s directors, their promoters, business activities and financial position. 
Unlike most other markets, AIM does not stipulate minimum criteria in relation to company 
size, trading record, number of shares to be in public hands or market capitalization.46 Instead, 
all prospective companies need a nominated adviser (‘a Nomad’) from an approved register 
who is responsible to the London Stock Exchange for ensuring that all applicants are suitable 
for admission to AIM and ready to be admitted to a public market. The admission document is 
not, however, pre-vetted by the Exchange nor UK regulatory authorities but rather by the 
Nomad. AIM has also created a streamlined admission process to make it even easier for 
international companies who have already been admitted to certain other major markets for at 
least 18 months to come to AIM.47 These companies need not produce an admission document 
but simply need to make a detailed preadmission announcement. Existing published 
information can generally be relied upon although the latest annual audited accounts may not 
be more than nine months out of date. 
 
6.4.3 Hong Kong 
 
Cross-listings in HKSE are regulated under the Listing Rules of the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (‘HKSE’). Chapter 19 of the HKSE Listing Rules applies to cross- listing 
companies generally and chapter 19A deals specifically with cross-listing companies 
incorporated in the People Republic of China. Both rules contain additional requirements 
and/or exceptions applicable to cross-listing companies. In addition, appendix 13 contains 
                                                 
45London Stock Exchange, “A guide for Japanese companies listing on the London Stock Exchange”, 2003, 
available at: http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/D85. 
46 London Stock Exchange website,  
available at: http://www.londonstockexchange.com/en-
gb/products/companyservices/ourmarkets/aim_new/About+AIM/whyjoin1.htm. 
47This fast-track route is available for existing listings on the following stock exchanges: Australian Stock 
Exchange, Deutsche Börse, Euronet, Johannesburg Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, New York Stock Exchange, 
Stockholmbörsen, Swiss Exchange, Toronto Stock Exchange, UK Official List (as issued by the UK Listing 
Authority).m 
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additional provisions relating to cross-listing companies in Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and 
the PRC. The HKSE controls admission to listing and admission to trading. 
 
HKSE has no general exemptions for foreign companies in respect of its conditions for listing, 
irrespective of whether they seek to primary listings or secondary listings. On the contrary, 
cross-listing companies are subject to additional conditions for listing by comparison with 
Hong Kong incorporated companies.48 Take the PRC as an example, in chapter 19A 01(2) of 
the HKSE Listing Rules it says that:49   
To deal with the different markets in which a PRC issuer’s shares may be traded as well as 
with the non-common law basis of the PRC legal system, certain additional requirements, 
modifications and exceptions to the Exchange Listing Rules are necessary in order for a PRC 
issuer to obtain and to maintain a listing of its securities on the Exchange. 
 
The purpose of chapter 19 is to clarify that the Exchange Listing Rules apply as much to PRC 
issuers as they do to Hong Kong and overseas issuers, subject to the additional requirements, 
modifications and exceptions set out or referred to in this chapter.  
 
In contrast to the UK, all listed companies in Hong Kong are expected to comply with the 
Code of Best Practice50, the equivalent of the combined code in the UK. Companies are 
required to state in their annual reports whether they are in compliance with the Code and the 
SEHK can impose sanctions for non-compliance. 
 
Another choice for foreign companies to cross-list in HK is the GEM, however, it is not open 
to every country. Only companies incorporated in Hong Kong, China, Bermuda and the 
Cayman Islands have a possible chance of being accepted.51  GEM Listing Rules do not 
impose a profit requirement on listing applicants but the minimum market share capitalization 
cannot be less than 46 million H.K. dollars (about 5.94 million U.S. dollars) at the time of 
listing. In respect of corporate governance, GEM requires that the new applicants must have: 
appointed competent personnel; appointed at least 2 Independent Non-executive Directors; 
and established an audit committee. 
                                                 
48 See ch 19A and Appendix 13 of SEHK Listing Rules. 
49 See ch 19A 01 (2) of SEHK Listing Rules. 
50Appendix 14 of SEHK Listing Rules. 
51See the Hong Kong Stock Exchange website, available at: http://www.hkex.com.hk/index.htm. 
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6.4.4 Singapore 
 
Singapore Exchange (SGX) has two major equity trading boards: the SGX Main board and the 
SGX Dealing and Automated Quotation System (SESDAQ). 
 
The foreign listing applicant who has a primary listing on the SGX must comply with the 
Listing Manual. There are altogether 7 Rulebooks issued and administered by SGX. These 
Rulebooks contain the various rules governing issuers (seeking a listing) and intermediaries 
(brokers/dealers trading on the securities futures market). The Rulebooks provide a framework 
for the listing, trading, clearing and the provision of depository services.  Its adoption of 
international standards of disclosure and corporate governance policies has also provided a 
well-regulated trading environment for both local and international investors. For primary 
listings, the financial statements submitted with the listing application, and future periodic 
financial reports, must be prepared in accordance with the Singapore Statements of 
Accounting Standards (SAS), the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), or the 
US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP). Accounts that are prepared in 
accordance with IFRS or US GAAP need not be reconciled to SAS. In March of 2000 The 
Stock Exchange of Singapore, adopted IOSCO Disclosure Standards for both foreign and 
domestic issuers.  However, it modified the IOSCO Standards in several respects. For 
example, where the IOSCO requirements provide that five years of information should be 
furnished, the issuer making an offering in Singapore may provide the required information 
covering only the three most recent financial years.52 Singapore also added a rider specifically 
permitted by the IOSCO Standards requiring disclosure of the “financial prospects” of the 
issuer.  
 
In contrast to a primary listing, a foreign listing applicant with a secondary listing on the SGX 
need not comply with SGX’s listing rules, provided that it undertakes to:53 
(i) release all information and documents in English to the SGX at the same time as they are 
released to home exchanges; 
(ii) inform the SGX of any issue of additional securities in a class already listed on the SGX 
and the decision of the home exchange; and  
                                                 
52See Singapore Listing Rules, app. 3 (a)(1)(2). 
53 Singapore Stock Exchange website. www.sgx.com/general/disclaimer.shtml. 
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(iii) comply with such other listing rules as may be applied by the SGX from time to time. 
 
SESDAQ is for newer companies and there are no quantitative requirements for listing. 
Listing applicants need not meet any minimum operating track record, profit or share capital 
requirements. Companies listed on the SESDAQ may apply to be moved to the main board if 
they have been listed for at least two years and meet the minimum quantitative requirements. 
 
6.4.5 Summary 
 
From the integrated comparison above among the different nations, it can be seen that there are 
many similarities in admission requirements. Regarding the main board, the underlying principles 
are broadly similar. In order to protect investors all the exchanges require an issuer to compile 
amounts of information, to provide their profitability record and to invest substantial company 
resources in the process. Although securities regulators share the broad goals of regulating 
securities markets, the means adopted to accomplish those goals differ. However, differences 
between the listing requirements among the exchanges are a matter of degree, rather than a matter 
of kind.  
 
6.5 The Trends of Cross-listing 
 
6.5.1 By Country 
 
Firstly this paper will collect some statistics to show the performance of each exchange and 
their level of competition.  The statistics include main board and second markets (or new 
markets). One thing that needs to be explained is that the numbers in table 1 and 2 do not 
include Chinese listing companies on HKSE. The HKSE’s explanation is that the term foreign 
company54 doesn’t include any companies incorporated in mainland China. However, due to 
the special relationship between People Republic of China (PRC) and Hong Kong,55 this paper 
views ‘PRC’ as one single legal jurisdiction. In order to get the whole picture, this paper will 
use particularly table 3 to show the numbers of Chinese companies listing on the world’s stock 
                                                 
54A “foreign company” is a company not incorporated in the same country where the exchange upon which a 
listing is sought is located. In the context of the United Kingdom, foreign company, and “overseas company” are 
used interchangeably. 
55 On 1 July 1997, sovereignty over Hong Kong reverted to the PRC but their legal systems will remain separated 
for 50 years. 
  
155
 
exchanges. Furthermore, a close look at the mainland’s overseas initial public offerings (IPOs) 
over the past years reveals that competition for a slice of the mainland economy is intensifying 
among the world’s stock exchanges.  
 
Table 6-1:  The numbers of foreign listed companies56 (main board) 
 
 200757 2006 2005 2004 
NYSE 421 451 452 459 
LSE 699 343 334 351 
HKSE 8 8 9 10 
SGX 275 247 122 25 
 
It is noticeable from table 1 that the competitive ability of SGX in attracting foreign listings 
has soared from 25 to 275 over the four year period. Whereas, that of NYSE and HKSE 
declined slightly over the same period. From 2004 to 2007, the trend of decline in NYSE 
continued. In contrast, the LSE experienced a decrease in 2005, but in 2006 it started to grow 
again, and by 2007 it achieved outstanding growth, it saw an almost 100% increase of foreign 
listings in that year. Also noticeable is the fact that up until 2006 NYSE was the leading 
market for foreign listings but it was well overtaken by LSE in 2007. It should also be noted 
that for HKSE the number of foreign listings is significantly smaller. This is due to the fact 
that it does not include the listings for mainland China. Thus compared to the other exchanges, 
it is not as popular with international companies outside mainland China. 
                                              
Table 6-2: The number of new listed foreign companies58 (main board) 
 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 
NYSE 28 19 20 16 33 51 60 
LSE 32 21 10 7 9 9 33 
HKSE 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
SGX 49 44 0 10 4 8 12 
 
                                                 
56 The data is from the website of World Federation of Exchange, available at http://www.world-exchanges.org    
57 Oct ,2007. 
58 The data are from the website of World Federation of Exchange, available at http://www.world-exchanges.org. 
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From 2000 to 2004, the average number of new listed foreign companies in the NYSE was 
greater than that of the other three stock exchanges. Its track record has been outstanding in its 
performances. However in 2005, this situation has been reversed, it is SGX rather than NYSE 
has the highest number of new listed foreign companies. LSE also pulled ahead of NYSE in 
the same period, having 21 new companies versus the 19 of NYSE. In 2006, although the 
number of new listed foreign companies in the NYSE increased, it did not regain its number 
one leading position. SGX and LSE continue to lead the race in attracting new listed foreign 
companies. 
Table 6-3 59 The number of new Chinese listed companies (main board) 
 2004 2005 
HKSE 43 35 
SGX 31 26 
NYSE and NASDAQ 10 8 
LSE 1 0 
In 2005, there were in total 69 new Chinese companies listed on Hong Kong, Singapore and 
United States markets. In contrast with table 1, HKSE is the first choice for Chinese overseas 
listings as 50% of Chinese companies listed their shares on the HKSE. SGX was the second 
choice.  NYSE, NASDAQ and LSE were far behind HKSE and SGX. 
Table 6-4: Average number of companies listed on global growth markets 2003-0560 
 2006 2005 2004 2003 
NASDAQ 3145 3187 3229 3335 
AIM 1535 1232 875 713 
GEM 200 203 198 175 
SESDAQ 173 167 148 128 
 
                                                 
59 2004 and 2005 Chinese cross-listing companies research.  
60 Source: Grant Thornton’s 2006 ‘Global new markets guide-insight into international capital markets’. 
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Throughout 2005 most of the world’s markets displayed growth in the numbers of companies 
quoted, with the exception of NASDAQ. Despite a decline in year-on-year growth, NASDAQ 
continued to be the leader in each year, with 3145 companies listed in 2006. Compared with 
2003, AIM has seen growth of 115%, with a peak of 1535 companies listed in 2006. Thus over 
the period AIM can be seen to be one of the star performers. During the 2003—2006 period, 
AIM attracted more new listings than NASDAQ, GEM and SESDAQ combined. Steady year-
on-year growth has also been recorded for Singapore’s SESDAQ. It supported 173 companies 
- an increase 35% on 2003. From 2003 to 2005, Hong Kong’s GEM also experienced steady 
year-on-year growth, but it slightly declined in 2006. 
 
6.5.2 Analysis 
 
Competition inevitably implies that there will be winners and losers. Using the four tables 
mentioned above we can see that there are five outstanding things worth noting: firstly, the 
decrease in foreign listings on the exchanges in New York; secondly, LSE’s outstanding 
growth in 2007; thirdly, SGX has become the new star of the main board; forthly, HKSE has a 
very strong position when it comes to attracting Chinese State Owned companies; and lastly 
AIM’s fast growing performance on the growth market. From the above we might conclude 
that four of them look like “successful” stories and one of them is a “failure” story. 
 
6.5.2.1 Successful Stories 
 
In August 2006, California-based Napo Pharmaceuticals became the first US company to do 
an IPO on the London Stock Exchange’s Main Market.61 In 2007, the LSE had 699 foreign 
listed companies which meant for the first time, since 2004, it overtook NYSE. This figure is 
part of an important body of statistical data that shows London’s lead over New York as a 
venue for international companies seeking to raise growth capital. The U.K. regulates the 
foreign issuer considerably less rigorously than does the U.S. and also less rigorously than it 
regulates its own domestic companies, that is, U.K. domestic companies are required to meet 
“gold-plated” standards to provide investor protector, but these same standards are not made 
applicable to foreign issuers. London also has a significant cost advantage. As a recent report 
                                                 
61 London Stock Exchange Press Release (Feb. 8, 2006), available at 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/exeres/E968DB1D-BA29-4B2D-88FE-34924B2A4681.htm. 
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commissioned by the City of London governmental body and the LSE found, IPO 
underwriting fees in London are typically 3 to 4 per cent of funding proceeds, compared with 
6.5 to 7 per cent in the US.62 
 
During the four year period, the number of foreign listed companies increased 10 times on the 
SGX i.e. from 25 to 275. Additionally, in 2005 and 2006, SGX attracted more foreign listed 
companies than NYSE and LSE. In 2007, SGX senior executive vice-president and head of 
markets Gan Seow Ann said its listing platform currently hosted more foreign listing aspirants 
than domestic ones. “Overall, foreign listings accounted for about one-third of our total market 
in terms of number and market capitalisation and we expect this to enlarge, going forward”.63 
In its pursuit for more foreign listings, the SGX has introduced listing rules that are market-
oriented. There are three different standards which apply to foreign companies. By satisfying 
any one of these standards a foreign company qualifies for listing. These rules provide greater 
flexibility for companies with diverse backgrounds to access public financing in Singapore, 
without compromising any regulatory standards. The SGX listing threshold is the lowest 
among NYSE, LSE and HKSE. Roughly speaking, companies who go to NYSE spend several 
million dollars, LSE costs at least £500,000 (around $ 0.94 million),64 HKSE at least HKD 10 
million (around $1 million), SGX around $0.1 million.65 Although the numbers are not 100% 
accurate, it represents the outline.66 It indicates that compared with NYSE, LSE and HKSE; 
listing on SGX is not a big financial burden. In the past listing rules required that foreign 
companies must have achieved in the previous three years a pre-tax profit of 15 million 
Singapore dollars, now it has been reduced to 7.5 million Singapore dollars. Therefore its 
profitability requirement has been reduced to half its previous value.  
 
Regarding attracting Chinese Stated-Own companies to list, it can be said that HKSE is the 
absolute winner. In 2004, HKSE amended the Main Board Rules67to introduce 2 alternative 
                                                 
62Clara Furse, ‘Comment: SOX is not to blame—London is just better as a market’ (2006) September 17, 
Financial Times (London) 17 September 2006. 
63 Leong Hung Yee, ‘More foreign firms drawn to Singapore exchange’ Malaysia Star, Monday December 3, 
2007, available at: http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2007/12/3/business/19616730&sec=business. 
64 See London Stock Exchange website, ‘A practical guide to listing’, available at:  
www.londonstockexchange.com. 
65Xiaoqing, He, ‘Gongsi liyun 2000 wai, gai xuanze zai xinjiapo shangshi haishi zai xianggang shangshi hao?’ 
2005-6-17 Chinese minying jingji newspaper. Available at: http://www.3009.cn/Article/200561714733-1.htm. 
66 See appendix. 
 67 Hong Kong Stock Exchange, ‘Amendments to the Listing Rules’ HKEx News Release, Updated: 30 January 
2004 available at: http://www.hkex.com.hk/news/hkexnews/0401303news.htm (last visited, December 2007). 
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financial tests68 to provide more flexibility and cater for the wide variety of issuers seeking to 
list on the Main Board. Although the profit requirement has been maintained as one of the 
quantitative tests for assessing the track record financial performance of a listing applicant, the 
new rules eased the profit requirement. The purpose of this amendment was to attract the 
substantially larger sized Chinese Stated-Owned companies. The Semiconductor 
Manufacturing International Corporation (Shang hai) (SMIC) which listed its shares on the 
HKSE in 2004 became the first beneficiary of the new rules. SMIC was a money-losing 
company in 2003 and there were no profit records for the most recent years prior to its listing. 
It was impossible for it to have a foreign listing in any of the major world stock exchanges. 
Due to HKSE amended its listing rules, SMIC was able to fulfill its listing dream. SMIC was 
just the beginning of a wave of large Chinese companies who went to Hong Kong. Besides 
Hong Kong, Chinese companies are listed in Singapore, London and New York. But while 
Hong Kong has retained its primary importance, the other market options are fading or are 
being temporarily closed down.69 There is no doubt that from 2005 HKSE, has sought to win 
over Chinese companies and it has achieved.  NYSE or LSE, have historically been the top 
choice for companies who wished to raise large amounts of capital when listing. But now 
these seem to have no advantage over Hong Kong in luring large mainland IPOs. From the 
China Construction Bank to the Bank of China, China’s newly super-large listing companies 
simply dropped their US plans and listed in Hong Kong instead. In 2006 HKSE hosted the 
US$ 16 billion IPO of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the world’s largest IPO 
to date. It is often said that its similar culture, language and convenient location are the reasons 
for HKSE’s success, but its lower entrance requirements are a major important factor.  
 
                                                 
68 (1)Market capitalization / revenue test: The Exchange has amended the Main Board Rules to introduce a 
market capitalization / revenue test which is to apply to listing applicants with a market capitalization of at least 
HK$4 billion at the time of listing and revenue of at least HK$500 million for the most recent financial year 
comprising 12 months. This test caters particularly for those listing applicants that are of substantially larger size, 
are able to generate substantial revenue and can demonstrate that they are able to command significant investor 
interest (having at least 1,000 shareholders at the time of listing). They may or may not have a full 3-financial-
year trading record. (2)Market capitalization / revenue / cash flow test: The Exchange has also amended the Main 
Board Rules to introduce a market capitalization / revenue / cash flow test which is to apply to listing applicants 
with a market capitalization of at least HK$2 billion at the time of listing, and revenue of at least HK$500 million 
for the most recent financial year comprising 12 months and a positive cash flow from operating activities that 
are to be listed of at least HK$100 million in aggregate for the 3 preceding financial years. Listing applicants 
under this test will still be required to comply with the trading record period requirement of not less than 3 
financial years. 
69AME information, ‘China listings puts HKSE into top global bourses’ (5 January, 2005) available at: 
http://www.ameinfo.com/61753.html (last visited, December 2007). 
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Another success story is AIM. Of the new markets AIM is the most successful growth market 
in the world. The number of listings on AIM has increased most dramatically in recent years: 
international companies listing counts increased from only 3 within one year of its launch in 
1995 to 334 at the Oct of 2007.70 It boasts a wide variety of countries including Australia, 
China, Germany, Japan and the United States. It is noticeable that as of October 2006, there 
were 36 US companies quoted on the AIM, of which 13 joined the AIM in 2006.71 AIM out 
competed other international exchanges in part because it adopted a “zero” requirement 
policy. AIM’s success is built on a simplified and flexible regulatory environment which has 
been specifically designed for the needs of smaller companies. It is well-known that listing 
requirements on AIM are minimal – there is no prior trading requirement, prior shareholder 
approval for transactions is not required, admission documents are not pre-vetted by the 
exchange or by the UKLA, there is no minimum market capitalization, and there is no 
minimum public float requirement. In fact, all that is required for a firm to be admitted to AIM 
is that it has the support of a nominated advisor (“Nomad”) and subsequently the firm has to 
satisfy only the exchange’s weak disclosure duty. AIM rules impose a “general duty of 
disclosure requiring information which it (the issuer) reasonably considers necessary to enable 
investors to form a full understanding of the financial position of the applicant.” This flexible 
approach ensures appropriate quality control of AIM companies whilst making AIM as open 
as possible to a range of smaller, growing companies. This lowest listing requirement was 
extremely successful in attracting smaller Chinese companies in 2005. “Currently 28 Chinese 
companies (including Hong Kong companies) are listed on AIM. The first half of 2006 saw 12 
Chinese companies list themselves there,” Clara Furse, chief executive of LSE told China 
Daily.72 By comparison, only nine small mainland companies were listed on Hong Kong’s 
second market, the GEM in the same year. This number has fallen since 2003, when there 
were 27 mainland listings on GEM.  
 
 
 
                                                 
70 See London Stock Exchange website, ‘AIM Market Statistics’, available at: 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/5FAB97C2-2D32-4700-B95C-
D7E004A2B304/0/AIMMarketStatistics0710.pdf (last visited, December 2007). 
71 See London Stock Exchange website, ‘Lst of AIM Companies’, available at:  
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/98BE8920-8CFB-483F-8D37 
4F006B12C663/0/LISTDATEAIMCOS.XLS (last visited, December 2007). 
72 Zhang Ran and Sun Min, ‘Mainland companies weigh up exchanges’ (2006) July 14 China Daily, available at: 
www.chinaview.cn. 
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6.5.2.2 Failure Story 
 
The three most publicized reports—Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation, Report on Sustaining New York’s and the US’s Global Financial Services 
Leadership sponsored by Mayor Bloomberg and Senator Schumer and the Report and 
Recommendations of the Chamber of Commerce’s Commission on the Regulation of the U.S. 
Capital Markets in the 21st Century—all concluded that the U.S. has lost ground in the 
increasingly global and competitive capital markets. The Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation (better known as the “Paulson Committee”) issued an “interim report” in late 2006 
concluding that “the United States is losing its leading competitive position as compared to 
stock markets and financial centres abroad.”73 Similarly, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson 
said the U.S. public-equity market has continued to decline in competitiveness.74 Two sets of 
statistics document the US equity markets’ growing unpopularity: a decrease in the number of 
foreign companies listed in the United States and an increase in the number of foreign 
companies expressing an interest in exiting the US markets.  
 
It can be seen from the above table that cross-listings have been falling on U.S. exchanges.  
The diminishing market for American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) also provides evidence 
that foreign companies had less reason to do a public offering in the United States and list on a 
US stock exchange. As of June 2006, only 1.4 percent of the 34,800 companies listed on 
foreign exchanges had a registered ADR program in the United States; whereas in 2000 the 
percentage of international companies with registered ADR programs was 2.7 percent. 75 
They’re also losing out to overseas exchanges for initial public offerings (IPOs). In 2004, only 
three out of the twenty-five largest IPOs were listed on U.S. exchanges, in 2005 none of the 
twenty-five largest IPOs were listed on U.S. exchanges, and during the first half of 2006, only 
two of the largest twenty-five international IPOs were listed on U.S. exchanges. By contrast, 
in 2000, eleven of the twenty-five largest IPOs were listed on U.S. exchanges.76 The decline in 
new non-U.S. listings is even starker when measured by volume. For example, in 2003, thirty-
                                                 
73 See Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (November 30, 2006)  at ix.  
74 Shanny Basar, ‘More Non-U.S. Companies Ditch Their New York Listings’ (2007) December 6 Wall Street 
Journal.  
75 Eric Pan , ‘Why the World No Longer Puts Its Stock in Us’ (2006) Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
176, available from the Social Science Research Network at  
http://ssrn.comb /abstract= 951705.  
76Aaron Lucchetti, ‘NYSE, via Euronext, Aims to Regain Its Appeal for International Listings’ (2006) June 30 
Wall Street Journal, at C1 
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one percent of the NYSE’s initial public offering volume derived from non- U.S. issuers, 
compared to just eight percent in 2005.77 
 
However, at the same period, the delisting of foreign companies from U.S. markets increased. 
A record show that 56 foreign companies have chosen to delist in 2007, up from 30 in 2006 
and 12 a decade ago. Those 56 represented 12.4% of all listed foreign companies.78 In one 
recent survey of 54 European companies with shares listed in US exchanges, 17 percent stated 
they would consider delisting their shares from the US exchanges.79  
 
6.6 Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Bonding theory  
 
One of the remarkable phenomena of the 1990s capital markets was the dramatic increase in 
cross-listed securities, particularly in the United States. The bonding theory was one of the 
more intriguing theories to surface which tried to explain the phenomenon. Cross-listing, the 
bonding theory suggested, might be a bonding mechanism by which firms incorporated within 
a jurisdiction with weak protection of minority rights or poor enforcement mechanisms could 
voluntarily subject them to higher disclosure standards and stricter enforcement of the US 
markets in order to attract investors.80 However, by the 21st century, after the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (SOX) was issued, new non-U.S. listings experienced a downward trend. Some 
scholars argue that the reasons postulated for this includes overly burdensome U.S. regulation 
and heightened litigation fears in a post-Sarbanes-Oxley world. This raises the questions: does 
overregulation threaten the competitiveness of the United States’ capital markets? And does 
the bonding theory still work in practice? These questions need to be answered.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
77McKinsey & Co., Sustaining New York’s and the US’ global financial services leadership   (2007) 46 
[hereinafter Mckinsey Report] (report of McKinsey & Co. on the competitiveness of the U.S. capital markets). 
78 “Is Wall Street losing its competitive edge?” (2006) December 2 Wall Street Journal   
79 See Eric, ‘In us’, above, n.507 
80 See Coffee, above, n. 173, 11 
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6.6.1 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
 
 6.6.1.1 Overview 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, comprised of eleven sections, was signed into law on July 30, 2002 
by President George W. Bush. It was passed in response to high-profile business failures, such 
as Enron and WorldCom. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the public company accounting reform 
and investor protection act. It introduced highly significant legislative changes to the 
regulation of corporate governance and financial practice.81 It established stringent new rules, 
to “protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made 
pursuant to the securities laws”.82 The legislation’s intent is no less than to change American 
corporate culture by drawing a direct enforceable relationship between senior corporate 
management and the integrity and quality of their companies’ financial statements. The former 
chairman of the SEC, Harvey Pitt, initially stated that the Act would apply equally to U.S. and 
non-U.S. issuers listed in the United States.83 The Act applies to all corporations with a stock 
market listing in the United States, regardless of where they are incorporated, and specifically 
affects all companies filing periodic reports with the SEC. This includes non-U.S. companies 
that issue securities or have their securities traded in U.S. exchanges, and foreign issuers 
subject to the reporting requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act. In many 
respects, the Sarbanes-Oxley represents the end of one era and the beginning of another. 
 
 
 
                                                 
81The Act impose new requirements on issuers are the following: (1) section 301 (“Public company audit 
committees”) (mandating audit committees composed exclusively of directors meeting a statutory standard of 
independence); (2) section 302 (“Corporate responsibility for financial reports”) (requiring sworn declarations 
from senior financial officers); (3) section 303 (“Improper influence on conduct of audits”) (criminalizing actions 
to “coerce, manipulate, or mislead” the firm's auditors); (4) section 304 (“Forfeiture of certain bonuses and 
profits”) (requiring forfeiture of incentive or equity compensation received, or stock trading profits made, during 
the initial twelve month period covered by an earnings restatement); (5) section 306 (“Insider trades during 
pension fund black-out periods”) (restricting the ability of directors and executive officers to sell during certain 
“black-out” periods when holders of individual account plans are prohibited from trading); (6) section 307 
(“Rules of professional responsibility for attorneys”) (requiring securities attorneys to report “a material violation 
of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation” to chief legal counsel, chief executive officer, 
and, under specified circumstances, to board of directors); and (7) section 402 (“Enhanced conflict of interest 
provisions”) (barring most loans by firms to their corporate executives). 
82The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Community Forum, ‘Introduction and background’ available at : http://www.sarbanes-
oxley-forum.com/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=1. 
83Anupama J. Naidu, ‘Was its bite worse than its bark? The costs Sarbanes-Oxley imposes German issuers may 
translate into costs to the United States’ (2004) 18 Emory International Law Review, 271. 
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6.6.1.2 The Influences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
 
Sarbanes-Oxley reflects a potential shift in the philosophy underlying the US securities laws 
from disclosure to substantive regulation of corporate governance.84 With its fundamental 
corporate governance reforms,85 the Act undoubtedly raises compliance costs for public firms. 
Many companies – especially foreign companies – believe that these new requirements are 
unduly burdensome and costly. One estimate suggests the largest firms will spend an average 
of $4.7 million in out-of-pocket costs in the first year of compliance just to implement 
required internal controls. 86  Other increased cost estimates range from $1 to 3 million, 
depending on the size of the firm.87 Another survey of 70 UK-based companies estimates that 
the aggregate cost of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance for these companies may be as high as $860 
million.88 Not surprisingly, the higher costs of complying with all the provisions of Sarbanes-
Oxley have encouraged foreign and US companies to consider other markets for their capital 
raising activities. Shortly after passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Porsche AG of Germany 
and Benfield Group Ltd. and a British insurance concern abandoned plans to list their 
                                                 
84 Larry E Ribstein, ‘International Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley: Raising The Rent on US Law’(2003) Journal 
of Corporate Law Studies, 299. 
85 For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules requiring issuers to disclose on a 
“rapid and current basis” such additional information concerning material changes as the SEC determines “is 
necessary or useful for the protection of investors and in the public interest.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(l) (1997 & 
Supp. 2004). As part of this new rulemaking authority, the SEC required issuers making any public 
announcement about past earnings performance to furnish a report to the SEC within five business days of the 
public announcement. Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
47226, at 10, 2003 WL 16117 (Jan. 22, 2003). This requirement did not apply to foreign issuers. See Dixie L. 
Johnson & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, FFHSJ Client Memorandum: The Post-Enron Corporate Governance 
Environment: Where Are We Now?, PLI Order No. B0-01NM 938 (Apr.-June 2003) (noting that new disclosures 
required in revised Form 8-K inapplicable to foreign private issuers using Form 6-K). Similarly, concurrent with 
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC considered and has since adopted a proposal significantly 
expanding the number of items considered to be material changes requiring disclosure under Form 8-K and 
requiring a filing within four business days of the event. S.E.C. Release No. 34-49424 3 (Mar. 16, 2004). See also 
Gary M. Brown, Reporting and Disclosure Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; What a Public 
Company Should Know, PLI Order No. 3396 698 (Sept.-Dec. 2004) (describing new expanded Form 8-K 
disclosure requirements). This expanded disclosure also does not affect foreign issuers. Additional Form 8-K 
Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, Exchange Act Release No. 34-49424, at 3, 2004 WL 
536851 (Mar. 16, 2004). 
86 Deborah Solomon & Cassell Bryan-Low, ‘Companies Complain About Cost of Corporate-Governance Rules’ 
(2004) February 10 Wall Street Journal, at A1. 
87 HighBeam research, ‘A (Going) Private Matter: To Be a Public Company, or Not to Be?’ (2003) March 22 
Economist (US), 58. 
88 Beth Carney, ‘Foreign Outfits Rue Sarbanes-Oxley’ (2005 December 15) Business Week, available at: 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/dec2004/ nf20041215_9306_db016.htm (citing study conducted 
by Parson Consulting). 
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securities in the United States, citing specific concerns about the Act.89 Daiwa Securities and 
Fuji Photo Film of Japan also delayed listing their securities in the United States because of 
the unsettled regulatory environment.90  In each case, companies chose to make offerings 
outside the United States in part to avoid the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley and related SEC 
and exchanged-based disclosure rules. Given China’s notoriously poor corporate governance, 
the cost of producing accounts that comply with US accounting standards is prohibitive. 
Companies must provide three years of year-end financial data and in some cases five. Many 
of China’s state-owned companies simply don’t have that information, and the ones that do are 
rife with fraud. Additional the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that issuers rotate their auditor 
every five years poses significant difficulties for Chinese issuers. 91  In China, “there is 
approximately one certified public accountant per 13,000 [Chinese] persons.”92 In the U.S., 
however, there is “one certified public accountant per 1000 [sic] persons.”93  This leaves 
Chinese issuers scrabbling for certified public accountants. The result is that more and more 
Chinese firms have to say “no” to the United States stock markets. 
 
Sarbanes-Oxley not only gives trouble to Chinese companies but also could block European 
companies as its new substantive requirements may conflict with their home-country law and 
contains no exemption for such firms. The most important and sweeping revision of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act is its requirement of independent audit committees. Section 301 of SOx requires the 
SEC to direct the U.S. national securities exchanges and the NASD to prohibit the listing of 
any issuer’s security if that issuer does not have an Audit Committee comprised entirely of 
independent members. Although this was not a major change for most U.S. companies, it 
represents a revolutionary reform for foreign issuers. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires all 
members of an issuer’s audit committee to sit on the issuer’s board of directors. This 
requirement is in direct conflict with “Section 85.6 of the Russian law governing joint stock 
companies . . . which prohibits members of the audit committee from serving on the board of 
                                                 
89 Craig Karmin & Kevin J. Delaney, ‘SEC’s Exemption Gets Some Praise’ (2003) January 13 Wall Street 
Journal, at C16.Even the SEC’s subsequent exemption of foreign issuers from most of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s 
corporate governance provisions has not satisfied some foreign issuers.  
90 Craig Karmin, ‘Foreign Firms Lose Urge to Sell Stock in U.S.’ (2003) July 24 Wall Street Journal, at C1. 
91Jonathan Shirley, ‘International Law and the Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002’ (2004) 27 
Boston College International & Comparative Law Review, 501, 512. 
92 Tamara Loomis, ‘Sarbanes-Oxley Act’ (2003) 2 New York Law Journal. 
93 Ibid.  
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directors.”94 It also conflicts with corporations incorporated under civil law regimes, because 
civil law codes often require a two-tier board, with the lower or “managing board” having no 
independent directors and the upper or “supervisory board” being half composed of 
representatives of employees. As a result, because codetermination laws staff the supervisory 
board with employee and union representatives, civil law corporations have generally resisted 
giving the supervisory board significant substantive responsibilities.95 Thus, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act is particularly threatening to many European firms precisely because it assigns to 
the audit committee all responsibility “for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the 
work of any registered public accounting firm employed by that issuer (including resolution of 
disagreements between management and the auditor regarding financial reporting).” 
 
6.6.1.3 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act can not Explains Everything 
 
The blame for the United States’ unpopularity does lie with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Anecdotal arguments for such a shift in listing activity abound. Both John Thain (CEO of the 
NYSE) and Bob Greifeld (CEO of Nasdaq) have expressed concern that foreign firms are 
bypassing U.S. exchanges as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.96 However, Craig Doidge, G. 
Andrew Karolyi, and René M. Stulz latest academic research has found that after controlling 
for firm characteristics, there is no deficit in cross-listing counts on U.S. exchanges related to 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.97 The loss of U.S public market competitiveness compared to global 
public markets results from a number of factors: the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is just one of them. 
                                                 
94 Sabyasachi Ghoshray, ‘Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on Multiple Listed Corporations: Conflicts in Comparative 
Corporate Laws and Possible Remedies’ (2004) 10 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, 447, 450-
51.   
95 Under German law, for example, the supervisory board (or Aufsichtsrat) is expected to appoint and, if 
necessary, remove the corporation's managing board (or Vorstand), which consists of its principal executive 
officers, but the supervisory board does not make or review most business decisions. Under the Co-
Determination Act of 1976, supervisory boards of companies with 2,000 or more employees must have an equal 
number of representatives of shareholders and labor. Thomas J. André, Jr., ‘Cultural Hegemony: The Exportation 
of Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance Ideologies to Germany’ (1998) 73 Tulsa Law Review, 69, 84-85. Thus, 
the supervisory board is only half shareholder-elected and is not an organ necessarily committed to the 
shareholders’ interests. Some critics have also reported that the “supervisory board has never been strong.... The 
board is not a serious monitoring mechanism inside the firm”. Mark J. Roe, ‘Political Preconditions to Separating 
Ownership from Corporate Control’ (2000) 53 Stanford Law Review, 539, 548. Roe further suggests that 
shareholders do not wish to delegate enhanced powers to the supervisory board because to do so would only 
strengthen “labor’s voice and authority inside the firm”.  
96 Suraj Srinivasan and Joseph D. Piotroski, ‘Regulation and Bonding: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Flow of 
International Listings’ 2008 January available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=956987. 
97 C. Doidge, A. Karolyi, and R. Stulz, ‘Has New York become less competitive in global markets? Evaluating 
foreign listing choices over time’ (2007) April Charles A. Dice Center Working Paper No. 2007-9 available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=982193. 
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, however, is not the main reason for the loss of IPOs and increase in 
delistings. Many signs of foreign companies’ diminishing interest in the US stock markets 
existed long before the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. What has changed is that the US market is 
no longer unique – it is one market of many, and capital-raising and investing can now be 
conducted around the world. Marketplace developments in recent years also made a U.S. 
listing less attractive for foreign issuers. The European markets have matured to a point where 
capital can be raised there to meet the needs of most companies. Foreign, and even some U.S. 
companies, engaging in IPOs or stock exchange listings have done so in Europe, rather than in 
the United States. Moreover, Erica98 found that the trend of Chinese issuers evolving away 
from U.S. listings and toward Hong Kong listings has more to do with the successful 
performance of the HKEx for China stocks and the receptiveness of Hong Kong investors 
rather than the desire to escape tougher regulations imposed by the U.S. Exchanges. As Hong 
Kong is now part of China and has always shared close cultural ties with the mainland, Hong 
Kong has many investors knowledgeable about and interested in investing in China. More 
importantly, unlike U.S. investors, Hong Kong investors understand the mainland business 
climate and perspective. As one person interviewed by Erica Fung succinctly put it, it is the 
“home country premium theory” at work, in that home markets tend to deliver the best 
valuations.99 He cited China Telecom as an example: unlike investors in the Asia region who 
witnessed firsthand the popularity of SMS (mobile phone text-messaging), U.S. investors did 
not understand the company’s business model, which depressed valuations.100 He also recalled 
how the CEO of a major online gaming company in China commented in an interview that he 
had to educate American investors on how to do valuation of Chinese companies during road 
shows, and that listing in the U.S. often makes companies vulnerable to Wall Street dictating 
how they should run their companies.101 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98 Erica Fung, ‘Regulatory Competition in International Capital Markets: Evidence from China in 2004-2005’ 
(2006) 3 NYU Journal of Law & Business, 243. 
99  Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
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6.6.2 The Bonding Theory 
 
 6.6.2.1 What is Bonding Theory? 
 
“Bonding”102 is a term of art in modern institutional law and economics. It refers to the costs 
or liabilities that an agent or entrepreneur will incur to assure investors that it will perform as 
promised, thereby enabling it to market its securities at a higher price.103 The paradigmatic 
example would be the surety bond purchased by the agent to protect the firm’s shareholder 
principals. The idea of using stock exchange listing as a mechanism for bonding to a different, 
arguably better, governance regime first appeared in a fully domestic context in the United 
States. In a 1988 article titled “Ties that Bond”, Jeffrey Gordon presented this argument with 
regard to listing on the NYSE.104 Jack Coffee sets forth an argument known as the “bonding 
hypothesis.” Coffee argues that foreign firms actually use a listing on an American market to 
bond their insiders to better governance standards: 
 Large firms can choose the stock exchange or exchanges on which they are listed, and in so doing can opt into 
governance systems, disclosure standards, and accounting rules that may be more rigorous than those required or 
prevailing in their jurisdiction of incorporation . . . [T]he most visible contemporary form of migration seems 
motivated by the opposite impulse: namely, to opt into higher regulatory or disclosure standards and thus to 
implement a form of “bonding” under which firms commit to governance standards more exacting than that of 
their home countries. 105 
 
The notion that issuers may want to improve their corporate governance by subjecting 
themselves to a better regulatory regime through cross-listing is appealingly elegant. In 
contrast to the bonding hypothesis, an “avoiding hypothesis” proposes that stringent corporate 
governance requirements in destination markets actually deter insiders and may drive them to 
avoid cross-listing on these markets.106 
 
 
                                                 
102  The term was coined in Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics, 305, 325. 
103 Cally Jordan, ‘The chameleon effect: beyond the bonging hypothesis for cross-listed securities’ (2006) 3 NYU 
Journal of Law & Business, 37. 
104 Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice’ 
(1988) 76 California Law Review, 3.  
105 See Coffee, ‘The Future as History’, above, n.17.  
106Amir N. Licht, ‘Legal Plug-ins: Cultural Distance, Cross-listing, and Corporate Governance Reform’ (2004) 
22 Berkeley Journal of International Law, 195. 
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6.6.2.2 Cross-listing Premium 
 
A growing body of academic research has found that foreign corporations that do cross-list on 
a U.S. exchange seem to reap extraordinary benefits: (1) a valuation premium compared to 
otherwise similar firms that do not cross-list in the U.S., which at least one study finds to 
average 37% for foreign firms cross-listing on a major U.S. exchange,107 and (2) a significant 
reduction in the cross-listing firm’s cost of capital.108 Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, and 
René M. Stulz found that from 1990 to 2005, there was a significant premium for the U.S. 
exchange listings every year, the historical average listing premium for foreign firms cross-
listing onto major U.S. exchanges have been 32.6%.109 Their evidences support the theory that 
an exchange listing in New York has unique governance benefits for foreign firms. In 2006, 
another research found that when non-U.S. companies cross-list in the U.S. market, they incur 
a cost of capital reduction that averages 13% and ranges as high as 25%110. A variation on this 
basic theory has suggested that, as cross-listing increases the shareholder base, the firm’s risk 
is shared among more shareholders which reduce the firm’s cost of capital.111 Coffee also 
found that greater intensity of enforcement action in the US contributes towards a lower cost 
of capital and this may attract some foreign issuers, even while it deters others from cross-
listing.112 The most plausible explanation for the existence of this premium is supplied by the 
“bonding hypothesis,” which explains that by subjecting themselves to the SEC’s higher 
                                                 
107 See C. Doidge, A. Karolyi, and R. Stulz, ‘Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?’ (2004) 71 
Journal of Financial Economics, 205. These authors find that foreign companies with shares cross-listed in the 
U.S. had Tobin’s q ratios that were 16.5% higher (as of the end of 1997) than the Tobin’s q ratios of non-cross-
listed firms from the same country. This figure rises to 37% when the foreign firm cross-listed on a major U.S. 
exchange (i.e., the New York Stock Exchange, Nasdaq, or the American Stock Exchange). In short, the valuation 
premium is twice as high over non-cross-listing firms when the foreign firm lists on a major U.S. exchange. In a 
later study, Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz find the historical average listing premium over 1997 to 2005 for foreign 
firms cross-listing onto major U.S. exchanges to have been 32.6% (but only 14.9% for all firms that cross-list in 
any way onto the U.S. market). See Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, ‘The Valuation Premium for Non U.S. Stocks 
Listed in U.S. Markets: 1997-2005’ (January 3, 2007) at 1. This longer term study, showing a consistent listing 
premium over eight years, greatly enhances the robustness of their findings. 
108 See L. Hail and C. Leuz, ‘International Differences in the Cost of Equity Capital: Do Legal Institutions and 
Securities Regulation Matter?’ (2006) 44 Journal of Accounting Research, 485 (finding that when non-U.S. 
companies cross-list in the U.S. market, they incur a cost of capital reduction that averages 13% and ranges as 
high as 25%). 
109 C. Doidge, A. Karolyi, and R. Stulz, ‘The Valuation Premium for Non U.S. Stocks Listed in U.S. Markets: 
1997-2005’ (January 3, 2007). 
110 See Hail and Leuz, ‘International differences’, above, n.108.   
111 Stephen Foerster and G.Andrew Karolyi, ‘The Effects of Market Segmentation and Investor Recognition on 
Asset Prices: Evidence from Foreign Stocks Listing in the United States’ (2002) 54 The Journal of Finance, 981. 
112 John C. Coffee, Jr., ‘Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement’ (2007) April 4 Columbia Law and 
Economics Working Paper No. 304, 5. 
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disclosure standards and the greater prospect of enforcement in the United States, foreign 
firms thereby reduce their agency costs. 
 
6.6.2.3 Beyond the Bonding Theory 
 
The bonding hypothesis has its critics. Some researches argue that the bonding hypothesis 
offers only a partial explanation for the cross-listing phenomenon in the United States. One 
recent article focuses on the cross-listing by Israeli firms (which is a major subcategory of 
U.S. cross-listings) and argues that there can be little bonding because Israeli corporate law 
has essentially the same substantive provisions as U.S. law.113 In this article the comparison 
between the Israeli and U.S. laws demonstrates that the Israeli law provides an adequate level 
of investor protection that is not significantly different from the level of investor protection 
offered by U.S. law. The bonding hypothesis also can not explain Canadian-based inter-listed 
corporations (CBIs) easily. CBIs form the largest single group of inter-listed foreign 
corporations in the United States, by a huge margin, representing over 25% all inter-listings on 
the NYSE, NMSNASDAQ and AMEX in 2004.114 CBIs do not come from a “weak investor 
protection” jurisdiction and, for a variety of reasons and in a number of ways, tend not to 
“signal” their entry into the US market. Rather than “bonding”, CBIs have been adroitly 
exploiting what financial economists have described as the “home bias” of U.S portfolio 
investors.115 Therefore, the bonding hypothesis should not be overstated. Furthermore, not all 
foreign firms will want to bond; many controlling shareholders of firms may prefer to enjoy 
the private benefits of control that they can obtain with relative legal immunity so long as they 
do not list in the U.S. 
 
6.7 The Consequences of Competition  
 
The trends in competition have lead to one obvious question: is competition producing greater 
laxity so that exchanges can attract more listings or greater liquidity from dealers (i.e., the race 
to the bottom)? Or producing greater transparency and more rigorous listing standards (i.e., a 
race to the top)? At least, from the appearances, the successful experiences of LSE, SGX, 
                                                 
113 Ariel Yehezhel, ‘Foreign Corporation Listing in the United States: Does Law Matter? Testing the Israeli 
Phenomenon’ (2006) 2 NYU Journal of Law & Business, 351, 393. 
114 See Jordan, ‘The chameleon effect’, above, n.103. 
115 Ibid. 
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HKSE, AIM and the failure of NYSE indicate that the result of competition is a race to the 
bottom. Although there is a decrease in the flow of new listings in New York and an increase 
in the flow of new listings in London, SGX and AIM, it not safe to make a definite conclusion 
that competition led to a race to the bottom.  
 
On the one side, it is true competition may reduce the exchanges bargaining leverage in 
pushing for higher standards. SEC head Harvey Pitt noted that exchanges such as the NYSE 
and NASDAQ were reluctant to be the first to raise listing standards, “for fear of giving the 
other a competitive advantage.”116 The United State’s standards became an upper limit rather 
than lower limit. Thus with this added protection foreign companies cannot meet the more 
stringent requirements of the U.S. market. Years later, the head of one US exchange put it: 
“By setting the bar so high in the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has had the unintended 
consequence of triggering a ‘race to the bottom’ by stock markets and companies.”117  
 
On the other hand, there are evidences to show that competition could lead to a race to the top. 
Although the high standards of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have generated much criticism, it has 
resulted in more global attention been given to corporate governance. A recent study by 
Ethiopis Tafara, director of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s office of international 
affairs, showed that the major provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley “have not competitively 
disadvantaged U.S. markets, simply by virtue of the fact that they have been widely adopted 
elsewhere”. 118  In the early stage maybe the exchanges took a more relaxed attitude to 
regulation, but latterly, in order to sustain the competitiveness in the market they have found 
that adhering to certain standards is necessary. LSE used to have significant concessions for 
foreign listed companies. But in the future, foreign listed companies will have to adhere to the 
Combined Code.119 Likewise in France, pretty soon the vast majority of Sarbanes-Oxley will 
be applicable either at the European level or at the national levels. 120 Outside of the European 
Union, other countries have also closed the gap with the United States. More countries have 
adopted new rules improving the amount and frequency of disclosure and the oversight of 
                                                 
116Albert B. Crenshaw, ‘SEC to Toughen Rule on Option Plans’ (2001) December 20 Washington Post. 
117 Clara Furse, ‘Comment: SOX is not to blame—London is just better as a market’ (2006) September 17 
Financial Times (London). 
118 Greg Ip, Kara Scannell and Deborah Solomon ‘In call to deregulate business, a global twist’ (2007) January 
26 Wall Street Journal.  
119 Tony Tassell and Neil Hume, ‘London Issues Guidelines for Foreign Listings’ (2007) May 9 Financial Times 
(London), 43. 
120 See Ip, Scannell and Solomon, ‘A global twist’, above, n.118. 
  
172
 
markets. For example, in 2004, Hong Kong’s then-chief securities regulator, Andrew Sheng, 
told a Senate panel that Hong Kong has moved “closer to the U.S. SEC regulatory model”, 
though without as much detail and prescription. Recently, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission announced plans to adopt IPO regulations that conform to standards used in 
Hong Kong and other major international markets.121  
 
Competition may also lead to increased specialization. Different markets will serve different 
clienteles, with some becoming more transparent and imposing higher listing standards in 
order to foster dispersed ownership, attract portfolio investors and maximize the share value of 
listed companies while others will persist as lower cost, relatively opaque exchanges which 
accommodate firms with concentrated ownership. For example, the AIM has focused on 
attracting smaller companies which more than likely would not have been listed in the U.S. 
because either they didn’t meet U.S. requirements or they were too small to attract interest 
from U.S. underwriters and investors. “Many of the companies listed on AIM today wouldn’t 
come anywhere close to meeting an NYSE listing standard”, says Noreen Culhane, executive 
vice-president of listings at the NYSE.122 HKSE has take advantage of its political and its 
location to attract large Chinese state owned companies. Some of them are impossible to list 
on other major exchanges. The U.S. might be the listing venue for higher quality issuers that 
wish to pursue strategic plans that require them to obtain low-cost equity financing or to bond 
with their shareholders, while London (and other markets) provide instead a comfortable 
refuge for firms with a control group intent on enjoying the private benefits of control (or a 
management pursuing other self-interested aims).123 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
121 Zheng Jin, ‘China Says It Intends to Adopt Major Overseas Standards for IPOs’ (2006) September 13 Wall 
Street Journal, C4. 
122 See Ip, Scannell and Solomon, ‘A global twist’, above, n.118. 
123 See Coffee, ‘Racing towards the top’, above, n.12. 
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Chapter Seven:  Cooperation 
 7.1 Introduction 
 
As an incident of internationalization, there are two key viewpoints that have appeared in 
addressing the challenges associated with regulation of an international securities market. As 
discussed individually in chapter five and six, one is harmonization, the other is competition. 
However, Sykes argues that neither complete regulatory harmonization nor pure regulatory 
competition is feasible or desirable where important international cross border effects of 
regulation arise. Instead, a considerable degree of regulatory cooperation is always needed.1 
Whether the approach is harmonization or competition, enforcement of regulatory standards 
needs cooperation. Regulatory cooperation is another important reaction to internationalization 
evolution. As internationalization has accelerated, securities regulators are experiencing a 
corresponding rise in securities fraud originating from abroad. This has increased the 
incentives for domestic regulators to extend their reach abroad.  In response, efforts to 
formalize cooperation among regulators have redoubled, to the point where “international 
cooperation...is blossoming among the world’s regulators.”2  
 
This chapter is organized as follows: the first section describes the pre-period of cooperation 
which gives the background of why countries began to cooperate with each other. The second 
section analyzes the different methods of cooperation within the securities sector. Successful 
cooperation needs legislative support. Thus, the legislative basis for providing assistance will 
be explored in the third section. After this the next section catalogues the different scope of 
cooperation. The last section will discuss the influence of international cooperation. 
 
7.2 The Pre-period of Cooperation 
 
Internationalization makes the enforcement cooperation among securities regulators a high 
priority. These statements are almost axiomatic today, but this was not always the case. Until 
the 1990s, regulators in the world’s major markets often lacked the legal and practical ability 
                                                 
1 A. O. Sykes, ‘Regulatory Competition or Regulatory Harmonization? A Silly Question?’ (2000) 3 Journal of  
International Economic Law, 257  
2  David Zaring, ‘International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial 
Regulatory Organizations’ (1998) 33 Texas International Law Journal, 281.  
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to share with their foreign counter-parts information vital to the resolution of cross-border 
investigations. The result was that, when the investigative trail crossed its jurisdiction’s 
borders, it quickly became cold. In 1981, the SEC brought two civil enforcement actions 
alleging insider trading through foreign banks.3 The first case filed, BSI/St. Joe, concerned the 
acquisition of call options and common stock of St. Joe Minerals Corporation (“St. Joe”) 
through Banca Della Svizzera Italiana (“BSI”), prior to the public announcement of a cash 
tender offer for St. Joe by a subsidiary of Seagram Company Ltd. (“Seagram”). After 
commencing the injunctive action, the SEC tried unsuccessfully for eight months to determine 
the names of the BSI customers. The SEC moved for an order to compel BSI’s New York 
branch to disclose its customers’ names. BSI countered that such disclosure would violate 
Swiss secrecy laws and subjects it to civil and criminal liability in Switzerland.4 Assertions of 
foreign secrecy laws frustrated SEC attempts to secure foreign-based evidence in several 
notorious insider trading cases, the SEC resorted to the federal courts to compel the production 
of the foreign-based information. That unilateral approach, however, was time consuming and 
expensive and strained international relations. 
 
Partly because of the SEC’s success in U.S. courts, the Commission was able to begin a 
dialogue with foreign securities officials and other law enforcement authorities to develop 
informal case-by-case understandings that facilitated the production of foreign-based 
information.5  The ad hoc nature of that approach highlighted the need for more formal 
mechanisms that would provide greater assurance of assistance and foster cooperation. As a 
result, the SEC began focusing on using existing bilateral and multilateral agreements to 
satisfy its information needs. In some cases, the SEC found that because those mechanisms 
were not specifically tailored to its investigation and litigation needs, the existing agreements 
provided inadequate assistance. Accordingly, the SEC initiated discussions for its own formal 
understandings. 
 
                                                 
3 SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana and Certain Purchasers of Call Options for the Common Stock of St. Joe 
Minerals Corp. (“BSI/St. Joe”), 92 FRD 111 (SDNY1981); SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common 
Stock of, and Call Options for the Common Stock of, Santa Fe Intl. Corp. (“Santa Fe”), [1983-1984 Transfer 
Binder] FedSecurLRptr (CCH) 99,424 (SDNY1983). 
4 Ibid. 
5 Michael D. Mann, Joseph G. Mari, and George Lavdas, ‘International Agreements and Understandings for the 
Production of Information and Other Mutual Assistance’, (1995) 29 International Law, 796. 
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The SEC is not alone in its ability or commitment to utilize unilateral measures to enforce 
final or ancillary provisional measures in connection with securities cases. In addition, U.K. 
courts have similarly faced issues involving the extraterritorial enforcement of court orders 
designed to preserve assets for return to defrauded investors. Nonetheless, the U.K. courts 
have also recognized that, in the absence of a better mechanism, it is crucial for a court with 
jurisdiction over the matter to act to preserve the availability of relief. Indeed, the 
internationalization of the world’s securities markets and the increased frequency of cross-
border trading activity have made reliance on domestic powers alone insufficient. Strong 
international cooperation is vital to the quick, thorough and accurate resolution of international 
enforcement investigations.  
 
 
7.3 Methods of Cooperation 
 
This section examines methods by which securities regulators could obtains information and 
evidence from abroad. Indeed, the method of cooperation has developed and expanded over 
time, from requests under the Hague Convention and pursuant to Letters Rogatory, to the 
implementation of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) among governments and less 
formal bilateral and multilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) among securities 
regulators.6  From the traditional Hague Convention method to develop new mechanisms, 
international regulatory authorities have enhanced their ability to investigate and prosecute 
activities that cross into another regulator’s jurisdiction.  
 
7.3.1 The Hague Convention 
 
The traditional means of obtaining information abroad originated with the Hague Convention 
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Convention or 
Convention).7 Many countries are contracting nations to the Hague Convention. The Hague 
Convention enables signatories to request each other’s assistance in obtaining evidence “for 
                                                 
6 Michael D. Mann, William P. Barry, ‘Developments in the internationalization of securities enforcement’ 
(2005) 39 International Lawyer, 667. 
7 Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature 
Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. 
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use in judicial proceedings, commenced or contemplated.” 8  The Hague Convention 
encompasses three of the most common devices for foreign discovery: letters rogatory, 
evidence taking by a consular official, and private commissioners. 
 
The traditional letter rogatory is a formal request from a court in one jurisdiction to a court in 
the jurisdiction in which the information or evidence is located. But the state from which 
assistance is requested may refuse if, under its laws, execution of the request falls outside the 
functions of the judiciary. 9 Many signatory states have exercised the Convention’s Article 23 
option, which enables signatories to declare that they will not execute letters rogatory for the 
purpose of pre-trial discovery of documents “as known in Common Law countries.” 10 The 
letters rogatory method is unpredictable, however, because the court that receives the request 
has no obligation to provide assistance and needs no justification for denying the request.11 
Moreover, letters rogatory are complicated, time-consuming, and do not supersede bank 
secrecy laws.12 Also they do not apply to supervisory procedures such as licensing. 
 
Although the Hague Convention itself provides limited assistance to securities investigators, 
Article 27 states that methods of obtaining information other than those specified in the 
Convention are permissible.13Thus, when a national court exercises jurisdiction over a foreign 
national, principles of comity do not require the court to resort to the Hague Convention first; 
the court may instead employ its subpoena powers.14 
 
 7.3.2 Mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) 
 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs), negotiated through formal diplomatic channels, 
have the force of law and oblige signatories to provide assistance in a broad range of criminal 
                                                 
8 Hague Convention, art. 1, para. 2.  
9 Hague Convention. art 12, para. 1(a). 
10 Hague Convention,  art. 23. 
11  Robert G. Morvillo, ‘International Criminal Law Issues’ (1994) 1 New York Law Journal, 3, 6. The 
effectiveness of letters rogatory generally depends on comity between nations. Bradley O. Field, ‘Improving 
International Evidence-Gathering Methods: Piercing Bank Secrecy Laws from Switzerland to the Caribbean and 
Beyond’  (1993) 15 Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Journal,  691, 702.  
12 See John J. Tigue, Jr. & Bryan C. Skarlatos, ‘Obtaining Evidence Abroad’ (1994 ) 20 New York Law Journal, 
3. 
13 Hague Convention, art. 27. 
14  Caroline A.A. Greene, ‘International Securities Law enforcement: Recent Advances in Assistance and 
cooperation’   (1994)  27 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law,  635. 
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matters.15 Under such treaties, parties may obtain information either in preparation for or 
during trial, regardless of whether charges have been filed in the requesting state. MLATs 
provide for direct communication between designated Central Authorities rather than between 
the parties’ respective judiciaries. Thus, when an official of one state needs information or 
assistance, he or she must direct the request through the state’s Central Authority. 
Communication between designated Central Authorities eliminates the impediment that the 
nation encounters under the Hague Convention, namely, the refusal of civil-law authorities to 
execute requests from non-judicial authorities, such as prosecutors. 16 
 
 7.3.3 Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) 
 
Today Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) is the leading example of international 
cooperation in securities regulation.17 Professor Teixeira Dos Santos, the Chairman of the 
IOSCO Executive Committee and President of Portugal’s Comissão do Mercado de Valores 
Mobiliários, said “The MOU truly reflects an international consensus among securities and 
derivatives regulators that effective regulation of globalized capital markets requires a high 
degree of cooperation among the world’s regulators.”18 
 
The widespread use of MOUs as a cooperative tool largely arose from functional imperatives. 
Existing treaty arrangements “were seen as inadequate because they are too general and 
inflexible for highly technical and rapidly evolving securities markets in which intense 
surveillance of legal activities is needed to detect illegal activities.”19 MOUs evolved as an 
attempt to circumvent these obstacles and introduce a more flexible, lower-profile alternative. 
Unlike MLATs, MOUs are nonbinding statements of intent that target specific offenses. 
MOUs were described as “arrangements between like-minded regulators”. 20  While they 
purport to address other types of securities law violations, they are chiefly intended to address 
                                                 
15 See Morvillo, ‘Criminal law’, above, n.11. 
16 See Marian Nash (Leich): ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law’ (1992) 
86 American Journal of  International Law, 547, 550.   
17 Stephen J. Choi, Andrew T. Guzman, ‘Portable reciprocity: rethinking the international reach of securities 
regulation’ (1998) July Southern California Law Review, 903.   
18 ‘IOSCO Strengthens International Cooperation to Fight Illegal Securities and Derivatives Activities’ Press 
Release, 16 October 2003, available at: http://www.fsa.go.jp/inter/ios/20031016/01.pdf.  
19 Ibid.   
20 See Mann, Mari and Lavdas, ‘International Agreements’, above, n.5.  
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insider trading and secondarily intended to address other forms of securities fraud.21 MOUs 
are expected to be more efficient and predictable than MLATs in obtaining information 
regarding securities violations because they are negotiated and implemented by parties with 
direct responsibility for regulating their respective securities markets.22 MLATs, on the other 
hand, are negotiated through diplomatic channels. Such as, under the United States 
Constitution, they must be ratified by the U.S. Senate. With the United States MOUs, the SEC 
has established relationships of direct communication and assistance with foreign securities 
regulators. These relationships expedite the execution of requests and increase the reliability 
of the information received. A significant feature of the mutual assistance MOUs is the fact 
that they are bilateral. While unilateral measures such as court-ordered extraterritorial 
measures can be effective, they are subject to a case-by-case review by a court. MOUs provide 
bilaterally that each regulator will assist the other in the future by providing information and 
cooperation. Additionally, according to IOSCO principles, these MOUs should not require 
dual criminality--the subject matter under investigation need not constitute a violation of the 
requested country’s laws. 
 
7.4 Legislative Basis for Providing Assistance 
 
When the national securities regulators began to use international cooperation as a primary 
vehicle for gaining access to foreign-based information, it became clear that the success of 
such an approach would depend on legislative changes. Indeed, at that time, most national 
regulators lacked the authority to use compulsory investigative powers unless there was an 
independent basis for suspecting a violation of domestic securities law. For example, if a 
foreign government needs US assistance with market investigation, it must ask for a court 
order to compel testimony or evidence.  
 
The SEC sought specific legislation authorizing it to assist its counterparts and urged its 
counterparts to seek similar legislation in their countries. The SEC was among the first 
securities regulators to receive the legal authority to assist foreign counterparts in 
investigations of securities fraud.  In 1988 the SEC proposed, and Congress enacted, 
                                                 
21 Joel P. Trachtman, ‘Unilateralism, bilateralism, regionalism, multilateralism, and functionalism: a comparison 
with reference to securities regulation’ (1994) 4 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems Spring, 69.  
22 See Michael D. Mann et al., ‘The Establishment of International Mechanisms for Enforcing Provisional Orders 
and Final Judgments Arising from Securities Laws’ (1992) 55 Law & Contemporary Problems, 303, 317.  
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legislation authorizing the SEC to conduct investigations on behalf of foreign securities 
authorities, using subpoena authority if necessary. 23  Today, the SEC can assist foreign 
securities authorities in their investigations using a variety of tools, including exercising the 
SEC’s compulsory powers to obtain documents and testimony, subject to the governing rules. 
Section 21(a) (2) of the Exchange Act, empowers the SEC to conduct a formal investigation 
upon the request of a foreign securities authority24 without regard to whether the facts stated in 
a request would constitute a violation of the laws of the United States.25 The SEC also has the 
ability to provide access to non-public information in its files with foreign persons. The 
Exchange Act provide that the Commission may, in its discretion and upon a showing that 
such information is needed, provide such non-public information in its possession to specified 
foreign persons.26 
 
The Exchange Act requires that the SEC in deciding whether to provide the requested 
assistance, consider whether the foreign authority has agreed to provide reciprocal 
assistance.27 It allows the SEC to refuse to process any request on the grounds that the request 
violates the public interest. 28  Further, it provides witnesses with all the protection and 
remedies afforded to witnesses in SEC proceedings.29 Accordingly, witnesses could obtain 
access to a formal order identifying the basis and subject matter of an investigation. Further, 
they would be able to resist enforcement of an unnecessarily burdensome subpoena. In 
accordance with SEC practice, any challenge to a SEC subpoena would be reviewed by the 
SEC as part of the authorization process for a subpoena enforcement action. 
 
The Exchange Act provides the SEC with flexibility, as it is not required to enter into a MOU 
before granting assistance to a foreign securities authority. In the absence of a MOU, the SEC 
may, if it receives all necessary confidentiality and use assurances, assist a foreign regulator 
and thereby demonstrate the value of international cooperation. This allows the SEC to use its 
                                                 
23 William G. Horton, Gerhard Wegen, Litigation Issues in the Distribution of Securities (Business & Economics, 
1997), 561. 
24 Section 3(a) (50) of the Exchange Act broadly defines the term foreign securities authority to include “any 
foreign government, or any governmental body or regulatory organization empowered by a foreign government 
to administer or enforce its laws as they relate to securities matters.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(50) (2005). 
25 Ibid, § 78u(a)(2). 
26 Section 24 (c) of the Exchange Act. 
27 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(2). 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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powers to encourage the development of reciprocal assistance powers in countries that may 
not yet be able to enter into broad MOUs. 
 
In December 1990, Congress enacted the International Securities Enforcement Cooperation 
Act (ISECA), which amended section 24 of the Exchange Act. 30  ISECA has improved 
substantially the SEC’s ability to cooperate with the securities regulators of other countries. 
Sub-section 24(d) of the Exchange Act provides a basis for withholding disclosure under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of certain records obtained from a foreign securities 
authority. 31  This exemption complements existing exemptions from disclosure under the 
FOIA. Therefore, information obtained from a foreign securities authority that does not satisfy 
the specific requirements of sub-section (d), also may be withheld if it is entitled to any other 
FOIA exemption. The exemption provided for in sub-section (d) could be claimed where the 
information requested was provided by a foreign securities authority, and the foreign securities 
authority has in good faith determined and represented to the SEC that the disclosure of such 
information would violate the laws applicable to the foreign securities authority. 
 
ISECA also clarified the Commission’s authority to provide foreign and domestic securities 
authorities with non-public information and authorized the SEC to obtain reimbursement from 
a foreign authority for expenses incurred in providing assistance to that authority. Finally, the 
SEC and US Self Regulatory Organizations (SROs) were authorized to impose sanctions on a 
securities professional found by a foreign court or securities authority to have engaged in 
illegal or improper conduct. 
 
7.5 The Scope of Cooperation 
 
As might be expected, cooperation tends to begin on a small scale, but over time it becomes 
more and more institutionalized, to the extent considered appropriate. Often this movement is 
gradual; perhaps beginning with a certain part of a sector, or perhaps beginning bilaterally, and 
expanding coverage after experience is gained and needs change. In fact engaging, even in 
disputes, can produce institutions for cooperation. 
 
                                                 
30 International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1990, H.R. 1396, 101st Cong. (1990). 
31 15 U.S.C. § 78x (d). 
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 7.5.1 Unilateral 
 
As a temporal matter, unilateral initiatives might be expected to precede bilateral, regional, or 
multilateral initiatives, or to succeed the breakdown of such initiatives. Unilateral initiatives 
provide experience regarding what is acceptable and unacceptable to other countries and also 
set the stakes for bilateral or multilateral negotiations. For example, until 1988, insider 
trading was not a violation of Swiss law, and so was not subject to cooperation under the 
U.S.-Swiss mutual legal assistance treaty.32 In response, the United States unilaterally sought 
Swiss legislation prohibiting insider trading in order to provide the predicate for more 
effective enforcement cooperation.33 Thus, in this case, unilateral pressure worked, resulting 
in unilateral “harmonization” in order to enhance enforcement cooperation.  
 
To regulate and police the U.S. securities markets the SEC has tried to obtain a wide variety of 
information from abroad. The SEC’s attempts in the early 1980s to secure foreign-based 
evidence in several notorious insider trading cases often were frustrated by the assertion of 
foreign secrecy laws. Although the federal courts assisted the SEC by compelling the 
production of the foreign-based information, that unilateral approach was time-consuming and 
expensive. However, in part because of its success in U.S. courts, the SEC was able to begin a 
dialogue with foreign securities officials and other law enforcement authorities, and it 
developed informal case-by-case understandings that facilitated the production of information 
from other countries. 
 
Unilateral initiatives may also be explained in terms of regulatory history. The United States 
has been a pioneer in business regulation generally and securities regulation in particular. It is 
a “standard-setter” 34 and a first-mover in the game of regulation.  
 
 
                                                 
32 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, This treaty relates only to criminal matters, and imposes a 
dual criminality requirement for compliance with requests. See Catherine F. Donohue, Comment, ‘Swiss Law 
Prohibiting Insider Trading: Its Impact on Switzerland and the United States’ (1990) 16 Brooklyn Journal of  
International Law, 379.  
33 Ibid, See Catherine, ‘ Swiss law’. 
34 James R. Doty, ‘The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in an Internationalized Marketplace’  
(1992) 60 Fordham Law Review.  
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 7.5.2 Bilateral 
 
Cooperation between national securities regulators has traditionally taken place via MOUs. 
The SEC has led the way in establishing such regulatory arrangements. Securities regulators 
around the world now use cooperative arrangements modelled on those pioneered by the SEC 
as a significant means of enforcing domestic securities laws. The SEC entered into its first 
information-sharing arrangement to obtain evidence located abroad in 1982.35 Since then, the 
SEC has made international evidence gathering a priority and has entered into more than thirty 
cooperative arrangements. MOUs form the basis of the SEC’s ability to take enforcement 
action when the evidence is located overseas. The SEC may negotiate a MOU with its 
counterpart in a country where there is a great deal of cross-border business or where there is a 
broader U.S. government interest in establishing closer ties. In each case, the MOU must be 
crafted to fit the circumstances of the foreign market and the powers of the foreign authorities. 
Indeed, the actual texts of the documents reflect these differences in legal and regulatory 
authorities. Thus, before entering into a MOU with a foreign authority, the SEC and the 
foreign securities authority exchange information about their respective regulatory systems 
and thereby learn about each other’s specific interests, needs, and capabilities. The SEC’s 
bilateral understandings with foreign regulators and other formal and informal information-
sharing arrangements provide a framework in which the SEC can seek and provide assistance 
for the purpose of enforcing the securities laws of the United States and foreign jurisdictions.  
 
 
This paper will examine the Swiss MOUs and FSA MOU because they served as models for 
MOUs later negotiated with many other countries. The Swiss MOUs include three MOUs. The 
Swiss MOU of 1982 clearly recognized that both nations had an interest in cooperating on 
insider trading investigations and balancing the needs of such investigations with Swiss bank 
secrecy policies.36  The 1982 MOU with Switzerland was effective in prosecuting insider 
trading cases involving trading through Swiss banks. In 1982 MOU, a separate private 
agreement among members of the Swiss Bankers Association was established. The agreement, 
known as Convention XVI, provided that, in cases involving takeovers, where insider trading 
                                                 
35 See Mann and Barry, ‘Securities enforcement’, above, n.6.  
36 See Memorandum of Understanding to Establish Mutually Acceptable Means for Improving International Law 
Enforcement in the Field of Insider Trading, Aug. 31, 1982, U.S.-Switz., 22 I.L.M. 1. 
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was suspected, the signatory banks would disclose and furnish information to the SEC without 
violating Swiss bank secrecy laws. 37  The MOU of 1987 was designed to improve the 
exchange of information between the United States and Switzerland in the investigation of 
insider trading and other crimes. 38 In this MOU, the parties agreed to use their “best efforts” 
to notify each other when they seek information or evidence, to prevent the disclosure of 
information to anyone other than the officials involved in the case, and to refrain from using 
unilateral compulsory measures unless a request has not been answered within thirty days.39 In 
cases in which a party employs unilateral compulsory measures, the parties must “exercise 
moderation and restraint.” While the Swiss MLAT expressly excludes assistance with the 
prosecution of tax and customs laws violations unless the request includes an allegation of 
organized crime, 40 the second Swiss MOU authorizes assistance in cases involving duty or tax 
fraud, as defined under Swiss law.41 In 1993, Switzerland amended its fairly restrictive 1987 
MOU to include violations of law concerning securities, futures, or options, in other than 
penal proceedings, including cooperation with formal investigation that may lead to such 
proceeding. Thus, the three Swiss MOUs greatly expand the scope of assistance available to 
the SEC in insider trading cases relative to that authorized by the Swiss MLAT. The method 
of operation of MOUs facilitates this expansion. The three Swiss MOUs were negotiated 
through and are implemented by the parties’ respective securities regulators, thereby enabling 
the SEC--through the Department of Justice--to tailor the agreements to its specific regulatory 
needs.  
 
 
Based on its experiences under the Swiss MOUs, the SEC sought to develop more 
comprehensive relationships with other foreign securities authorities. On 14 March 2006, the 
FSA published a MOU entered into with the SEC in relation to the exchange of information 
regarding oversight and supervision of financial services firms carrying on business in both 
the UK and the US.42 Through the MOU, the SEC and the FSA express their willingness to 
                                                 
37Agreement XVI of the Swiss Bankers’ Association with regard to the handling of requests for information from 
the SEC on the subject of misuse of inside information, 43 SEC Docket 155 (July 14, 1982). 
38See Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and Ancillary Administrative 
Proceedings, Nov. 10, 1987, U.S.-Switz., 27 I.L.M. 480. 
39 Second Swiss MOU, art. III, 27 I.L.M. at 483-84. 
40 Swiss MLAT. 
41 Second Swiss MOU. 
42  The name of MOU is Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation, Cooperation and the 
Exchange of Information Related to Market Oversight and the Supervision of Financial Services Firms.    
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cooperate with each other in the interest of fulfilling their respective regulatory mandates, 
particularly in the areas of investor protection, fostering market integrity, and maintaining 
confidence and systemic stability.43  According to the MOU, each regulatory agency will 
endeavour to inform the other in advance of: pending regulatory changes that may have a 
significant impact on the operations, activities or reputation of a firm in the other jurisdiction; 
and any material event that could adversely impact each other’s markets or the stability of a 
firm, in the other jurisdiction.44 In addition, upon written request, each agency will provide to 
the other the “fullest possible cooperation” in assisting with the oversight of a firm, and 
ensuring compliance with the laws and regulations of the requesting agency.45 This assistance 
will include the provision of information based upon documents held in the files of the agency 
to whom the request is made covering, among other areas, a firm’s financial and operational 
condition as well as information drawn from regulatory reports and filings. The MOU also 
contains a protocol dealing with on-site visits by one regulatory agency to persons located in 
the other’s jurisdiction that are either regulated by both the FSA and the SEC, or are affiliates, 
branches or subsidiaries of a person subject to oversight in the other agency’s jurisdiction. 
 
The MOU between the FSA and the SEC is part of an increasing trend of transatlantic 
regulatory cooperation, the most recent public example of which was evidenced by the fines of 
companies in the Shell group (Shell) by both the SEC and the FSA in connection with Shell’s 
overstatement of hydrocarbon reserves. In that case Shell paid US $120 million to settle the 
SEC case and was fined £17 million by the FSA following a joint investigation by both 
regulatory agencies. Significantly in its press release relating to the Shell case, the SEC stated 
that: “The degree of international and interagency cooperation in this case has been 
extraordinary and sets an important precedent for investors that regulatory efforts to police the 
financial markets will transcend national borders.” 46  In light of the increased regulatory 
cooperation between the FSA and the SEC, financial services firms with operations in both the 
UK and the US will find it increasingly difficult to insulate the regulatory impact of a 
compliance breach occurring in the US from its UK operations and vice versa. Consequently, 
in seeking to address and mitigate such impact, firms will need to ensure that their response to 
                                                 
43 See FSA MOU article two 12. 
44 See ibid, article three 20. 
45 Ibid, article three 21. 
46 ‘FSA and SEC Publish Joint Memorandum of Understanding’ available at: 
http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s10News%5CFileUpload44%5C12748%5CFSA_MoU_Client_Alert.pdf. 
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the discovery of a compliance breach is joined up and takes into account the likely regulatory 
consequences in both jurisdictions. 
 
In addition to MOUs, the SEC actively seeks to identify and use other formal and informal 
information gathering mechanisms, most notably U.S. MLATs with foreign criminal 
authorities. The United States has signed MLATs with Argentina, the Bahamas, Canada, the 
United Kingdom concerning the Cayman Islands, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Belgium, and Thailand. Unless otherwise specified, the party addressed 
will carry out the request in accordance with its own laws. Most of the United States MLATs 
contain similar general provisions that detail the type of assistance available, the requisite 
elements of a request, the means by which requests will be executed, the permissible uses of 
information obtained, and the occasions for denying requests. MLATs between the United 
States and other countries are intended to enable U.S. authorities to obtain information that 
will be admissible in U.S. courts.47 In particular, the MLAT between the United States and 
Switzerland has provided a useful mechanism for the SEC, working with the U.S. Justice 
Department, to obtain information located in Switzerland, including detailed banking 
information.48 In addition, the Swiss authorities have been willing, in specific cases, to freeze 
profits traceable to illegal securities activities, thereby preserving the status quo pending 
further SEC action. Several mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) also provide that one 
country may request another, consistent with the requested country’s domestic law, to (1) 
freeze forfeitable assets; (2) initiate a forfeiture action against property; (3) repatriate assets 
located abroad; and (4) enforce forfeiture judgments issued by a foreign court.49 Through the 
U.S. Department of Justice, the SEC has used mutual legal assistance treaties to obtain 
provisional freezes of assets that it suspected were obtained in violation of U.S. federal 
securities laws.  
 
Another important development in bilateral arrangements is the establishment of Regulatory 
Dialogues between particular countries that deal with areas of regulation of mutual concern. 
For example, the US and the EU have been engaged in such a dialogue since 2002. The U.S. is 
represented by the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board and the SEC and the EU is 
                                                 
47 See Marian Nash (Leich), ‘Contemporary Practice’, above, n.16, 550. 
48 See Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, U.S.-Switz., 27 U.S.T. 2019, 2050 
(entered into force Jan. 23, 1977).  
49 See Mann et,al , ‘The Establishment of International Mechanisms’, above, n.22.  
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represented by the E.U. Commission. These meetings are supported by other bilateral 
meetings of technical regulators, for example meetings between CESR and the SEC. The 
meetings began due to EU concern with the foreign impact of US laws such as Sarbanes-
Oxley that made it more costly to access US capital markets. The goals of the cooperation are 
to identify emerging risks in the US and EU securities markets and to engage in early 
discussions of potential regulatory initiatives in the interest of promoting convergence where 
possible. Today the dialogue is focused on several issues, including the US acceptance of 
international accounting standards, EU acceptance of SEC holding company regulation, and 
issues of financial privacy. One critical issue on the economic front is whether the US and the 
EU will seek to compete or collaborate. For example, the EU might respond to increasing US 
regulation by providing less regulated alternative, rather than pursuing efforts to relax US 
regulation and further the integration of the two markets. 
The Dialogue also fulfills other functions. One important function is that it has allowed the US 
and the EU to reinforce their common ground. With respect to financial services regulation, 
the US and EU share the same fundamental goals — protecting investors, maintaining stability 
in our markets, and allowing free and unfettered competition among all market participants.  
To date, the Dialogue has proven helpful in resolving potential problems, but it has also 
created the opportunity for the EU and US delegations to educate each other about existing 
laws and regulations and any changes thereto. This educative process allows the US and the 
EU to eliminate misunderstandings that may exist or that may arise with regard to regulatory 
changes being considered. It allows them to consider possible new avenues of regulation for 
their own markets, which ultimately enriches the regulatory rulemaking process and helps 
them each to better carry out their regulatory mandates.  
 
7.5.3 Regional Level 
 
The European Union serves as a good example of successful cooperation among member 
states. Although European securities regulators also have utilized MOUs extensively,50  a 
                                                 
50 See Bryan Thomas Shipp, ‘Filling gaps in European Union securities law: contractually organized supervision 
and the college of Euronext regulators’ (2008) 23 American University International Law Review, 407 (in his 
footnote stating that the FSA has approximately 150 MOUs with various regulatory authorities). 
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prime example is the Euronext Regulatory MOU.51 Euronext merged the securities exchanges 
of Amsterdam, Brussels, and Paris in 2000 to take advantage of the increasingly harmonized 
regulatory regime for securities markets in E.U. Member States. But at the time of this merger 
there were gaps in EC securities legislation, particularly with respect to the harmonization of 
securities trading markets regulation. The Euronext College52 responded to this regulatory 
challenge by creating a mechanism for the harmonization of trading markets rules in the 
jurisdictions in which Euronext operates. The mechanism employed in the Euronext 
Regulatory MOU parallels the harmonization framework of existing EC securities directives. 
The goals of the Euronext Regulatory MOU are identical to the goal of creating harmonized 
securities regulation in the EC. The Euronext Regulatory MOU provides for close cooperation 
between industry and the regulators in developing new rules for securities exchange regulation, 
the rules thus negotiated are better informed of the emerging structure of the industry. The 
primary concern of the Euronext Regulatory MOU is the establishment of a “coherent” 
regulatory framework for Euronext markets.53 Under the terms of the Euronext Regulatory 
MOU, Euronext is obligated to cooperate with the Euronext College of the jurisdictions in  
which Euronext operates regulated markets. In general, Euronext’s cooperation with the 
Euronext College encompasses the harmonization of domestic regulations pertaining to listing 
requirements, prospectuses, on-going obligations of listed companies, take-over bids and the 
disclosure of large shareholdings.54 The Euronext College has authority under the Euronext 
Regulatory MOU to approve the modification and harmonization of Euronext Rulebooks.55 
Further, the Euronext Regulatory MOU does not state in terms that it is not binding,56 as is the 
case with all MOUs to which the SEC is a party. As an instrument for cooperation the 
                                                 
51 Memorandum of Understanding on Supervision, Regulation, and Oversight of the Euronext Group, Mar. 22, 
2001, available at  
http://www.amffrance.org/documents/general/3622_1.pdf [hereinafter Euronext Regulatory MOU]. 
52 The group of regulatory authorities that are signatory to the MOU is known as the College of Euronext 
Regulators, or Euronext College. See Prospectus Of  NYSE EURONEXT, INC. 349-51 (Euronext, N.V., Nov. 27, 
2006), 
 available at http://www.euronext.com/file/view/0,4245,1626_53424_979643772,00.pdf. 
at A-15 (defining the Euronext College as the Committee of Chairmen of the AMF, the Netherlands Authority for 
the Financial Markets (Autoriteit Financiele Markten), the Belgian CBFA, the Portuguese Securities Market 
Commission (Comiss˜ao do Mercado de Valores Mobiliarios or “CMVM”), and the U.K. Financial Services 
Authority (FSA)). 
53 See Euronext Regulatory MOU, art. I (outlining the principles and objectives of cooperation by the College of 
Euronext Regulators). 
54 Euronext Regulatory MOU, article VII, 7.1. 
55 Euronext Regulatory MOU, article III, 3.1.1. 
56 Euronext Regulatory MOU, article X. 
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Euronext Regulatory MOU thus represents a significant evolution beyond the non-binding 
MOUs of the SEC and IOSCO.  
 
 
7.5.4 International Level 
 
International multilateral initiatives play an important role in raising the standard of 
information sharing on a global scale. Indeed, they can help securities regulators obtain the 
necessary domestic legal authority to share information with foreign securities regulators. The 
heads of state of the Group of Seven (G-7) countries (Canada, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, 
the U.K. and the U.S.) asked securities and banking regulators to cooperate in enhancing 
regulatory oversight and promoting stronger risk management and improved transparency in 
the markets. The G-7 Finance Ministers Report, which was issued at the G-7 Summit in June 
1997, promotes continued information sharing and cooperation among financial regulators in 
connection with their oversight of globally active firms. IOSCO is the world’s leading forum 
for setting standards and cooperation on all matters concerning securities regulation. SEC 
officials note the importance of IOSCO as a forum for promoting cooperation and the spread 
and strengthening of securities law to new areas of the globe. IOSCO has fully endorsed 
information sharing among securities regulators worldwide. IOSCO has employed a variety of 
vehicles, such as core principles, resolutions and MMOU to establish a framework for 
information sharing on which its members can build in order to strengthen their securities 
laws. 
 
In 1991, in light of the need for cooperation in enforcement matters, IOSCO adopted 
“Principles of Memoranda of Understanding.” The Principles represent a consensus among 
securities regulators about key tools that should be available to regulators for fighting 
securities fraud. These principles have been referred to time and again as IOSCO members 
developed bilateral and regional MOUs. They include core provisions on obtaining and 
sharing information, and on confidentiality and use of information that is shared. In particular, 
the MOU Principles endorse: 
The provision of assistance without regard to whether the type of conduct under investigation would be a 
violation of the laws of the requested authority; Use of full domestic powers to execute requests for assistance, 
including obtaining documents, testimony, and conducting inspections; The importance of protecting the 
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confidentiality of the information provided; and the right to use the information for enforcement investigations, 
actions and proceedings. 
 
In addition to the MOU Principles, IOSCO members adopted a series of resolutions designed 
to affirm IOSCO members’ commitment to cooperation in 1986, 1989 and 1994.  
 
The 1997 Enforcement Resolution was a product of IOSCO members’ recognition that there 
were significant differences in the ability of members to maintain, collect and share non-public 
information. The 1997 Enforcement Resolution thus addresses the importance of 
comprehensive record keeping and collection of information, as well as strong enforcement 
powers, in the context of mutual assistance and cross-border cooperation. In 1998, IOSCO’s 
full membership incorporated the 1997 Enforcement Resolution into the IOSCO Core 
Principles. 
 
On October 1, 1998, IOSCO adopted a Resolution on Principles for Record Keeping, 
Collection of Information, Enforcement Powers and Mutual Cooperation to Improve the 
Enforcement of Securities and Futures Laws.57  The resolution marked the first time that 
IOSCO’s focus turned to improving the maintenance and collection of information as a critical 
part of international cooperation. The members recognized that “comprehensive record 
keeping, improved collection of information, strong enforcement powers and the removal of 
impediments to cooperation are fundamental to effective enforcement of securities and futures 
laws, market transparency and more generally the development of sound securities and futures 
markets.” 58 The IOSCO Resolution first sets forth the principles that the participants agree are 
important for record keeping and enforcement and second focuses on the importance of 
information sharing among IOSCO members. The resolution suggests the creation of 
contemporaneous records of all securities and futures transactions, including information as to 
funds and assets transferred, beneficial ownership and details such as price, quantity of 
                                                 
57 The resolution derives from the 1994 IOSCO Resolution in which the members renewed their commitment to 
the principles of mutual assistance and cooperation and agreed to undertake self-evaluations. International 
Organization of Securities Commissioners, Resolution on Commitment to Basic IOSCO Principles of High 
Regulatory Standards and Mutual Cooperation and Assistance (Oct. 1994), available at http:// 
www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES11.pdf. 
58 International Organization of Securities Commissioners, Resolution of Principles for Record Keeping, 
Collections of Information, Enforcement Powers and Mutual Cooperation to Improve the Enforcement of 
Securities and Futures Laws (Nov. 1997), available at 
 http:// www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES15.pdf. 
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securities and identity of brokers.59  Record keeping as prescribed by the Resolution will 
provide a more complete document trail for transactions that will assist in monitoring and 
enforcement. IOSCO members also agreed in the Resolution that a competent authority in 
each member’s jurisdiction should have the power to identify persons who own or control 
public companies, bank accounts, and brokerage accounts, emphasizing that domestic secrecy 
laws should not prevent or restrict the collection of such information.60 As a result of the self-
evaluations, IOSCO members recognized that the ability of members to implement the desired 
measures may vary significantly depending on many factors, including domestic legislation. 
Because of the importance of access to information, each IOSCO member agreed under the 
Resolution to “strive to ensure that it or another authority in its jurisdiction has the necessary 
authority to obtain [the relevant] information.” 61  This provision suggests that, while the 
regulator itself may not have the power to provide assistance in some cases, another 
government authority in the jurisdiction--the criminal prosecutor, for example--may have such 
power to share information with foreign regulators. Because of the different legal structures 
among IOSCO members, this is an important alternative. 
 
Equally important to effective enforcement, however, is the sharing of such information with 
other IOSCO members. The Resolution therefore provides that members will take appropriate 
efforts to ensure that such information may be shared among them.62 Finally, members agreed 
generally to take efforts to remove such other impediments to cooperation as may exist under 
their domestic legislative and regulatory schemes.63 
 
In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, IOSCO undertook to further enhance the 
information sharing critical to the successful investigation and prosecution of cross-border 
securities violations. The result was the adoption of a Multilateral Memorandum of 
Understanding (“MMOU”) in May 2002. Although a number of securities authorities have set 
up their own bilateral agreements over the past decade to cooperate with each other on cross-
border securities fraud investigations, the IOSCO MMOU is the first global information-
sharing agreement among securities regulators. It sets a new international benchmark for 
cooperation critical to combating violations of securities and derivatives laws. The MMOU 
                                                 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
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establishes a complex framework for cooperation to which IOSCO members can subscribe. 
The framework was agreed upon unanimously at IOSCO’s 2002 Annual Meeting. To date, 
around 30 regulators have become signatories.64 The key provisions of the MMOU focus on 
two essential elements of cross-border enforcement cooperation. First, the MMOU specifies 
the particular types of information a signatory may be asked to provide, such as client 
identification information, brokerage records, and information from a signatory’s files. 
Second, the MMOU requires the confidentiality of information provided, while allowing 
information to be used for compliance with the securities laws, investigations and enforcement 
proceedings, surveillance or enforcement activities of self regulatory organizations, and 
assistance in criminal prosecutions. 
 
 The IOSCO MMOU provides for the exchange of essential information in investigating cross-
border securities and derivatives law violations, including bank, brokerage, and client 
identification records. The MMOU also enables regulators to use that information to enforce 
compliance with securities and derivatives laws and regulations, including through civil and 
criminal prosecutions. 
 
The MMOU is broad-based, authorizing regulators to obtain information and evidence from a 
variety of sources, including the following:  
 
•Information and documents in the files of the requested authority;  
•Information and documents regarding the matters set forth in the request for assistance. 
Upon request, the requested authority can require production from any person designated in 
the request or any person who may possess the requested information or documents. The types 
of information and documents subject to required production include:  
                                                 
64 The following regulators are signatories to the IOSCO MOU: Australia--Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission; British Columbia-- British Columbia Securities Commission; France--Commission des operations 
de bourse; Germany--Bundesanstalt fur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht; Greece-- Capital Market Commission; 
Hong Kong--Securities and Futures Commission; Hungary--Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority; India--
Securities and Exchange Board of India; Italy--Commissione Nazionale per le Societa e la Borsa; Jersey--Jersey 
Financial Services Commission; Lithuania--Lithuanian Securities Commission; Mexico--Comision Nacional 
Bancaria y de Valores; New Zealand--New Zealand Securities Commission; Ontario--Ontario Securities 
Commission; Poland--Polish Securities and Exchange Commission; Portugal-- Comissao do Mercado de Valores 
Mobiliarios; Quebec--Commission des valeurs mobilieres du Quebec; Spain--Comision Nacional del Mercado de 
Valores; South Africa--Financial Services Board; Turkey--Capital Markets Board; United Kingdom--Financial 
Services Authority; United States--United States Securities and Exchange Commission and Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission. 
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• Contemporaneous records sufficient to reconstruct all securities and derivatives transactions, 
including records of all funds and assets transferred into and out of bank and brokerage 
accounts relating to these transactions;  
• Records that identify the beneficial owner and controller and for each transaction, the 
account holder, the amount purchased or sold, the time of the transaction, the price of the 
transaction, and the individual and the bank or broker and brokerage house that handled the 
transaction;  
• Information identifying persons who beneficially own or control non-natural persons 
organized in the jurisdiction of the requested authority;  
• Compelled, sworn testimony (where permissible) or the statement of a person regarding the 
matters set forth in the request for assistance. Where permissible under the laws of the 
jurisdiction of the requested authority, a representative of the requesting authority may be 
present at the taking of statements and may provide specific questions to be asked of any 
witness. 
 
The MMOU also provides that each authority will make all reasonable efforts to provide 
unsolicited assistance to the other authorities in the form of information that it considers likely 
to be helpful to the other authorities in securing compliance with the laws and regulations 
applicable in their jurisdictions. 
 
The IOSCO MMOU is an important contribution to cross-border enforcement cooperation and 
a public statement that the world’s securities regulators are committed to assisting one another 
in preventing and prosecuting violations of our securities laws. In recognition of the 
importance which the IOSCO MMOU is now seen, the organization took the decision at last 
year’s annual conference to set the deadline of 1 January 2010 for all IOSCO members to sign 
onto the MMOU. Setting such a deadline was a major milestone for IOSCO as an 
organization.  
 
7.6 The Influence of Cooperation 
 
In the last ten years, securities regulators have made substantial progress in developing 
cooperative relationships to reduce the value of international borders as barriers to the 
detection and prosecution of securities fraud. The obvious benefit of cooperation is that 
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regulators are able to obtain enforcement-related information from numerous jurisdictions. 
Information is said to be the lifeblood of financial markets.65 The exchange of information and 
other means for cooperation are critical components for the effective oversight of an 
expanding cross-border market. By obtaining a ready source of access to information, 
regulatory authorities will be in a better position to carry out their oversight functions. 
Depending on the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements, the exchange of 
information could facilitate the following regulatory functions:66 
Obtaining information to assist in determining whether a foreign-based investment 
management person is eligible to do business in a member’s jurisdiction; gaining an additional 
tool for ascertaining, through exchanging inspection reports and by conducting joint 
inspections, if an investment management person located abroad is operating in compliance 
with applicable domestic requirements; and obtaining an additional source of information to 
assist in making a determination whether a foreign-based fund should be permitted to market 
its shares or interests within a member’s borders 
Cooperating directly with peers in other jurisdictions also permits government officials to 
maximize their ability to fulfil their domestic mandates and more effectively enforces 
domestic law. The SEC believes cooperation serves important U.S. interests. SEC officials 
argue that cooperation enhances the ability of the U.S. to police fraud that undermines U.S. 
markets. 
Another benefit of cooperation is that regulators could learn a great deal about their respective 
interests, needs and capabilities. Douglas Melamed of the US Department of Justice (DOJ) 
recently stated that cooperation can encourage the evolution of “common views 
and…understandings” about substantive and procedural issues, which facilitates shared 
enforcement responsibility and leads to deeper, more effective cooperation.67 Similarly, a top 
US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) official stated that “the constant contacts [with foreign 
regulators] enable us to understand each other’s analysis, lead to convergence in our 
approaches toward competition matters—in some measure due to an increasingly common 
                                                 
65 Onnig H. Dombalagian, ‘Licensing the word on the street: the SEC’s role in regulating information’ (2007) 55 
Buffalo Law Review, 1. 
66 See, Exchange Act Release No. IS-806, 59 SEC Docket 536  (May 3, 1995). 
67A. Douglas Melamed, ‘International Cooperation in Competition Law and Policy: What Can be Achieved at the 
Bilateral, Regional, and Multilateral Levels, Address Before the WTO Symposium on Competition Policy and 
the Multilateral Trading System’ (1999) 2 Journal of  International Economic Law, 423.  
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economic analysis—and benefit parties insofar as we are often able to arrive at 
complementary remedies.”68 
International cooperation is active and growing, with the SEC playing a critical and active 
role. The SEC began to actively cooperate with foreign agencies in the 1980s, by the late 
1990s, the SEC was at the centre of international cooperation. A striking result of international 
cooperation is the diffusion of SEC style regulatory rules and practices around the world. 
Many jurisdictions replicate U.S regulatory approaches. This phenomenon is termed as the 
“regulatory gospel” of U.S. securities law.69 SEC officials confirm that the SEC is far less 
interested in learning from its foreign counterparts than it is in imparting the wisdom it has 
accumulated regulating the world’s largest financial markets. A statement by Richard 
Breeden, then Chairman of the SEC, “I’m interested in knowing the capital rules in other 
countries to know how big their buffers are. I’m not at all interested in what the French think 
US capital standards ought to be.”70 This gospel includes the following elements: strict insider 
trading rules; mandatory registration with a governmental agency of public securities issues; a 
mandatory disclosure system; issuer liability regarding registration statements and offering 
documents; broad anti-fraud provisions; and government oversight of brokers, dealers, 
exchanges, etc.71 The SEC push for U.S.-oriented securities law also extends to advanced 
industrial democracies. The SEC has pressured Japan and Switzerland, for instance, to develop 
insider-trading regimes similar to that in place in the U.S. The encouragement of US style 
market structures and regulatory principles promotes open entry and competitive market 
conditions that may be enjoyed by US participants and service providers. 
 
For the SEC, cooperation with foreign regulators is a conscious strategy aimed at enhancing 
its enforcement powers in a globalizing economy while at the same time promoting the 
institutionalization of U.S.-style securities laws abroad through its technical assistance 
                                                 
68 Debra Valentine, General Counsel of the FTC, Remarks at a 1998 American Bar Association panel, cited in 
David M. Knight, ‘Global Antitrust Cooperation: The Role of Transnational Networks in Competition Policy 
Formation and Enforcement’ (unpublished paper, Harvard Law School, 1998). 
69 Kal raustiala, ‘The architecture of international cooperation: transgovernmental networks and the future of 
international law’  (2002) 43 Virginia Journal of International Law The author quoted term from the Interviews 
with SEC officials, SEC Headquarters, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 2000). 
70 Joel P. Trachtman, ‘Unilateralism, Bilateralism, Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Functionalism: A 
Comparison with Reference to Securities Regulation’ (1994) 4 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 
Spring, 69. 
71 Theodore Levine & W. Hardy Callcott, The SEC and Foreign Policy: The International Securities Enforcement 
Cooperation Act of 1988, 17 SEC. REG. L.J. 115, 123 (1989), cited in Kehoe: “The SEC raised foreign 
consciousness about the harmful effects of insider trading, and this directly led to legislation criminalizing insider 
trading or increasing enforcement in countries such as Switzerland, Japan, Canada, and England”. 
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programs. This is even true of the SEC’s cooperative efforts with regulators from other 
advanced industrial states. The SEC hosts a major training program each year for foreign 
securities regulators, the “International Institute for Securities Market Development,” which is 
taught by SEC officials and outside experts. As of 2000, nearly 800 participants from 101 
countries had taken part. 72  This training provides grounding in the basic principles and 
approaches employed by the SEC (such as the merits of disclosure-based versus merit-based 
regulation and the importance of transparency) and provide opportunities for regulators to 
share problems and solutions. The SEC also holds an International Institute for Securities 
Enforcement and Market Oversight, in which approximately 670 regulators from 65 countries 
have participated.73 In 2000 alone, approximately 460 securities regulators from 71 countries 
were trained by the SEC.74 These programmes are designed to benefit both the United States 
and recipient countries. Benefits to the US include an improved foreign investment climate 
and regulatory foundation for foreign offerings in the United States. SEC officials also argue 
that, aside from spreading the gospel and building the rule of law abroad, these sessions help 
to build important ties and contacts for future cooperation on concrete cases.75 However, some 
argued that the SEC’s efforts to export regulation, resulting in greater friction between the 
SEC and foreign regulators.  
 
Opposition with SEC’s export regulation, economically weak jurisdictions always embrace a 
substantial part of the regulatory models of the dominant powers. What incentives exist for 
weak jurisdictions to import the regulatory approaches of the advanced industrial 
democracies? In a complex, uncertain economic environment, the strategy of adopting 
successful foreign models can markedly reduce regulatory costs.76 Importing jurisdictions do 
not bear the (often considerable) expense of creating the regulatory institutions they adopt.77 
While these institutions “may not match domestic conditions precisely . . .[they] are ready-
made, pretested, and provide international compatibility.” Foreign regulatory rules and 
                                                 
72 Practicing Law Institute, ‘International Affairs: The SEC Speaks in 2001’ 1235 PLI/Corp 977 (2001), 991. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 See Kal, ‘International cooperation’, above, n.621, The author quoted from Interview with former SEC official, 
in Washington, D.C., (Apr. 2000). 
76 Giandomenico Majone, ‘Cross-National Sources of Regulatory Policymaking in Europe and the United States’  
(1991) 11 Journal of Public Policy, 79. 
77  Nancy Birdsall & Robert Z. Lawrence, ‘Deep Integration and Trade Agreements Good for Developing 
Countries?’ in Inge kaul et al (eds) Global public goods: international cooperation in the 21st century (Oxford 
University Press, 1999),128. 
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systems also may come “pre-interpreted”—with a body of case law and other decisions that 
have elaborated and improved the rules over time.  
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Chapter Eight: International Securities Regulatory Institutions 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
As early as 1998, Eatwell and Taylor recommended establishing a World Financial Authority.1 
They argue that for efficient regulation the domain of the regulator should be the same as the 
domain of the market that is required.2 Alexander is a supporter of this view. He contends that 
the changing structure of the international financial markets and in particular, the increased 
risk of systemic failure requires an efficient international financial regulator.3 Ten years later, 
the securities market has changed even more, internationalization as discussed in chapter 3 has 
continued to grow. The risks involved have become more and more obvious and larger in scale.  
Chapter 3 has already argued that national securities regulations are not in harmony with this 
new situation. That is why it is necessary to call for international regulation. As discussed in 
chapter 4, there are three regulatory models in responding to international securities 
regulation: harmonization, competition and cooperation. Although they all have had in some 
way a degree of success in connection with international securities regulations, generally 
speaking it has not been very successful. One major reason for this is lack of an informal 
international regulator to coordinate things.  Currently, many governments, committees, action 
groups, associations, etc., are involved in the regulation or governance of international 
securities trading, with each offering their own input on the various concerns associated with 
such regulation or governance.4  However, to the contrary of international trade, which is 
formally and legally ruled by binding laws adopted at the WTO, there is a lack of leadership 
and central authority among the international securities regulatory institutions, which is 
worrisome. Clearly, “to create an effective system of regulation will mean overcoming turf-
wars.”5 Regardless of all the regulatory parties involved their efforts to set universal standards 
results only in non-binding recommendations because they do not have regulatory authority.6 
                                                 
1 John Eatwell, ‘New issues in international financial regulation’ in Eilis Ferran and Charles A E Goodhart (eds) 
Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the 21st Century (Oxford, Portland Oregon, 2001), 235. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Key Alexander, ‘The need for efficient international financial regulation and the role of a global supervisor’ in 
Eilis Ferran and Charles A E Goodhart (eds) Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the 21st Century 
(Oxford, Portland Oregon, 2001), 273. 
4 Katharina Pistor, ‘The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies’ (2002) 50 American  
Journal Comparative Law. 
5 Alex Brummer, ‘Saturday Notebook: Regulators Must Talk to Each Other’ The Guardian (London), Aug. 12, 
1995, at 34. 
6 See Pistor, ‘The Standardization of Law’, above, n.4. 
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“There are simply too many trade associations and working parties, dissipating the force of 
their message and . . . needlessly duplicating effort.”7 Furthermore, “these groupings are 
further discredited by the fact that the same faces from the same firms almost inevitably 
appear on the roster of every new organization, and yet still fail to provide true leadership.”8 
The issue thus arises, who should fulfil the international leadership position and set 
international securities standards? This chapter will try to answer this question. 
 
Firstly, this chapter will examine what role the existing national regulator and international 
institutions play and what their objectives are. America and the EU are the representatives of 
national regulators; Banking Supervision Committee (the Basel Committee) of the Bank for 
International Settlements, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) are the representatives of 
international institutions. Then the chapter will explore who is going to be an international 
securities regulator. 
 
8.2 American Leadership 
 
National governments are the principal regulators of international financial transactions and 
the formulators of international policies. The SEC has responded to the internationalization of 
markets by expanding its influence beyond U.S. borders. The United States now has, in the 
aggregate, the largest and most liquid securities markets in the world and possibly the most 
efficient, innovative, and fair markets in the world. 9  One of the SEC’s goals in the 
internationalization of securities markets is to minimize discrepancies between different 
securities regulation schemes throughout the world.10 This has led SEC regulators to believe 
that the SEC “has a responsibility to assume a leadership role in international securities 
regulation”. 11 The SEC might believe that its policies are better than all others in the world 
and might want the world securities markets to benefit from its “superior” form of governance. 
Securities law practitioner Lee S. Richards, III summarizes the SEC’s evolution into an 
international regulatory agency: For better or for worse, the internationalization of securities 
                                                 
7 Richard Greensted, ‘Committee Fails to Show Leadership’ (September 11, 2000) Financial News. 
8 Ibid. 
9 OTA-BP-CIT-66, Trading Around the Clock: Global Securities Markets and Information Technology 
(Washington DC, Diane Publishing, 1990), 78. 
10 Peter E. Millspaugh, ‘Global Securities Trading: The Question of a Watchdog’ (1992) 26 George Washington 
Journal of International Law & Economics, 359. 
11 Ibid. 
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markets has encouraged the SEC to regard itself as an international policing agency. From the 
outside looking in, it would appear that internationalizing its efforts is now a major SEC 
priority.  Indeed, the SEC now has a whole division devoted to this subject.12  
 
 
8.3 The Special Case of the European Union 
 
The Commission of the European Union, together with the European Parliament and Council 
of Ministers, is probably the most influential of all multilateral institutions, although it is often 
regarded as a quasi-national actor (representing the 27 member states of the E.U.). The 
Commission has formulated important Directives in many areas of finance that are 
implemented through national legislation, particularly measures seeking to enhance the 
operation of the E.U. “single market.” Implementation of these Directives is coordinated 
through E.U.-wide functional regulators, such as the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR).  
 
There are two committees related to securities regulation in the Europe Union. The European 
Securities Committee (ESC) is composed of Member State nominees representing their 
respective economic and finance ministries, and is chaired by a representative of the European 
Commission. ESC act in both “advisory” and “regulatory” capacities in the field of securities 
markets. In its advisory capacity, the ESC would advise the Commission on securities issues 
relating to the adoption of proposed Directives or Regulations under the Co-Decision process 
(Level 1). In its regulatory capacity, the ESC would vote on implementing measures proposed 
by the Commission (Level 2). The Committee of European Securities Regulator (CESR) is 
composed of senior representatives of national regulatory authorities designated by the 
Member States. CESR act as an independent advisory group. CESR now serves two distinct 
functions in the EC securities regime.  As an advisory body under Level 2 of the Lamfalussy 
Process, CESR consults with the Commission during the drafting of securities legislation.13  
                                                 
12 See Lee S. Richards, III, ‘Legal Representation in the International Securities Markets: Representing Client in 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Department of Justice or Self-Regulatory Organization Proceedings 
Involving Foreign Citizens or Foreign Trading’ (1990) 683 PLI/CORP  145. 
13 See Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets (Feb. 15, 
2001) Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-wise-
men_en.pdf , 31 (hereinafter Final Lamfalussy Report) (noting that CESR, also known as “ESRC,” serves as an 
“independent advisory committee” during Level 2 of the Lamfalussy Process. 
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Under Level 3 of the Lamfalussy Process, CESR serves as a forum for collaboration among 
securities authorities to ensure consistent implementation of EC securities legislation.14 
 
 
8.4 International Securities Regulatory Institution 
 
 
Currently, there are many committees, action groups, associations, etc., involved in the 
regulation or governance of international securities trading. The most important of these are 
the Banking Supervision Committee (the Basel Committee) of the Bank for International 
Settlements, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). This chapter focuses on these three 
organizations. In addition, before discussing these three organizations, it will also give a brief 
interdiction of other international organizations in order to get a clear picture of international 
securities regulatory organizations. 
 
8.4.1 Briefly introduction of international organizations 
 
The International Securities Association for Institutional Trade Communication (ISITC) is an 
industry association that collaborates to develop and promote market practice and shared 
standards in the global securities industry in order to reduce inefficiencies, lower risk, and 
build shareholder value. ISITC is an organization that develops invaluable recommendations 
for straight-through processing and other electronic trade and communications procedures — 
recommendations that are repeatedly adopted by the industry and become standards that have 
transformed trading processes. 15 
 
The International Capital Market Association (ICMA) is a unique self regulatory organization 
and an influential voice for the global capital market. It represents a broad range of capital 
market interests including global investment banks and smaller regional banks, as well as asset 
managers, exchanges, central banks, law firms and other professional advisers amongst its 400 
                                                 
14 Ibid, 31. 
15 See The International Securities Association for Institutional Trade Communication (ISITC) website, available 
at: http://www.isitc.org/ (last visited, September 2008). 
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member firms across almost 50 countries.16 ICMA’s market conventions and standards have 
been the pillars of the international debt market for 40 years, providing the self regulatory 
framework of rules governing market practice which have facilitated the orderly functioning 
and impressive growth of the market. ICMA actively promotes the efficiency and cost 
effectiveness of the capital markets by bringing together market participants including 
regulatory authorities and governments.17 
 
The Federation Internationale Des Bourses de Valeurs (FIBV) was formed in the 1930s in 
Paris with 57 member stock exchanges.18 The aim is to facilitate exchange of information. 
Recently is concentrating on clearing and settlement, disclosure requirements, and listing 
procedures.  
 
The International Councils of Securities Associations (ICSA) formed in 1988, membership 
includes four SROs (Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and three 
Securities Dealers Associations (Canada, Japan and the United States).19 Aims to aid and 
encourage the sound growth of the international securities markets by promoting and 
encouraging harmonization in the procedures and effective regulation of those markets, 
thereby facilitating international securities transactions and by promoting mutual 
understanding and the sharing of information among the members.20 
 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), which represents participants in the 
privately negotiated derivatives industry, is the largest global financial trade association, by 
number of member firms. It is headquartered in New York. ISDA was chartered in 1985, and 
today has over 850 member institutions from 56 countries on six continents. 21 Since its 
                                                 
16 See The International Capital Market Association (ICMA) website, available at: http://www.icma-group.org/ 
(last visited, September 2008). 
17 Ibid. 
18 See John Reed, ‘Globalization and the Group of Thirty’  
available at: http://www.capital-flow-analysis.com/investment-essays/globalization2.html (last visited, September 
2008). 
19 See the International Councils of Securities Associations (ICSA) website, available at: 
http://www.icsa.bz/html/about_icsa.html (last visited, September 2008). 
20 Ibid. 
21 See International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) website, available at: http://www.isda.org/ (last 
visited, September 2008). 
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inception, ISDA has pioneered efforts to identify and reduce the sources of risk in the 
derivatives and risk management business.22 
The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the central banks of the Group of ten 
countries (CPSS) was established in 1990. Its functions are to monitor and analyze 
developments in domestic payment, settlement and clearing systems as well as in cross-border 
and multicurrency systems. It has also increasingly focused on standard setting activities. All 
its 15 members come from rich countries, two of them, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
and the Monetary Authority of Singapore being representatives of new financial centers in 
Asia. 23 
 
8.4.2 The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (Basle Committee) 
 
The Basel Committee established by the central-bank Governors of the Group of Ten 
countries at the end of 1974, consists of representatives of twelve central banks that regulate 
the world’s largest banking markets.24 The Basle Committee meets regularly four times a year 
seeks to create common standards of banking oversight. The Basel Committee is widely 
recognized as the principal international forum for developments in international banking 
supervision. However, the standards developed by the Basel Committee are of direct relevance 
to the capital requirements imposed on investment firms (such as investment banks) operating 
in securities markets.  
 
The Basle Committee works informally. Its operations are distinguished by an emphasis on 
personal contacts, insistence on the nonbinding nature of the agreements it concludes, and an 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 CPSS Publications, ‘CPSS history, organization, cooperation’ available at:  
http://www.bis.org/cpss/cpssinfo01.htm (last visited, September 2008). 
24 The institutions represented on the Committee are as follows: from Belgium, the National Bank of Belgium 
and the country’s Banking Commission; from Canada, the Bank of Canada and the Office of the Inspector 
General of Banks; from France, the Bank of France and the country's Banking Commission; from Germany, the 
Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Banking Supervisory Office; from Italy, the Bank of Italy; from Japan, the 
Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance; from Luxembourg, the Luxembourg Monetary Institute; from the 
Netherlands, the Netherlands Bank; from Sweden, the Sveriges Riksbank and the Royal Swedish Banking 
Inspectorate; from Switzerland, the Swiss National Bank and the Swiss Federal Banking Commission; from the 
United Kingdom, the Bank of England; from the United States, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation; and, serving as the Committee’s Secretariat, the Bank for International Settlements. See David 
Zaring, ‘International Law by other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory 
Organizations’ (1998) 33 Texas International Law Journal, 281. 
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interactive and decentralized method of ensuring compliance. The Committee makes decisions 
by consensus. It operates through a rotating chair and makes recommendations based on 
consensus.25 The Basle Committee operates in secret and has sought throughout its existence 
to maintain an unpublicized existence and a low profile.26 The Committee has declared that 
“the development of close personal contacts between supervisors in different countries has 
greatly helped in the handling and resolution of problems affecting individual banks as they 
have arisen. This is an important, though necessarily unpublicized, element in the committee’s 
regular work”.27 The Committee pursues those contacts within its membership and has sought 
to develop others with outside banking regulators. This quest for common ground is the 
Committee’s substitute for binding agreements.  
 
The Basle Committee characterizes its “key objectives” as “strengthen[ing] international 
cooperation, improv[ing] the overall quality of banking supervision worldwide, and ensur[ing] 
that no foreign banking establishment escapes supervision.” 28 The Committee has developed 
principles of “consolidated supervision” over the past decade and created a multinational 
framework for bank capital adequacy requirements, among other regulatory efforts. 29 
Although the Basle Committee has strong background of banking regulation, it is also an 
important player in international securities regulation, as exemplified by its Capital Accord 
Basel I and Basel II. The Basel I was published in 1988 laid down universal minimum 
capitalization standards (ultimately pegged at eight percent of assets) for international banks 
under the regulatory aegis of the members’ central banks.30 While a non-binding, non-official 
document, this Accord soon (through a complex, informal and uncoordinated transmission 
matrix) became the international benchmark for bank capital adequacy within the developed 
and then-developing world.31 The Basel II which was initially published in June 2004 is the 
second of the Basel Accords, which are recommendations on banking laws and regulations.32 
The purpose of Basel II is to create an international standard that banking regulators can use 
                                                 
25 Ibid, see Zaring, ‘International law by other Means’, p288. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Annexure C para. 7 (September 1995) (hereinafter Annexure C).  
28 Ibid, para. 3.  
29 See William A. Lovett, ‘Conflicts in American Banking Regulation: Renewed Prudence, Retrenchment, and 
Struggles over Growth Potential’  (1993)12 Annual Review of  Banking Law, 443, 458. 
30 Basel Committee, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (July 1988), 
available at http:// www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf. 
31  See Joseph Jude Norton, ‘Capital Adequacy Standards: A Legitimate Regulatory Concern for Prudential 
Supervision of Banking Activities?’ (1989) 49 Ohio State Law Journal 1299, 1342.  
32 Basel Committee, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II, June 
2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf. 
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when creating regulations about how much capital banks need to put aside to guard against the 
types of financial and operational risks banks face. Generally speaking, the Basel II rules mean 
that the greater risk to which the bank is exposed, the greater the amount of capital the bank 
needs to hold to safeguard its solvency and overall economic stability. The Basel II has 
already been implemented by Capital Requirements Directive in the EU.33 
 
The Basel Committee’s does not have legislative authority. As Peter Cooke, a former chair of 
the Committee, has observed that “[t] he committee does not undertake a formal super-
national supervisory role; its conclusions do not have, and were never intended to have, legal 
force.” 34 Usually, the committee has allowed for some flexibility in how local authorities 
implement recommendations, so national laws vary. The Committee has agreed that it 
possesses no such formal authority; rather, it formulates broad supervisory standards, 
practices, and guidelines which individual authorities use to implement the detailed 
arrangements-- statutory or otherwise--which are best suited to their own national systems. 
Because the Basel Committee has no enforcement authority, implementation of its proposals 
and standards are dependent on the member’s cooperation in implementing national 
regulations. In this way, the Committee encourages convergence toward common approaches 
and common standards without attempting detailed harmonization of member countries’ 
supervisory techniques.35  
 
8.4.3 The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
 
The birth of IOSCO dates back to 1974. In 1974, several Western nations organized the Inter 
American Association of Securities Commissions today known as IOSCO. IOSCO was 
initially formed in order to provide a setting in which representatives of the member countries 
could meet to discuss securities regulation matters. Despite its western origins and 
headquarters in Canada, in 1983, the organization had become a worldwide organization. At 
the same year it was incorporated by an act of the Quebec Parliament as a non-profit 
corporation under Quebec law.36  In an effort to facilitate discussion among a broader base of 
                                                 
33 For more details see chapter five: Harmonization, 5.5.3.1. 
34 See Zaring, ‘International law by other Means’, above, n.24, 289. 
35  See Annexure C, above, n. 27, para.2. 
36 The charter members of IOSCO are the countries of the North American continent, Quebec and Ontario. The 
non-charter members are the other countries that have since joined the organization. See Samuel Wolff, ‘Recent 
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securities regulators, IOSCO expanded its membership to include regulators from all over the 
world, and currently has 189 members, together accounting for more than 90% of the world’s 
securities markets.37 IOSCO is a consensus-based organization, its principles and standards 
reflect the collective wisdom of regulators worldwide. 
 
The organizational structure of IOSCO includes the General Assembly, a General Secretary 
(and General Secretariat located at the Quebec Securities Commission), and various 
committees. IOSCO is governed by and its work done through a network of committees. 
There are four main committees, a president committee, an executive committee, a technical 
committee and an emerging markets committee.38 The Presidents Committee is the most 
powerful committee and consists of the presidents of all of the regular and associate 
members.39 The Presidents Committee meets once a year at the annual conference. It is 
responsible for approving all resolutions; such resolutions then become policies and 
pronouncements of IOSCO. The Presidents Committee also elects members of the Executive 
Committee.40  The Executive Committee is the principal governing body and consists of 
twelve representatives elected by the Presidents Committee; the chairs of the Emerging 
Markets and Technical Committees; and a representative from each of the regional standing 
committees.41 The Executive Committee meets throughout the year, focusing primarily on 
governance and management issues. 42   The Technical Committee is responsible for the 
promoting of “regulation which facilitates the process whereby world class issuers can raise 
capital in the most cost effective and efficient way in all capital markets.”43 Its members are 
the representatives of sixteen securities agencies of the larger and more developed markets in 
the world.44 The Technical Committee operates through five Working Groups, each of which 
is responsible for reviewing issues related to international securities regulation in a defined 
area and for making recommendations to the Technical Committee. The Technical Committee 
                                                                                                                                                         
Developments in International Securities Regulation’ (1995) 23 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 
400.  
37 See IOSCO website, available at: http://www.iosco.org/ (last visited, May 2007). 
38 Ibid. 
39 International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 1995 Annual Report (1996) [hereinafter 1995 
Report]. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 International Equity Offers, Report of the Technical Committee of IOSCO 7 (September 1989) (manuscript on 
file with IOSCO) [hereinafter International Equity Offers]. It was intended that the Technical Committee primary 
objective was “to summarize the key problems in regard to a number of regulatory frictions ... affecting 
international equity offers.” 
44 See 1995 Report. 
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in turn forwards the recommendations to the Presidents Committee and Executive Committee 
for approval and promulgation. 45  The defined areas for which the Working Groups are 
responsible include: (1) multinational disclosure and accounting; (2) regulation of secondary 
markets; (3) regulation of market intermediaries; (4) enforcement and exchange of 
information; and (5) investment management.46 The Emerging Markets Committee (formerly 
the Development Committee) is concerned with the problems of emerging markets.47 IOSCO 
describes its mission in this manner: The Emerging Markets Committee endeavours to 
promote the developing and improvement of efficiency of emerging securities markets by 
establishing principles and minimum standards, preparing training programs for the personnel 
of members and facilitating exchange of information and transfer of technology and 
expertise.48 Like the Technical Committee, it does its work through working groups assigned 
to areas paralleling those established by the Technical Committee. The defined areas for 
which the Emerging Markets Committee Working Groups are responsible include: disclosure 
and accounting, regulation of secondary markets, regulation of intermediaries, enforcement 
and the exchange of information and investment management.49 In addition, there are four 
Regional Committees which meet to discuss problems in their geographical areas. These are 
the Africa-Middle East Regional Committee, the Asia-Pacific Regional Committee, the 
European Regional Committee and the Inter-American Regional Committee. 50  The 
geographic areas least represented in IOSCO are Africa, the Middle East and former parts of 
the Soviet Union (other than Russia). 
 
Before 1994, IOSCO did not limit membership to prosperous countries as the Basle 
Committee does, and even offers membership to non-government regulators. In 1994, IOSCO 
took steps to limit new membership. It resolved that future applicants for membership would 
be required to confirm that “they will be able and willing to adhere to IOSCO’s principles.”51  
IOSCO has three classes of membership: ordinary, affiliate and associate which has 109, 69 
and 11 members individually.52 Ordinary members consist of either governmental regulators 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Jonathan Shirley, ‘International Law and the Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002’ (2004) 27   
Boston College International & Comparative Law Review, 501.  
52 See IOSCO website (last visited, May 2007). 
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of securities markets, or a self-regulatory agency, such as a stock exchange.53 Associate 
members are made up of associations of public regulatory bodies having jurisdiction in the 
subdivisions of a country when the national regulator is a member, such as the North 
American Securities Administrators Association.54 Affiliate members include international 
organizations whose goal is the regulation or the development of capital markets, or any other 
organization recommended by the Executive Committee.55 While affiliate members are not 
given voting privileges and may not attend meetings of the Presidents Committee or the 
Executive Committee, they are allowed to be members of the Technical Committee and its 
working parties. 
 
IOSCO has no charter and was not formed by treaty; instead, it was incorporated by a private 
bill of the Quebec National Assembly. Although the organization has continued to amend and 
develop its bylaws, the formal statement of purpose has not changed. The members 
committed: to cooperate together to ensure a better regulation of the markets, on domestic as 
well as on the international level, in order to maintain just and efficient markets; to exchange 
information on their respective experiences in order to promote the development of domestic 
markets; to unite their efforts to establish standards and an effective surveillance of 
international securities transactions; and to provide mutual assistance to ensure the integrity 
of the markets by a rigorous application of the standards and by effective enforcement against 
offenses.56 
 
In the course of IOSCO history, it has had a number of significant achievements. One of the 
most prominent was the adoption of its Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation in 
1998. 57 In the same year, another impressive achievement was the adoption of International 
Disclosure Standards for Cross-Border Offerings and Initial Listings by Foreign Issuers 
(International Disclosure Standards). 58  Then in 2002 the adoption of its Multilateral 
                                                 
53 See 1995 Report. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 See 1995 Report. 
57 For more details see chapter five: harmonization, 5.3.3. 
58 For more details see chapter five: harmonization, 5.5.1.3. 
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Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Regulatory Cooperation and the Exchange of 
Information59 was also a significant.  
In 2005 the Presidents Committee set a new strategic direction. That decision had two aims: to 
raise the standard and consistency of securities market regulation world-wide, and to increase 
the number of jurisdictions signed on to the IOSCO multilateral MOU. The direction set itself 
four key priorities.60 The first of these strategic priorities is its aim to confirm and develop 
IOSCO’s role as the global leader in regulatory standards setting. That means the organisation 
must be proactive in identifying and analysing issues as they emerge, and responding promptly 
in the most appropriate ways. As a second strategic priority IOSCO promotes the full 
implementation of its 30 broad Principles for securities regulation in the regulatory framework 
of every member jurisdiction. A third strategic priority for IOSCO relates to improving 
enforcement related cross-border co-operation. And the last of the four priorities is about 
engagement with industry, in other words IOSCO’s commitment to further develop and 
strengthen relationships with stakeholders.  
 
8.4.4 The International Accounting Standards Boards (IASB)  
 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) founded on April 1, 2001 is the 
successor of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) founded in June 1973 
in London. The roots for IASC establishment can be traced back to the first international 
accounting conference in St Louis, Missouri, in 1904.61 However, the momentum towards its 
establishment actually began in 1966 when a three nation study group - the Accountants 
International Study Group - was set up, comprising the UK, Canada and the United States.62 
Six years later, at the tenth International Accounting Congress, in Sydney, Australia, definitive 
plans were drawn up for establishing the IASC. This was duly done in June 1973.  
 
                                                 
59 For more details see chapter seven: cooperation, 7.5.4. 
60 Jane Diplock AO (Chairman, Executive Committee IOSCO), ‘IOSCO - Global Strategic Issues in Securities 
Regulation’ (Speech on International Investment Funds Association Annual Conference, Sydney, 1 November 
2007) available at: http://www.seccom.govt.nz/speeches/2007/jds011107.shtml. (last visited, September 2008). 
61 Samuels, J M and A G Piper , ‘International Accounting: A Survey’ (1986) 61 The Accounting Review, 359. 
62  IASC Insight ‘Lord Benson - IASC’s Creator’ (1995) The Newsletter of the International Standards 
Committee, March 31. 
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Between 1973 and 2000, international standards were issued by the IASC. During that period, 
the IASC’s rules were described as “International Accounting Standards” (IAS). After nearly 
25 years of achievement, IASC concluded in 1997 that to continue to perform its role 
effectively, it must find a way to bring about convergence between national accounting 
standards and practices and high-quality global accounting standards. To do that, IASC saw a 
need to change its structure. In late 1997 IASC formed a Strategy Working Party to re-
examine its structure and strategy. At their November 1999 Meeting, the IASC board 
unanimously supported a resolution that would radically change its structure and its standard-
setting machinery in the future. A new IASC constitution is expected to move the organization 
even closer to its goals. The new structure and due process are somewhat similar to the 
structure of the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board. A new constitution was adopted 
in May 2000. New structure includes two main bodies, the Trustees and the Board, as well as 
Standing Interpretations Committee and Standards Advisory Council.63 A board of trustees has 
19 members. The trustees appoint the IASC board members, exercise oversight, and raise the 
money needed to operate the IASC. The IASC board is to be geographically diverse. Twelve 
of the 14 members of the board will be full-time. To achieve a “balance of perspectives and 
experience,” IASC has mandated that at least five members shall have been auditors, at least 
three shall have a background in the preparation of financial statements, at least three shall 
have a background as users of financial statements, and at least one shall have an academic 
background.64 In addition, seven of the IASC board members are expected to have direct 
liaison responsibility with one or more national standard setters. A simple majority of voting 
members is required to approve new IASC accounting standards. 
 
Since April 2001, rule-making function has been taken over by a newly-reconstituted IASB.65 
IASB is an independent, privately funded accounting standard setting body. The IASB 
describes its rules under the new label “International Financial Reporting Standards” (IFRS), 
though it continues to recognize (accept as legitimate) the prior rules (IAS) issued by the old 
standard-setter (IASC). The IASB is better-funded, better-staffed and more independent than 
                                                 
63  See Acceptance From Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance With 
International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, Securities Act Release No. 
8818, 72 Fed. Reg. 37962, 37964. (July 11, 2007). 
64 1995 report. 
65 The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) Foundation was incorporated in 2001 as a not-for-
profit corporation in the State of Delaware, US. The IASC Foundation is the legal parent of the International 
Accounting Standards Board. 
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its predecessor, the IASC. Nevertheless, there has been substantial continuity across time in its 
viewpoint and in its accounting standards. IASB’s mission is to develop, in the public interest, 
a single set of high quality, understandable and international financial reporting standards 
(IFRSs) for general purpose financial statements.66 
 
Officially, the IASB cannot force anyone to follow its standards. Compliance is totally 
voluntary. During the past years, actions taken by the SEC, the European Commission of the 
European Union (EU), and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
contributed significantly to the acceptance and prestige of the IFRS. SEC involvement has 
been a key factor. On 2007, the SEC issued two significant documents. The first document, a 
final rule, 67  would affect foreign private companies whose securities are listed in the US. The 
final rule would eliminate the current requirement that the foreign private issuers which use 
IFRS must provide reconciliations of the differences in net income and shareholders’ equity 
under IFRS and U.S. GAAP.68 The second document is a concept release on allowing US 
companies the choice (equivalent to that available to non-US issuers) of preparing their 
financial statements using either IFRS or U.S. GAAP.69 Before the SEC had accepted the 
IFRS, the EU from 2005 onward had already required that all listed companies in the EU 
adopt IFRS (as approved by the EU). 70  In 2005, IOSCO announced that it would be 
recommending that its members allow multinational firms to use IFRS standards 
supplemented, where necessary, by reconciliation, disclosure, and interpretation--to address 
outstanding substantive issues at a country or regional level. 71 
 
 
                                                 
66 International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) website, available at: http://www.iasb.org/Home.htm. (last 
visited, September 2008). 
67 SEC Release No. 33-8879 (Final Rule: Acceptance From Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements 
Prepared In Accordance With International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation To U.S. 
GAAP) (December 21, 2007) (the “Adopting Release”),  
available at:  http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/33-8879.pdf (last visited, September 2008). 
68 Ibid. 
69 United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), ‘Concept Release On Allowing U.S. Issuers To 
Prepare Financial Statements In Accordance With International Financial Reporting Standards’ Concept Release 
No. 33-8831, issued August 7, 2007, available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2007/33-8831.pdf. 
70 The EU Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union on the application of 
international accounting standards was adopted in June, 2002. 
71 In 2005, IOSCO reaffirmed its support for IFRS. Press Release, Technical Comm. of the Int’l Org. of Sec. 
Comm’n, Statement on the Development and Use of International Financial Reporting Standards in 2005, (Feb. 
2005), available at: http://www.iasb.org/uploaded_ files/documents/10_286_ioscopd182-100205.pdf. 
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8.5 Who is going to Supervise International Securities Markets? 
 
Some consider an international regulatory agency to be the answer to the dilemmas posed by 
the internationalization of markets and proliferation of cross-border trading. 72  The 
international body would design regulatory policies to govern international transactions, police 
the international securities marketplace, and effectively enforce the rules.73 Most importantly, 
international enforcement would alleviate home country resistance to submitting to a foreign 
country’s domestic regulatory regime. The question is who should become the international 
regulatory agency? 
 
 8.5.1 The SEC  
 
The groups that favour the SEC’s expanding role in international regulation tend to be  
those who will benefit from the increase in foreign market investment that the  
SEC predicts will result from its policies.74 The major supporters of the SEC’s regulation are 
securities lawyers, accountants, and others who prepare documents, and financial analysts, 
portfolio managers and other securities market professionals who benefit from these efforts.75  
Foreign regulators’ cool reception of the SEC’s plan to regulate foreign broker-dealers 
implies that some major disagreements between the U.S. and other countries over 
international securities regulation are on the horizon. Other countries will continue to object 
to the SEC’s erosion of their sovereignty. 
 
Unfortunately for the SEC, its policies do not enjoy worldwide support. Critics argue that 
extensive U.S. securities regulation actually disadvantages U.S. issuers and markets76 and that 
duplicative regulation causes “positive transaction costs”77 to all investors. The assumption of 
this role becomes problematic when the SEC imposes its regulatory regime on foreign 
markets. Critics argue that “more uniform regulation of international markets would benefit 
                                                 
72 See Lewis D. Solomon & Louise Corso, ‘The Impact of Technology on the Trading of Securities: The 
Emerging Global Market and the Implications For Regulation’ (1991) 24 John Marshall Law Review, 338 
73 Ibid. 
74 See Regulation of Exchanges, SEC Concept Release No. 34-38672, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) P85,942, at 89,684 (May 23, 1997). 
75 Matthew F. Gorra, ‘ON-Line Trading and United States Securities Policy: Evaluating the SEC’S Role in 
International Securities Regulation’ (1998) 32 Cornell International Law Journal, 232. 
76 James D. Cox, ‘Rethinking U.S. Securities Law in the Shadow of International Regulatory Competition’ 
(1992) 55 Law & Contemparative. Problems, 157.   
77 Gorra, ‘On-Line Trading’, above, n.75. 
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investors……, [but] the uniform system the SEC advocates is one patterned on the American 
model”. 78  Once the SEC is permitted to promulgate rules that infringe upon foreign 
sovereignties, it violates norms of international law. Under the non-intervention doctrine, each 
state has a duty not to intervene in the internal affairs of other states. 79  
 
Furthermore, the efficient regulation requires that the domain of the regulator should be the 
same as the domain of the market that is regulated. 80  The SEC, however, is a US federal 
agency; thus, it is dependent upon and at the mercy of the US Congress. It conducts itself in 
the best interest of US markets, not global markets. As a national regulator, SEC obviously is 
not the best candidate for international regulator. 
 
8.5.2 The IOSCO  
 
Both the rules of the Basle Committee and the IASB in the international securities regulation 
are limited and narrow. The Basle Committee more likely is an international banking 
institution which provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters. 
IASB is just focused on harmonizing international accounting standards. It is not realistic to 
expect them to take full responsibility to cover the whole international securities field. IOSCO 
is the international organization of stock exchanges supervisors. In this sense it complements 
the Basle Committee and IASB that are more specialized in banking and accounting. In 
comparing them, IOSCO is better suited as a leader in international securities regulation. 
There are three specific reasons: its global commitment, its independence, and its reputation. 
First, unlike the SEC, IOSCO is not committed to one specific market. Although many 
organizations have been formed in response to the globalization of the capital markets, 
IOSCO’s membership includes the securities regulators of scores of countries,81 thus making it 
the most important of these organizations. IOSCO’s focus is specifically international 
securities trading and the international market. Second, IOSCO lacks self-interest because it 
holds no allegiance to one specific country or market. As a result, IOSCO can exercise 
independence in making decisions in the best interest of the global market. Finally, regardless 
                                                 
78 Paul G. Mahoney, ‘Securities Regulation By Enforcement: An International Perspective’ (1990) 7 Yale Journal 
on Regulation, 306. 
79 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 5th ed (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1998), 293. 
80 See Eatwell, ‘New issues’, above, n.1. 
81 For more details see IOSCO website, it states that IOSCO expanded its membership to include regulators from 
all over the world, and currently has 189 members, together accounting for more than 90% of the world’s 
securities markets. 
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of periodic struggles, IOSCO is successful in setting international securities regulation 
standards. For example, IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation is 
recognized today by the world financial community as international benchmarks for all 
markets. Furthermore, IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning 
Consultation and the Exchange of Information (IOSCO MMOU) is the first global 
information-sharing arrangement among securities regulators; it sets a new international 
benchmark for cooperation critical to combating violations of securities and derivatives laws. 
IOSCO MMOU is an attractive and respected option for countries looking to partake in a 
global market. SEC officials note the importance of IOSCO as a forum for promoting 
cooperation and the spread and strengthening of securities law to new areas of the globe. The 
SEC is not the only group or individual following IOSCO. At the IOSCO’s annual conference, 
large numbers of persons in the securities industry, lawyers, and others interested in 
international financial matters attend as observers. This “following” suggests that IOSCO is a 
regulatory body that commands the attention of groups and individuals who hold an interest in 
the international securities industry. For these reasons, IOSCO would best serve as the lead 
governing body for international securities regulation. 
 
Although IOSCO has many advantages, that are its size and diversity, there are some 
problems. IOSCO has not been recognized as an international organization by international 
law. On a basic level, international law defines international organizations by state 
membership, tangible manifestations of organizational bureaucracy, and an adequate legal 
pedigree.82 All three attributes are lacking in the IOSCO. Moreover, IOSCO do not meet the 
standards for international organizations set by legal literature and settled practice. 
 
First, IOSCO does not look like a traditional international organization as defined by the 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. The Restatement 
suggests that an international organization “is created by an international agreement and has a 
membership consisting entirely or principally of states” 83and that “statehood . . . is generally a 
minimum qualification for membership in international organizations”. 84  One leading 
                                                 
82 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 221, cmt. b reporter’s note 6 (1987) 
[hereinafter Restatement] 
83Ibid. 
84 Restatement, § 222 cmt. a. The Restatement recognizes that some international organizations may include non-
state participants, but suggests that those participants would include “territories and possessions of member states 
that are not themselves states”, such as in the Universal Postal Union, or “delegations of member states 
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casebook defines international organizations as “organizations composed entirely or mainly of 
states and usually established by treaty”. 85  The members of IOSCO do not act as 
representatives of national governments, but as substate actors. The members explicitly view 
themselves as representatives of their bureaucratic employer, rather than their national 
government. In addition, IOSCO are not created by a treaty but by a less formal promulgation 
of bylaws. IOSCO similarly derives its legal existence from a private bill passed by the 
Quebec National Assembly. 86  
 
Secondly, IOSCO has flexible internal organization. The casual beginnings of IOSCO are 
matched by an informal approach to internal rules and restrictions. IOSCO has promulgated 
bylaws, but those laws are permissive and open-ended, rather than restrictive and definitive. 
IOSCO’s bylaws grant the Presidents Committee “all the powers necessary to achieve the 
purpose of the Organization”, 87 while its Executive Committee “takes all decisions necessary 
to achieve the purpose of the Organization . . . .”88 The enabling tenor of the bylaws of both 
organizations, comparable to bylaws a business might pass for itself, suggests that the 
organizations should be viewed as conduits for ongoing and flexible relationships. 89  By 
contrast, other international organizations have much more formal rules of order. The UN 
General Assembly, for example, has promulgated over 160 rules of procedure. 90  These 
flexible internal arrangements suggest that IOSCO is not concerned with a carefully delineated 
power-sharing arrangement. It focuses on the content of the resulting promulgations, rather 
than a sense that fair, or at least acceptably clear, procedures were used to create the 
supranational standard. Observers have concluded that this flexibility has also enabled the 
                                                                                                                                                         
includ[ing] representatives” from bodies of private citizens, such as the International Labor Organization. Id. § 
221, cmt. c. 
85 See Louis Henkin et al., International Law: Cases and Materials  3rd edition  (1993),344. 
86 See An Act Respecting the International Organization of Securities Commissions, ch. 143, 1987 S.Q. 2424, 
2437-38 (Can.). 
87 IOSCO By-Laws, pt. 4, para. 15. 
88 Id. pt. 5, para. 26. 
89To be sure, the bylaws IOSCO do impose some limitations on their operations--a maximum number of 
members on the management committees is specified in both cases, for example, as are broad aims such as to 
“enhance the ability of insurance supervisors to better protect insurance policyholders,” IAIS By-Laws, pmbl., or 
to “cooperate...in order to maintain just and efficient markets”. IOSCO By-Laws, pmbl. Generally, majority votes 
effect changes of policy for both organizations, although IOSCO requires a two-thirds vote to amend its bylaws. 
See IOSCO By-Laws,, pt. 4, para. 21(l). However, the existence of majoritarian processes in IOSCO and IAIS 
distinguishes both organizations from the Basle Committee, which apparently relies on consensus among its 12 
members. Consensus may have helped to drive the effectiveness of the implementation of Basle’s capital accord, 
while IOSCO’s resolutions have been less likely to be enacted by its members. See IOSCO Annual Report 1994, 
at 8. 
90 See Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, reprinted in Basic Documents of the United Nations 41-67 
(Louis B. Sohn ed., 1968). 
  
215
 
most important financial regulators to have a central role in IOSCO. “The United States, 
European Union, and Japan control” IOSCO, according to Gary Klieman.91 And Tony Porter 
believes that the SEC plays an overwhelmingly influential role in IOSCO.92  
 
Finally, the Restatement suggests that international organizations, once constituted, possess 
“status as a legal person, with capacity to own, acquire, and transfer property, to make 
contract”, and the like. 93 IOSCO lack much in legal status, it does not have legislative and 
enforcement authority. Most of the international standards, rules, principles, guidelines, 
codes of conduct, best practices, and other arrangements governing cross-border financial 
relations can be characterized as ‘soft law’. 94  The international standards of securities 
regulation which promulgated by IOSCO are not an exception to soft law. Different from 
‘hard law’ which is formal and enforceable, soft law expresses a preference and not an 
obligation that states should act, or should refrain from acting, in a specified manner.95 
Although soft law is not legally enforceable, they have often proven to be effective in finding 
their way into national law. In a sense, IOSCO has indirect force through mechanisms such 
as the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). FSAP, a joint International Monetary 
Found (IMF) and World Bank effort introduced in May 1999, aims to increase the 
effectiveness of efforts to promote the soundness of financial systems in member countries.96 
FSAP will assess a country’s compliance with and observance of IOSCO’s standards. In 
October 2003, IOSCO released the Methodology for Assessing the Implementation of the 
IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation.97 This Methodology is intended 
to provide guidance on the conduct of a self-assessment or third party assessment of the level 
of implementation of the International Organization of Securities Commission’s Objectives 
and Principles of Securities Regulation.98 IOSCO Methodology provides a comprehensive 
                                                 
91 Gary N. Klieman, ‘Better Forum Needed to Negotiate Terms of Foreign Competition’ American Banker, Jan. 
4, 1996, at 5. 
92 See Tony Porter, States, Markets, and Regimes in Global Finance (1993) 66, at 122-23. 
93 Restatement, supra note 23, § 223(a). See also Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. Pleadings, 
at 151, 168 (July 20, 1962) (discussing fiscal powers and responsibilities of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations). On the legal rights of international organizations generally, see Henkin et al., above, n.85, at 344-68. 
94 Mario Giovanoli, ‘A New Architecture for the Global Financial Markets: Legal Aspects of International 
Financial Standard Setting’ in Mario Giovanoli (ed), International Monetary Law. Issues for the New Millennium 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 33. 
95 Joseph Gold, Interpretation: The IMF and International Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), 
31. 
96 International Monetary Fund, ‘Financial Sector Assessment Program’ available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/fsap.asp. 
97 See IOSCO website, http://www.iosco.org/library. 
98 Ibid. 
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framework for analyzing implementation of the principles.99 Furthermore in order to help 
achieve implementation IOSCO provides technical assistance, advice and training to 
members. It is also concerned to see regulators who can effectively enforce international 
securities regulation standards through co-operation and information exchange.  In today’s 
global capital markets cross- border enforcement cooperation is essential. SEC Chairman 
William Donaldson said, “The SEC has long recognized that international cooperation is 
vital to an effective enforcement program. The IOSCO MOU is an important contribution to 
cross-border enforcement cooperation and a public statement that the world’s securities 
regulators are committed to assisting one another in preventing and prosecuting violations of 
our securities laws.”100 But soft law is soft law. The key element for distinguishing between 
hard and soft law is enforcement.101 IOSCO promulgations have less force than do those of a 
traditionally defined international organization. When states violate legal obligations to 
international organizations as covered by the Restatement, they are obligated to provide 
redress.102 But the promulgations of the IOSCO considered here is in theory not binding on 
member states. Regulators have claimed that nothing they do in the organizations is legally 
binding. “We can’t bind the United States”, observed one SEC regulator who has participated 
in IOSCO. 103  The lack of effective enforcement is the eternal problem of international 
financial soft law.104 This is also the foremost disadvantages of IOSCO.  
IOSCO, therefore, cannot create the legal obligations to which traditional international 
organizations are entitled. IOSCO thus do not qualify as traditional international organizations 
under the definition of the Restatement or other leading texts, and are not subject to the rights 
and duties of international organizations. It has not authority to impose its recommendations 
on regulators and frequently finds it difficult to obtain a consensus amongst regulators. 
Solutions are often worked out informally before being drafted as agreements between the 
concerned parties. Discussions at IOSCO conferences often can result in bilateral or 
multilateral solutions to regulatory problems.  
 
                                                 
99 World Bank and International Monetary Found, Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook (Washington, 
2005), 145. 
100 SEC, ‘SEC Announces IOSCO Unveiling of Multilateral Agreement on Enforcement Cooperation’, available 
at: http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-145.htm. 
101 Rosa M. Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability (New York, Oxford University Press, 
2006), 454. 
102 See Restatement, § 901 cmt. a. 
103 See Pistor, ‘The Standardization of Law’, above, n.4. 
104 See Lastra, Legal Foundations above, n.101, 460. 
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8.5.3 Lessons Learned From the EU 
 
Within the EU, at a member state level there are many powerful regulators who do excellent 
work promulgating listings and offering rules for the national markets, but there is little 
coordination at the EU level. As a result, there exists a regulatory vacuum for cross-border 
offerings. The EU needs a single regulator to create a single securities market. It needs a single 
regulator to coordinate and to impose the necessary regulatory reforms to develop a well-
functioning, cross-border securities market and to represent the interests of European issuers 
and investors in international forums. This situation of the EU is very similar to that of the 
international securities regulation. Both regulatory domains are composed of member from 
various states. Much can be learned from the experience gained within the EU.  This would 
include lessons learned from their failures. EU efforts are not only important in their own right 
but have offered a model, and an experimental laboratory, as to how regulation might be 
formulated and implemented in the international system at large. 
The idea of a European Securities and Exchange Commission (ESEC) is not new: Hopt argued 
in 1976 that such an institution should be considered and Walter recently stated that it would 
be unavoidable if Europe is serious about having a single financial market.105 The support for 
the creation of an ESEC is growing. 
 
The ESEC is likely to differ from the current EU institutional structure in three important 
ways. First, neither representatives of Member State governments nor the European 
Commission will have direct control over the ESEC, and in that sense it will be independent 
and autonomous. Second, it will have decision-making powers going beyond those currently 
obtained by either the ESC or CESR. Finally, the ESEC will have some enforcement powers.  
 
Its role could initially be relatively limited, with further developments subject to a step-by-step 
approach. The most likely way to effect the transition from the Lamfalussy structure towards 
an ESEC, will be via the ESC or CESR obtaining progressively more powers. Indeed, CESR is 
already the front-runner to take on a transition role to form the basis for the ESEC for several 
                                                 
105 Hopt, Klaus J., ‘Third Theme: The Necessity of Co-ordinating or Approximating Economic Legislation, or of 
Supplementing or Replacing It by Community Law - A Report’ (1976) 13 Common Market Law Review 245 
Walter, Norbert, ‘The Banking Supervision Issue in Europe’ (2001) Briefing Paper for the Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) of the European Parliament. 
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reasons. CESR is independent of Member States, in the sense that representatives on CESR 
are mostly not part of their respective governments. The members of CESR have an expertise 
in regulating securities markets, whereas the representatives of the ESC are highly placed 
bureaucrats in Member States’ economics or finance ministries. The creation of the ESEC will 
similarly only be possible if it too obtains wide political support. However, universal support 
throughout the EU will not be necessary for its creation.  
 
Opponents for an ESEC have doubled the viability of such a body on constitutional grounds 
and also fear the enormous costs required in setting up and operating it. ESEC sceptics have 
furthermore argued that the notion of supra-national supervisor is not a pragmatic solution.106 
It is argued that given the fragmented nature of Europe’s securities markets, it is untenable 
since such an idea presupposes that Member States are willing to make political concessions 
as well as complete harmonized regulation, technologies and infrastructure. There is an 
immediate need first for more harmonization of securities market regulation. However, often 
the same opponents see the benefits of a single national regulator for  various market 
segments, as it offers ‘one-stop shopping’ for market participants with improved economies of 
scale as a result of pooled resources and management, lower supervisory costs and more 
transparent to consumers than with a fragmented system.  Already this rationale has been 
entrenched in various European countries (e.g. United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway, Iceland, Finland) as well as far a field as Japan and South Korea107 more recently. If 
this reasoning is correct at a national level, it should logically apply at the European level, in 
the context of a single currency, a single market, free capital flows and an increasingly global 
market place.  
 
The barriers to establishing a pan-European single regulator are numerous. Support for 
subsidiary remains strong in Europe. Very few countries are willing to give up regulatory 
control of their capital markets, even though the evidence shows they already have. The 
challenge for Europe is to create a single European regulator that has the authority and 
resources to drive the formation of a single European securities market is another challenge. 
The single European securities regulator needs powers similar to those of the SEC, including 
                                                 
106 See for example, Karel Lannoo, ‘ A European SEC? (Part II)’ (march 2000) FRR, p.1; James W F Walson, 
‘International Co-operation in the Field of Financial Regulatory Enforcement, Part 2—the EU Services 
Regulator’ (2000) JIBFL 15 (1), p.13; Clive Briault, ‘The Rationale for a Single National Financial Services 
Regulator’ Financial Services Authority Occasional Paper Series No. 2, (May 1999). 
107  Ibid, See Clive Briault, ‘Single Regulator’, 11-12. 
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rule-making powers. The single regulator cannot rely on member states to implement its rules 
but must have direct rule-making authority over the entire European market. The single 
regulator must also have enforcement powers. Without enforcement powers, the regulator will 
not be able to ensure that issuers carry out its regulations effectively. The EU institutions lack 
the legislative and regulatory tools they need to act as, or to create, a successful securities 
regulator. Even if a regulator surmounts the political and institutional hurdles, it must develop 
common regulations and policies for all countries in the European Economic Area, countries 
divided by culture and legal tradition. Member states must be willing to give up their desire 
for documents translated in their local language and agree on common definitions of 
professionals and retail investors. At the same time, new regulations must be understandable 
and effective in both the common law and civil law traditions, particularly with regard to legal 
issues such as fiduciary duty, enforceability of contract, and corporate control. By no means 
will these barriers be easy to overcome.  
 
Just as is true of the EU, there is no doubt that there is a need for an international securities 
regulator. However, there are many barriers to be overcome. Therefore, before establishing a 
formal international regulator, the intermediary step of regional integration could be 
employed, this would offer an alternative to going directly to international securities 
regulation. Regional integration also gives developing countries the opportunity to build their 
own governance according to their needs and stage of development.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
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This thesis has assessed the concept and history of the securities market, the securities 
exchange, securities regulation and the securities regulator. This thesis does not view the 
securities markets and the securities exchanges as one and the same thing, although quite often 
the terms are used interchangeably in the academic articles. The reason for this is discussed in 
Chapter 1. A securities exchange has different roles: it can be viewed as a firm, as a regulator 
and as a regulated entity. In this respect the securities market and securities exchange are 
different.  Building on this theory, the paper has examined the characteristics and 
developments of securities markets and securities exchanges separately.  
 
The history of the securities market proves that it is very important to have both securities 
regulation and regulators in order for the system to operate successfully. The securities market 
is an ‘engine’ of general financial development. It plays a crucial role in economic growth and 
financial stability. The securities market’s strong relationship with economic growth 
underlines the importance of the need for regulation.  However, unfortunately, initially the 
securities market was in essence unregulated. After financial crises and scandals occurred, 
government regulation was called for and introduced. It has obviously taken some time to 
develop a proper independent securities regulation. Until the 1930s modern securities 
regulation in a systematic and sophisticated form first started in the US. Furthermore, the 
protection of investors; ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent; and the 
reduction of systemic risk became the core objectives of securities regulation. In order to 
function effectively, securities regulation would logically require a regulator. In the past 
securities exchanges were used as the main regulator but as time moved on, it was proven that 
relying solely on securities exchanges as regulators brought more risks. It is now widely 
accepted that the existence of a public entity charged with the regulation and supervision of 
the market and market participants is key to the healthy development of markets. But this does 
not mean that securities exchanges loose their regulator identification completely, they still 
undertake some responsibilities. A national financial regulator has five main tasks: (1) 
authorization of market participants; (2) the provision of information to enhance market 
transparency (3) surveillance to ensure that the regulatory code is obeyed; (4) enforcement of 
the code and disciplining of transgressors and (5) the development of policy that keeps the 
regulatory code up to date. Three distinct models of allocation of regulatory powers can be 
identified: Government-led Model, Flexibility Model and Cooperation Model.  
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In the past the most difficult task of the financial regulator has been to keep up with the 
changing market place that he or she is supposed to be to regulating. As discussed in Chapter 3 
the effect of internationalization was to change the world we live in completely, therefore even 
the securities markets could not avoid its influence.  Securities markets are closely linked and 
work in a systemic way therefore no market can function in isolation from others. Today 
securities markets around the world are more connected than ever before. The direct benefit of 
the internationalization of securities markets is access to markets, which would be otherwise 
inaccessible. Starting in the 1980s, many firms chose to raise capital or list their shares in 
foreign markets. Today many securities transactions have cross-border elements therefore an 
entirely domestic transaction is likely to become increasingly less common. 
Internationalization has also made the competition stronger and as a result that competition 
has brought many changes to the securities exchange. Traditionally, securities exchanges were 
member-owned and self-regulatory. Most major exchanges have now converted into for-profit 
companies and develop corporate strategy to expand their activity at international level in 
order to become more profitable. In most cases they have become public, i.e. listed on their 
own Exchange. By October 2006, 19 Exchanges or holding companies had obtained public 
listings. The result of demutualization is that the commercial nature of the exchange becomes 
more evident.  When securities exchanges convert to for-profit businesses this also results in 
an increase of conflicting interests.  These for-profit exchanges have become the dominant 
providers of securities markets the world over. International securities markets have also 
already witnessed the consolidation of different markets from different regions in the world. 
NYSE Euronext is the first international Exchange to operate in both Europe and the United 
States. Following NYSE Euronext, is Nasdaq OMX, another international consolidation. The 
tides of consolidation clearly show that the securities exchanges of the world are uniting. The 
economic benefit of exchange consolidation is to concentrate trading on a single platform. 
They have several potential benefits: cost savings; increased liquidity; reducing the transaction 
costs of purchasing foreign securities; and diversification of the exchange’s business into new 
product areas. Benefits or opportunities, however, are always accompanied with risks. Trading 
in securities markets, whether carried out domestically or across national boundaries, always 
involve risks.  Compared with trading in a strictly domestic setting many of these risks are 
heightened at international level. There are several kinds of risks involved: credit risk, 
liquidity risk, position risk, operational risk, legal risk and systemic risk. The most important 
is system risk, particularly in the field of international securities regulation. If a large 
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productive firm goes bankrupt, it naturally affects its employees and the economy, however, it 
does not trigger an economic crisis. On the other hand, if a large financial intermediary fails, 
the “domino effect” can lead to the collapse of the whole financial system, which can then 
ripple through the whole economy.  A recent example of this was the Federal Reserve Rescue 
of AIG, the world’s largest insurer, which had links to all major securities markets. It follows 
that in an international market economy the effect of a systemic run down or failure would be 
massive.  
 Following the above discussion, it becomes necessary to consider the role and position of the 
regulatory body in an international securities market. In a competitive marketplace, regulators 
cannot afford to be either insular or parochial in the way they go about making public policy 
decisions regarding what constitutes prudent regulation and what are acceptable levels of risk. 
Regulatory diversity should not be endorsed without a firm commitment by International 
Regulators to cooperatively ensure that the agreed rules of the game, which may need to 
evolve, are understood, accepted and observed. The development of comprehensive, global 
securities regulation is essential and would achieve two main objectives: (1) the enhancement 
of international economics through capital formation; and (2) the avoidance of an international 
economic crisis 
In response to the need for effective regulation, three approaches have been explored in this 
paper, namely: harmonization, competition and cooperation. It has to be acknowledged that 
these three very different regulatory approaches all have produced some successful results in 
the jurisdictions where they have been employed. Regarding harmonization, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, both the European Union and the International Organization of Securities 
Commission have made significant progress in adopting general disclosure and accounting 
standards for various public companies. For example, international accounting standards, now 
serve as a universal language for investors to help them better compare their investment 
options. International disclosure norms help establish a universal expectation for market 
participants around the world. Chapter 6 discussed competition. There is ample evidence 
indicating that competition could lead to both a race to the top and to increased specialization. 
A more likely possibility, however, is that regulatory competition will lead to a spectrum of 
varying standards. The simple reason for this is that different issuers and investors may have 
different preferences. High quality issuers and investors willing to pay a premium may select 
countries that supply strong regulatory standards and stringent disclosure rules, while investors 
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who are less risk-adverse and issuers wanting a relatively inexpensive means to raise capital 
may be drawn to more lenient regimes. One thing for certain is that as the world financial 
system becomes more multi-polar, the United States will gradually lose its superior 
position within that system. With regard to cooperation which was explored in Chapter 7,  a 
considerable progress has been made similar to that of harmonization. SEC has entered into 
more than thirty cooperative arrangements. European securities regulators also have utilized 
MOUs extensively; a fine example is the Euronext Regulatory MOU which has been adopted 
in 2001. The following year 2002, the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding 
(“MMOU”) was adopted. It is the first global information-sharing agreement among securities 
regulators. It sets a new international benchmark for cooperation critical to combating 
violations of securities and derivatives laws. Through cooperation, the various nations learned 
from each other’s experiences about what works, and what hasn’t. 
But there is no one system which will work in all jurisdictions.  Of the three securities 
regulatory models this paper has analyzed, none is perfect. As long as there are regulations, 
there will be abuses and room for improvements. They all have disadvantages. In the regional 
level, reforms of the EU legislative framework for constructing a single market in financial 
services are still underway. Progress towards an effective international standard, which is 
meaningful, specific and that applies to all aspects of securities regulations, has been 
slow.  Little has been done to harmonize enforcement. The directives provide for cooperation 
among authorities, but it is likely that some member states will have stronger enforcement 
than others and some will have almost none. The opposite view asserts that harmonization 
could lead to excessive regulation without sufficient corresponding regulatory benefits. The 
main problem with harmonization is that although international regulators can usually agree 
on the basic goals and objectives of regulation, there exists fundamental differences in the 
regulatory approaches taken, including the form and content of regulation. Therefore, to find a 
single solution that will be viable for every country is an arduous task. Additionally the 
harmonization process is not cost free.  
 
The “race to the bottom” phenomenon is perhaps the most well known criticism of the 
regulatory competition model. It is said that regulators in competing for multinational 
offerings will have an incentive to lower their regulatory standards and offer lax disclosure 
rules so as to attract foreign issuers into their markets by lowering their compliance costs. The 
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result is a race to the bottom in regulatory standards. In Chapter 6, statistics showed that the 
United States’ securities markets were losing its leading competitive position when it was 
compared to other securities markets abroad. In contrast to its failure AIM seems to be the 
complete success story. It has a lower entrance level and a more flexible regulatory 
environment.  This has resulted in the thinking that there is a race to the bottom, but this is 
based on appearances only. 
  
Opponents for cooperation argue that efforts on the part of countries to construct workable 
international cooperation into securities regulation, although fine in theory, are most likely to 
fail. Although the SEC has met with some success in gaining cooperation from other countries 
regarding insider trading laws, international cooperation remains limited.  
 
In international securities regulation, apart from the approach itself, there are common 
problems that exist among all three regulatory approaches. One problem is that international 
securities regulation as it exists today is biased in favour of the most powerful countries, in 
particular the US.  The US securities regulation became the “regulatory gospel”. A striking 
result of international cooperation is the diffusion of SEC style regulatory rules and practices 
around the world. The US promotes a regulation that protects and improves the interests of 
their own securities markets. The SEC regulators believe that the SEC has a responsibility to 
assume a leadership role in international securities regulation. They believe their form of 
regulation is the best in the world and want the world securities markets to benefit from its 
superior form of governance.  Therefore, the SEC is very positive about exporting their 
regulation model. This kind of unilateral approach may impede any attempt at harmonization 
and cooperation with regard to regulation. 
 
Another problem is that contrary to international trade, which is formally and legally ruled by 
binding laws adopted at the WTO, there is no official international securities regulation 
institution providing formal governance and defining of official laws by which international 
securities regulation can be ruled. Instead of a formal international securities regulator there is 
a set of international institutions, which include a limited number of countries, which produce 
standards and norms that are then adopted by national authorities on a voluntary basis. All the 
international securities regulation institutions lack legislative authority. Because of the 
diversity, complexity, and universality of issues likely to continue to arise over the next 
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decade, a single international body with legislative authority should be considered to facilitate 
world cooperation in addressing these issues. 
 
In the light of previous experience, an international securities regulator should be established. 
The new international regulator could be a brand new institution or could be a radical reform 
of the IOSCO. Before establishing a formal international regulator, regional integration offers 
an alternative to international securities regulation. The experiences of the EU offer a model 
for international securities regulations. It has long ago established common institutions and 
regulations to create a single European financial market. Regional integration also gives 
developing countries the opportunity to build their own governance according to their needs 
and stage of development.  
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Appendix 
6-1 The Main board listing requirements (1)1 
             
 NYSE LSE 
Shares market 
capitalization 
$40 million Not less than £700,000 
Financial record N/A 3 years 
Financial 
performance 
Pre-tax income (the latest 
year)$2.5million,  every year 
$2 million for two years; every 
year has profit for preceding 
three years, total pre-tax 
income is $6.5 million, the 
latest year>=$4.5million 
a sound well-managed business a 
relatively consistent record of 
revenues and profits 
Accounting 
standards 
US GAAP UK GAAP, US GAAP, IFRS 
Periodic 
Disclosure 
requirements 
Quarterly, half-year and yearly 
report 
Half-year and yearly report 
Corporate 
Governance 
The requirements of NYSE 
new rules, Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
The requirements of The 
Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance2 
Listing fees High High 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Source: the website of NYSE, LSE, HKSE, SGX:  available at: http://www.nyse.com/; 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/en-gb/; http://www.hkex.com.hk/issuer/listhk/glossary.htm; 
http://www.sgx.com/ 
2Not apply for foreign companies seconary listing. 
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   6-2 The Main board listing requirements (2)3 
 
 HKSE SGX 
Shares market 
capitalization 
Not less than HK$100 
million 
Alternative34:Singapore$80milion alternative 
1 and 2 there is no requirement 
Financial 
record 
3 years 3 years (Standard 3,  Standard 1 and 2 there is 
no requirement) 
Financial 
performance 
3 years>= HK$50 
million, the most recent 
year>=HK$20million 
 
pre-tax profit> alternative 1: Singapore$7.5 
million over three years; at least S$1million 
each year; alternative 2: S$10million in 1 or 2 
years; Alternative 3 there is no requirement 
Accounting 
standards 
HK GAAP, IFRS, UK 
GAAP, US GAAP 
US GAAP,IFRS,SAS 
Periodic 
Disclosure 
requirements 
Half-year and yearly 
report 
Half-year and yearly report 
 
Corporate 
Governance 
The requirements of 
Hong Kong Companies 
Ordinance 
Similar to UK Combined Code 
Listing fees High Low 
                                                 
3 Source: The website of NYSE, LSE, HKSE, SGX:  available at: http://www.nyse.com/; 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/en-gb/; http://www.hkex.com.hk/issuer/listhk/glossary.htm; 
http://www.sgx.com/ 
4 A company may apply for a Main Board listing based on any one of the three alternative criteria. 
Alternative 1 criterion 
- cumulative consolidated pre-tax profit of at least S$7.5 million for the latest three years, and a minimum pre-tax 
profit of S$1.0 million for each of those three years; 
- applicant must be under substantially the same management throughout the last three years. 
Alternative 2 criterion 
- cumulative consolidated pre-tax profit of at least S$10 million for the latest one or two years; 
- applicant must be under substantially the same management throughout the one year or two years, as the case 
may be. 
Alternative 3 criterion 
- market capitalisation of at least S$80 million based on the issue price and post-flotation issued capital. 
- continuity of management is not required. Management should, however, have the appropriate experience and 
expertise to manage the group’s business. 
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6-3 Second markets listing rules (1)5 
 AIM GEM SESDAQ 
Minimum 
public float 
 
No 
minimum 
requireme
nt 
Minimum of 100 or 300 
shareholders with 20% to 25% 
of shares with a minimum 
market value of US$3.8m or 
US$128m held by the public 
(depending on 
circumstances) 
 
Greater than 0.5m 
issued shares or 15% of 
issued shares held by a 
minimum of 500 public 
shareholders 
 
Initial equity 
required 
 
No 
minimum 
requireme
nt 
No minimum requirement No minimum 
requirement 
Market 
capitalizatio
n 
 
No 
minimum 
requireme
nt 
Minimum of US$5.9m or 
US$64m (depending on 
circumstances) 
 
No minimum 
requirement 
Trading 
history 
 
No 
minimum 
requireme
nt 
Minimum of 24 months 
(reduced to 12 months if 
additional requirements are 
met) 
 
If no track record, new 
projects must be fully 
researched and costed 
 
Financial 
performance 
No 
minimum 
requireme
nt 
No minimum requirement No minimum 
requirement but 
business is expected to 
be viable and profitable, 
with good growth 
prospects 
 
Accounting 
standards 
 
UK 
GAAP/IF
RS/US 
GAAP 
 
HK GAAP/US GAAP/IFRS 
 
Singapore FRS/US 
GAAP/IFRS 
 
Interview 
with 
exchange 
 
No No Yes 
 
                                                 
5 Source: Grant Thornton’s 2006 Global new markets guide-insight into international capital markets, Available 
at: http://www.gti.org/publications/markets.asp 
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6-4 Second markets listing rules (2)6 
 
 NASDAQ National Market 
 
NASDAQ Capital Market 
 
Minimum public float 
 
Minimum of 400 
shareholders Minimum of 
1.1m shares publicly 
held with a minimum 
market value 
of US$8 - 20m depending 
upon 
listing route 
 
 
Minimum of 300 
shareholders 
 
Initial equity required 
 
US$0 - 30m depending 
upon 
listing route 
 
US$5m 
 
Market capitalization 
 
Minimum of US$75m 
 
Minimum of US$50m 
 
Trading history 
 
0 - 2 years depending upon 
listing route 
 
1 year 
 
Financial performance No minimum requirement 
 
No minimum requirement
Accounting standards 
 
US GAAP 
 
US GAAP 
 
Interview with 
exchange 
 
No 
 
No 
 
                                                 
6 Source: Grant Thornton’s 2006 Global new markets guide-insight into international capital markets, Available 
at: http://www.gti.org/publications/markets.asp. 
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